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**ORIGINS OF MODERN GERMAN
COLONIALISM**

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**ORIGINS OF MODERN GERMAN
COLONIALISM**

1871-1885

BY

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TO

MY PARENTS

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PREFACE

"Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles to her overseas possessions."¹

The Great War brought to an abrupt conclusion the colonial history of modern Germany. It is a history whose facts are now complete, but whose story is as yet untold.

The present study is an effort to write the first chapter of the story, to trace the beginnings of modern German colonialism. It is designed to embrace only the first fifteen years of the empire and to include nothing in the history of Prussia, except in so far as Prussian influence affected imperial action.

To be sure, the years from 1871 to 1885 antedate the adoption of official colonization; for it was not until April 24, 1884, that Bismarck proclaimed imperial protection over the settlements of the merchant Lüderitz in Southwest Africa; yet these earlier years are important in two respects. Abroad, they marked the first steps of expansion which generally introduce in any country a colonial policy, such as the establishment of trading stations, factories, plantations, naval bases and favorable commercial treaties. At home, in Germany, the first fifteen years of the empire contained beneath their surface the motives and forces, the tendencies and currents which actuated colonial expansion. Any history of the movement would be far from complete without a study of its primary causes, its dominating influences, since they imparted to it distinctive characteristics which persisted throughout the life of imperial Germany.

¹ *The Treaty of Peace with Germany*, 1919, article 119.

The available material on German colonization, especially that in English, deals almost exclusively with the external aspect; it affords only fleeting glimpses of the elements and forces, the groups and parties, at work within the nation, which were responsible for outward activity. Such a point of view, moreover, conveys the impression that the German Government imposed a colonial policy upon the nation on April 24, 1884; and consequently that modern German colonialism dates from that year. Only a few brief accounts of any colonial activity before 1884 seem to exist, and hence the strength and significance of the internal movement remains underestimated.

The present study proposes to concern itself primarily with the internal history of colonialism. It is based upon such sources as the *Reichstag* Debates, *White Books*, government documents, records and letters of Bismarck, official publications of colonial and other societies, as well as propaganda literature, programs of political parties, periodicals, newspapers, histories of trading and banking companies. It has been necessarily limited to material available in the United States, as German archives have been inaccessible for several years; but the value of the documents in the Columbia University and New York Public Libraries, the Congressional Library, and the Hohenzollern Collection in the Harvard University Library, have made less serious the impossibility of consulting sources only to be found in Germany.

The writer is glad of this opportunity to express her indebtedness to Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes whose work in German History has inspired this study. For his constant encouragement and advice as well as for his patient and laborious correction of manuscript and proof she is deeply grateful. She is also under obligation to Professor Charles D. Hazen whose kind interest, assistance and criticism she acknowledges with sincere appreciation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

COLONIALISM AND THE NATIONAL MIND

THE founding of the German empire in 1871 not only remade the map of Germany, but it also reconstructed the national mind. The psychology of the new Germany in its relation to overseas expansion is, therefore, important as a point of departure for any study of the origins of modern German colonialism.

Many circumstances conspired to direct the German mind of 1871 to the thought of colonization. In the first place, the intense nationalism and patriotism engendered by the wars of unification found a natural outlet in enthusiasm for expansion. Now that Germany had become a nation, she, like the other great states of Western Europe, must express her self-consciousness in the extension of her nationalism to a colonial empire. She too must pass through her phase of overseas expansion and the impression of her individuality upon other lands. Furthermore, those Germans who had left the Fatherland in its days of weakness and insignificance,—the days of the German Confederation,—to establish their lives and fortunes abroad, desired now to be united again to a glorified Germany. After 1871, it meant something to be able to say "*Ich bin ein Deutscher Bürger.*" Petitions even from Latin America demanded the establishment of German naval stations in Bolivia, Ecuador and Costa Rica. The passion of nationalism worked two ways, both centrifugally and centripetally, towards the encourage-

ment of colonial foundations. Moreover, after the succession of triumphs from 1866 to 1871, Germany was overflowing with an exuberant energy and needed a single aim, a fixed purpose toward which to direct it. What could serve better as an objective than colonial expansion?

Another result of the wars of unification had been the impetus given to the growth of a navy. Germany had proved herself supreme on land; why not strengthen herself upon the sea? A navy necessitates naval bases and coaling stations, hence colonies. Both Prince Adalbert of Prussia, Chief of the Navy, and Vice-Admiral Livonius, strongly advocated their acquisition.¹ And, as the enthusiasm for naval greatness grew, it paved the way for colonialism.

A further stimulus to navalism, besides the national motive, was an awakened trading instinct. Since Germany had won the right to be a nation, she remembered her commercial ancestry and tradition; she began to exalt the Hanse towns. In the eighteen-seventies, German overseas commerce was considerable, and commerce always demands protection. A gradual growth of the navy commenced during these early years: in 1871, Wilhemshafen became a naval base on the North Sea;² on December 31, 1871, the Prussian Ministry of Marine became the Imperial Admiralty; and in 1874 a navy bill, providing for eighteen gun boats and twenty smaller ships, passed the *Reichstag* with no opposition.³

The growth of the navy and its results proved of the utmost importance in the history of colonization. "Officers of the navy now stood shoulder to shoulder with diplomats,

¹ Livonius, *Unsere Flotte* (Berlin, 1871).

² Koschitzky, *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1887), vol. i, p. 155.

³ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1874, *Aktenstück*, no. 62, p. 770.

intellectuals and traders, to further colonial expansion." Indeed in 1875, Vice-Admiral Livonius compiled a report, recommending the immediate need of colonies. He showed that Germany had not attained what England had, because of government neglect, and he urged that since Germany had now achieved unity, it was high time that she acquired colonies.¹ The Government suppressed Livonius' report, however, pigeon-holed it and prevented its publication until 1885, because Bismarck feared it might precipitate political difficulties with other nations. The Vice-Admiral also urged the advisability of placing Zanzibar under German protection and of establishing a protectorate in East Africa. Likewise, Prince Adalbert of Prussia, who was called the "Builder of the German Fleet" and who did everything in his power to advance the navy, thought that the two policies, naval and colonial, should go hand in hand. He became General Inspector of the Navy in 1870, went to England to study shipping in 1873, and was thus a person of knowledge and authority.² As he expressed it, "For a growing people, there is no prosperity without expansion, no expansion without an overseas policy, and no overseas policy without a navy."

Possibly more conducive to the thought of colonialism than the political influence of a triumphant nationalism, was the economic condition of Germany from 1870 to 1875. Given a country, strong and united after years of division and weakness, given the introduction of the Industrial Revolution with its consequent manufacturing and commercial boom, augmented by the billion-dollar war indemnity from France, and given the resulting over-production of all

¹Lewin, *The Germans and Africa: Their Aims on the Dark Continent* (London, 1915), p. 31; *vide*, also Livonius, *Kolonialfragen* (Berlin, 1885).

²*Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. xlv, p. 788.

kinds of commodities, what circumstances could be more favorable for colonial expansion? The era of security after 1870 developed industry and trade to a remarkable degree, as is too well established to need further exposition here. But the fact must be emphasized that the "commercial instinct is the origin of all colonial conquest," and hence a veritable hot-house atmosphere for the culture of the "colonial idea" existed.

Furthermore, the extraordinary over-development and over-production led to speculation and inflated values, as is also too well known to need elaboration. The agrarian crisis coincided with industrial misery; ten thousand peasant proprietors were sold out each year by the Department of Justice; the new industry, thanks to free trade, was submerged under England's products; French merchandise triumphed; the sum available for industry from the war indemnity had been exhausted and the terrible crisis and panic of 1873 resulted. Again we must concern ourselves only with the effect of this state of affairs upon the national mind in relation to colonialism. The necessity of financial recuperation was widely felt. When conditions proved too narrow at home, both for capital and labor, again there loomed large the opportunity for expansion abroad.

Such was the character of the national psychology in so far as it was receptive to the thought of colonization. As we have seen, certain factors influenced the German mind of 1871 to entertain the idea of overseas expansion. These were: an enhanced national consciousness expressed by Germans both at home and abroad; a swollen purse requiring objects for expenditure, and then a depleted purse in need of large dividends regardless of risk; an abnormally inflated production demanding outlet markets; mushroom industries clamoring for raw materials; an overstocked labor market using emigration as a safety-value; and finally,

an ever growing navy promising protection to oversea ventures and investments. Assuredly, such influences would seem to have produced a mental atmosphere most propitious for the growth of any idea of colonialism.

We must consider, on the other hand, the unfavorable elements in the national psychology which were inimical to the notion of expansion throughout those early years. Here we find definite obstacles and hostile factors. In the first place, there was the absolute opposition of the Government and the ruling class; for colonial policy involved expense, friction with other powers, perhaps war; it would inevitably interfere with Bismark's well known scheme to secure the hegemony of Germany in Europe by concentration upon the strengthening of internal resources and the maintenance of friendly relations with England. Indeed, on January 9, 1868, the Chancellor wrote to von Roon: "All colonial enterprise must be left to private individuals; all the advantages claimed for the mother country are for the most part illusions. England is abandoning her colonial policy; she finds it too costly Germany has no navy and conflicts with other powers are inevitable."¹

It is apparent that the writings of colonial partisans as well as the press propaganda worried Bismark at the time, because he ordered the press to announce that the North German Confederation contemplated no annexations and, also, because he instructed Consul von Weber, in Samoa, to avoid scrupulously anything which might lead to a misunderstanding with the United States.² He was not at all certain how the sentiments for expansion would be interpreted abroad. He was consistent, therefore, when he refused the colony of Mozambique which Portugal offered

¹ Zimmermann, *Geschichte der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik* (Berlin, 1914), p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

for purchase,¹ as well as the protectorate proffered by the Sultan of Zulu in 1867.

After the battle of Sedan, Bismarck had an excellent opportunity to secure colonies had he desired them: on October 23, 1870, Théophile Gautier, an Under-Prefect, came to him from the Empress Eugénie, to propose that Germany take Strassburg and its vicinity, Cochin China and two million francs, instead of Alsace-Lorraine, but Bismarck would not consider it.² Gautier then suggested that Alsace-Lorraine be made a buffer state; whereupon Bismarck replied, "If the king and I return home without having secured Alsace-Lorraine unconditionally, we should be received with stones," which indicated that the acquisition of colonies was apparently a predominant desire neither of the administration nor of the large majority of German people. When, during the peace preliminaries at Versailles on February 9, 1871, France again offered to relinquish her colonies in China and elsewhere in place of Alsace Lorraine, Bismarck replied, "I will have no colonies. For Germany to possess colonies would be like a poverty stricken Polish nobleman acquiring a silken sable coat when he needed shirts."³

At this time, Bismarck seemed either to fail to realise the value of colonies or else to prefer to postpone their acquisition until the nation was stronger. The latter opinion appears the more correct, in view of the political situation at the time. Engrossed first in his task of unifying and centralizing the empire, then absorbed in his bitter struggle with the Church, Bismarck had little opportunity to apply

¹ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

² Cännstatt, "Fürst Bismark's Kolonial Politische Initiative," *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik*, June, 1908, p. 438.

³ Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1889), vol. i, p. 63.

himself to external expansion. Furthermore, the guiding principle of his foreign policy, the isolation of France and the maintenance of friendship with England, would inhibit any activity likely to cause friction with foreign Powers, especially when Germany's navy was not strong.

Moreover, with the exception of a few such personages as Bucher, Prince Adalbert and Admiral Livonius, he lacked the support of official circles for any colonial policy. Politicians, ministers and bureaucrats, the practical statesmen of the day, did not possess sufficient sympathy, understanding and imagination to appreciate the movement for colonies which, as we shall see, was in a very embryonic and experimental stage. As a class they were too conservative to venture on untrodden paths.

In the second place, the prevailing economic doctrine of the times, that of *laissez-faire*, would also prevent colonial expansion. This was the era of the ascendancy of the National Liberal party and Bismarck was under the influence of the free traders, who considered colonies an anachronism. To have fostered anything at variance with the free-trade principle overseas would also have aroused the antagonism of England. To be sure, a small group of economists, composed of List, Wappäus, Wagner, and Roscher, had begun twenty-five years before to break away from the Manchester School, and to urge a colonial policy; but the predominant national school of political economy in Germany did not yet regard even German emigration from anything but the cosmopolitan view-point. Friedrich Kapp, a well known representative political economist of the time, who became Government Commissioner for Germans in the United States in 1866, emphasized entirely the cosmopolitan idea.¹ He was the author of several books

¹ *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. li, pp. 32, 33.

on emigration which showed no interest whatsoever in a narrow, nationalistic colonialism.¹

Lastly, from Bismarck's own lips we have the statement that "No country should engage upon colonial activity, unless a strong public opinion supports it;"² and when in these first years, public opinion was not avowedly opposed to colonialism, it was indifferent. The following sentiments may be termed fairly characteristic of most Germans who thought on the subject at all.

Colonialism is a sad political anachronism. The voices which would persuade us to take this dangerous, neck-breaking course have become less as the nation grows more powerful. There is no room for German colonies now. Even other countries which have had colonies have wearied of them. Colonies are only outlets for business. . . . Germany has a constant stream of emigrants going out to enrich the world. It is claimed that this is a national loss and should be stopped. But these emigrants keep alive the German spirit and should not be interfered with, either to direct or to hinder.³

Desire for colonies should be considered chimerical. They are an anachronism. The advantages of colonialism are very few and the expense very great. Beyond our frontiers, we wish to seek nothing but peace.⁴

In summary, we may say that the national psychology resulting from the unification of the empire was influenced by certain political and economic factors in favor of colonization. On the other hand the effect of these factors would seem to be far outweighed by the hostility of the Govern-

¹ *Vide* Kapp, *Aus und Uber Amerika* (Berlin, 1876).

² Hahn-Wippermann, *Fürst Bismarck*, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1891), vol. v, p. 4.

³ Lammers, *Deutschland nach dem Krieg: Ideen zu einen Programme Nationaler Politik* (Leipzig, 1871).

⁴ Chéradame, *La colonisation et les colonies allemandes* (Paris, 1905), p. 28, quoting from Meyers, *Konversation Lexikon*, art. "Kolonieen."

ment, by the inauspicious international situation, by the dominant, antagonistic economic thought of the day, and by the apathy of a large proportion of the German people. In the main, the German national mind during the early years of the empire did not regard with approval the adoption of an imperial colonial policy; indeed it was distinctly opposed to any idea of expansion overseas.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORY OF COLONIALISM

IT has often been said that England built up her colonial empire in "a fit of absent-mindedness," which aptly describes the lack of any pre-conceived plan of British expansion. To apply this statement to Germany, however, would be to convey a wholly erroneous impression; for the German colonial empire was acquired with presence rather than absence of mind. While it may be an English characteristic to construct a policy to fit the facts, it is indeed a distinctive habit of the Germans to formulate, at the very outset, an abstract theory as a guide to practice.

During the early years of the empire, colonial expansion was predominantly an idea, projected and promulgated by the so-called doctrinaires and intellectuals, as well as supplemented by certain definite currents within the national life. To be sure, the belief manifested itself in different ways: with some of its exponents, it assumed the form of a general national policy to be preached and urged; with some, a vision to be realized at a future time; while with others, it seemed a compelling necessity for immediate action. Whatever various means of expression conveyed the idea, they all united, nevertheless, to form a distinct colonial cult, whose existence at the dawn of the empire is evident to the most superficial observer.

A closer scrutiny of the colonial theory reveals its various elements. In the first place, the nucleus was a national tradition of expansion conferred upon the new Germany as

a heritage from Prussia and extending back to the emigratory propensities of the earliest Teutonic tribes.

Both the general history of Germany and the specific colonial experiments of Prussia contributed to the founding and fostering of the tradition, of which our survey must be very brief. To begin with the thirteenth century as a point of departure:—the Teutonic Knights commenced to supply an historic background; they penetrated eastward and achieved conquests in the Baltic lands. Animated by a keen religious zeal, they added the impulse of romance to the tradition. Later, the Hanse Merchants succeeded them with their world-renowned exploits. Although they founded their settlements and far-flung factories only in the interests of trade and not for colonization, strictly so-called, still they imparted a strength and tenacity to the tradition of colonialism and they made it one of peculiar and lasting influence. Down through the centuries, even into the twentieth, the fame, the initiative, the striking success of the Hansards have survived as favored subjects of German pen and tongue. In the fifteenth century, moreover, Germany boasted an explorer and cosmographer, a friend and contemporary of Columbus and Magellan, Martin Behaim of Nuremberg. He traveled under the patronage of the Portuguese, but bequeathed to his native town a globe of the known world. Germans like also to recall the memory of the Augsburg Welser, who in the middle of the sixteenth century, under Charles the Fifth, undertook to colonize Venezuela as a military conquest, "without any serious prospects of commercial advantage."

Specific Prussian activities supplemented the general background of German history and made the colonial tradition far more real.¹ Prussian colonialism began in the

¹ Chéradame, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

seventeenth century. The Great Elector was early inspired with imperial ambitions and attempted to realize them even before the treaty of Westphalia. He established an East India Company as early as 1647 and granted it a charter; but the company existed only on paper. In 1650, he purchased from the Danes Tranquebar and the Fort of Danesburg, both situated on the southeast coast of India; but he was soon obliged to relinquish them because he had no resources with which to protect and maintain them.

Meanwhile, the Great Elector sent out an expedition to reconnoitre the coasts of Guinea in 1676-1677, for he had built up a considerable navy in his efforts to consolidate his new possessions on the Baltic Sea, after 1648. The result was a treaty concluded with the native chiefs; it placed under the Great Elector's protection the territory on the Gold Coast between Axim and the Cape of Three Points. The Great Elector then founded in 1682 a Commercial Company to which he gave a monopoly of trade on this coast for twenty years. In 1683, the agent of the Company, Frederick von der Groeben, established a factory and built the Fortress Gross Friedrichsburg. Two years later another agent built two more forts and the natives of Taccorary placed themselves under Prussian protection, which greatly excited the envy of the Dutch. In 1686, negotiations for a naval base on Arguin Island were concluded, and concessions for the Company were secured from France and Holland by the treaties of 1683-1685. The port of Emden, where the business was centralized, was enlarged and the operations of the Company extended to Hamburg. All these efforts, however, met with very mediocre results. At the end of four more years, the Company's capital had to be increased by one-quarter in order to enable its enterprises to survive at all, and the Prussian Government was obliged to come to the rescue. But the

Dutch were all powerful on the coast of Guinea and in 1687, picking a quarrel with Prussia, they seized the territory occupied by her, a calamity which almost synchronized with the death of the Great Elector.

His successor, Frederick the First of Prussia, had no interest whatsoever in colonies, save in the pleasure he took in receiving the negro ambassadors from Guinea. The fortunes of the Company went from bad to worse. After laborious efforts the restitution of its territories was secured, but financially it was ruined. In 1691, its debt amounted to 900,000 thalers and the Prussian treasury had again to come to its rescue. The War of the Spanish Succession created a new enemy, the French Corsairs, who together with the Dutch were a menace to the African settlements. Finally Frederick William the First, in 1717, attempted to retrieve the situation by transferring the rights of the African Company to the East India Company, an expedient which proved entirely without success. Moreover, the French in Senegal and the Dutch in Guinea renewed their attacks upon Prussian territory in 1720. Frederick William, however, had a greater desire for money wherewith to pay his soldiers than for overseas expansion, and accordingly, in 1725, he ceded to the Dutch all the Prussian African interests for the small indemnity of 7,200 ducats; and Prussia disappeared from Africa.

The Great Elector's efforts in America and the Orient met with the same failure. In 1685, he attempted an establishment in the Antilles and by a contract with the Danes gained a part of the Island of Saint Thomas, where he tried to maintain a slave station; but this enterprise lacked the support of his successors and the land reverted to the Danes. The East India Company somewhat revived after Prussia had gained a foothold in Africa but its efforts to improve conditions there in 1717 finally ruined it.

Thus the Prussian colonies of the seventeenth century had only an ephemeral existence: they were imposed from above and were at no time in favor with or supported by the nation; their collapse was "the failure of a strong initiative to overcome the prejudices of a whole people." The Great Elector was obliged to depend on Dutch agents, the country was too young to support colonization overseas, and it encountered too strong rivals in the field. Prussia's colonial history ended in 1725. It left no durable trace and people even forgot the efforts of the Great Elector. Nevertheless, when another colonial enthusiasm arose in the late nineteenth century, it proved convenient and expedient for its exponents to hark back to the general history of Germany and to the imperial ambitions of Prussia, and to revive them as a national tradition. They had certainly pointed the way both figuratively and geographically, and could easily serve as a precedent for new imperial aims. Indeed, the very fact that the early attempts had failed, largely because of powerful rivals, provided another argument for the new Germany, in her fresh, united strength, to attempt a retrieval of that failure and to achieve a triumphant realization of what might be readily represented and accepted as a great national ambition.

In the second place, professors, historians, and political scientists contributed to the colonial idea by voicing the national tradition. Their writings and influence established the theory of colonial expansion as a positive, prevailing doctrine in intellectual circles during the early years of the empire. Indeed, for thirty years before 1870, the greatest German thinkers had been pointing out the necessity for expansion, and the later minor protagonists merely reflected the ideas already formulated by their forerunners. Their theory of national expansion received neither support nor sympathy from official and commercial classes, at first, and was thus mainly restricted to the university world.

Treitschke and Droysen represented the view of nationalist historians and naturally urged the expansion and projection of German nationality. Treitschke especially had an enormous influence. He was appointed to a chair in the University of Freiburg-im-Breisgau in 1863, subsequently going to the Universities of Kiel, Heidelberg and finally, in 1874, Berlin. Added to his academic was his political influence, for he entered the *Reichstag* in 1870 where he remained for nearly twenty years. As everyone knows, Treitschke stood for the Pan-German doctrine in its fullest extent and taught that Germany's most pressing need was the acquisition of colonies. It is merely a crystallization of his earlier teachings, when he writes in his *Politics*:¹ "People from elder states, who have been disciplined, go out and found new states Every virile people has established colonial power All great nations in the fulness of their strength have desired to set their mark upon barbarian lands and those who fail to participate in this great rivalry will play a pitiable rôle in time to come. The colonising impulse has become a vital question for every great nation." He preached with brutal frankness that Germany should prepare for the eventual seizure of the British colonies in order that Teutonic influence should be supreme. "England's colonial policy has not been fortunate at the Cape of Good Hope. The civilization which exists there is Teutonic, is Dutch If our nation had the courage to construct with determination, construct an independent colonial empire, a collision of our interests and those of England would be unavoidable."² In this century of national states and of armed nations, a cosmopolitan trading power such as England can no longer maintain herself

¹ Treitschke, *Politics* (Berlin, 1898), translated by Dugdale and DeBille (London, 1916).

² Treitschke, *Deutsche Kämpfe* (Berlin, 1879).

for any length of time.”¹ In 1885 he merely confirmed what he had written twenty years before: “Only those states which possess navies and control territories overseas can rank in future as great Powers.”²

Minor exponents of the phase of the colonial theory, which Treitschke represented were, Franz Mauer,³ whose pamphlet, *Die Nicobaren*, and whose articles in the *Rhenische Zeitung* in 1865, recommended the annexation of naval stations as footholds of national strength, and J. J. Sturz,⁴ “*der Vorkämpfer deutscher Ueberseepolitik*,” who had been most active in promoting colonization in Brazil. The writings of the latter were quite numerous, *Kann und Soll ein Neudeutschland Geschaffen Werden*, and *Die Krisis der Deutscher Auswanderung und ihre Benutzung*, appearing in 1862 and *Die Deutsche Auswanderung*, in 1868. These pamphlets urged direction of German emigration to Brazil and settlement there, while later in *Der Wiedergewonnen Welttheil: Ein Neues Gemeinsames Indien*, (Berlin 1876), he advised a German protectorate in East Africa.

Many years before the nationalist historians advocated colonial expansion, List had promoted the subject from his own point of view, political economy. He broke with the prevailing *laissez-faire* and cosmopolitan school, and urged colonialism as part of a national program. In his *National System of Political Economy* (1841) he advised a strong colonial policy in all of its phases.

A vigorous German consular and diplomatic service ought to be

¹ *Ibid.*, *Turkei und die Grosse Macht* (1876), in *Deutsche Kämpfe*, p. 677.

² *Ibid.*, *Deutsche Kolonisation* (Berlin, 1885), in Hausrath, *Treitschke* (London, 1914), pp. 195-216.

³ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

established. . . . Young explorers should be encouraged to travel through these countries and make impartial reports upon them. Young merchants should be encouraged to inspect them. Young physicians should go and practice there. Enterprises should be founded and supported by stock companies and taken under governmental protection. Companies should be formed in the German seaports in order to buy land in foreign countries and settle them with German colonists; also companies for commerce and navigation, whose object should be to open new markets abroad for German manufacturers and to establish steamship lines; and again, mining companies should be established whose object would be to devote German knowledge and industry to winning great mineral wealth. . . . Colonies are the best means of developing manufactures, export and import trade, and finally a respectable navy.¹

Lothar Bucher, a member of the Prussian Foreign Ministry, revived List's ideas, on the eve of the empire, by his articles in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* for February, 1867. He pointed out that everything which List had recommended for Prussia had been accomplished except the acquisition of colonies, and urged the speedy establishment of a colonial kingdom, naming Timor, the Philippines and St. Thomas as objects.² Also in his *Bilder aus der Fremde*³ Bucher had expressed himself in favor of colonies. Likewise advocating List's theory, was the work of Ernst Friedel, whose book, *Die Gründung Preuss-Deutschen Colonieen in der Indischen Ozean* (1867), emphasized opportunities for expansion in the Far East, especially recommending Formosa. "Maritime commerce, ships of war, colonies, are all terms which complement each other," he said. "The value of each is diminished, if one is lacking."⁴

¹List, *National System of Political Economy* (1841), translated by Lloyd (London, New York, 1904), pp. 347, 216.

²Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 5, note 6.

³Bucher, *Bilder aus der Fremde* (Berlin, 1862-3).

⁴Chéradame, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

The political scientists, Roscher, Wappäus, Höffken, stressed another point of view, that of economic necessity. Like List they antedated the nationalist historians. They preached colonialism for the overflow of population as well as for the benefit of trade, and demonstrated the value of colonies as new production and consumption centres.¹ At first, German economists had considered emigration, so great during the first half of the nineteenth century, as a loss to Germany. But these men were the first to accord to it a national character, for they regarded it rather as an important factor in opening new markets, raising navigation receipts, *etc.* Roscher first advanced such a theory in 1848, and it became his main thesis: "Germany must expand on the sea and over the sea into foreign lands if it wants to make up for the sins of past generations. New areas for production and consumption must be secured for our national interest, be they gained by means of political or economic colonization."²

Gradually, the growing birth rate in Germany and the responsibility for increasing agricultural products greatly strengthened the economic aspect of the colonial idea. Wappäus' *Geographie und Statistik des Kaiserreichs Braziliens*³ particularly, and the many publications and brochures of the *Central-verein*⁴ für Handelsgeographie und Deutsche Interesse in Auslande, founded in 1868, contributed to its support and perpetuation.

One more potent factor in promoting colonization for economic reasons was the influence of the many societies and of the organized efforts for emigration founded during

¹ Wappäus, *Deutsche Auswanderung und Kolonisation* (Leipzig, 1846).

² Roscher, *Kolonieen, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung* (Leipzig, 1856), second edition.

³ Wappäus, *Geographie und Statistik etc.* (Leipzig, 1871).

⁴ Cf. *infra*, p. 51.

the first half of the nineteenth century, which the writings of the theorists, as well as the tremendous streams of emigrants, had stimulated. To mention only a few: the Berlin Colonial Society (1844), for the colonization of the Mosquito Coast, Prince Solm's colony in Texas (1840), the Society for the Protection of Emigrants (1844), the Stuttgart Society (1844), which promoted settlements in South Chile, the Hamburg National Colonial Society (1849), which founded Dona Franziska, the National Society for German Emigration (1848) in Frankfort, and many others.¹ They supplied advice, information, and material aid to emigrants. It is true that these organizations had died out by the year 1870, except the Hamburg Society, the Frankfort branch of the National Society, and a Dresden association.² Their traditions still persisted, however, and reinforced by the theories of new advocates, formed an important element of the colonial idea. Especially was this true when, as the seventies progressed and emigration assumed enormous proportions, societies were formed at Cologne, Leipzig, and Frankfort, to prepare the mother country for the occupancy of distant lands.

As we have seen, it was first German tradition, and then historians and political scientists, who fostered the idea of national expansion. Now in the third place, explorers and geographers added numerous accounts of travels and researches in natural science to the colonial theory.

Since the eighteenth century, Germans of this type had been interested in Africa and had done much to increase knowledge and to excite curiosity concerning lands beyond the sea. From 1840 to 1870, and especially immediately preceding the period under review, many German travelers

¹ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 312.

² *Jahrbuch für Nationökonomie und Statistik*, 1884, p. 12.

and scientists had been busy penetrating the unknown places of the earth. Gustav Mann had studied flora in the region of the Niger;¹ Dr. Bastian of Bremen had made a tour of the world, writing a book about Africa;² Heinrich Barth, of Hamburg, had been the first European to explore the Hinterland of Kamerun;³ the geologist Karl von Fretsch had devoted himself to the mineralogy of Morocco;⁴ Karl Mauch, upon returning from the Transvaal, had ended one of his speeches saying, "May this beautiful land some day become a German colony."⁵

The expedition of Dr. Otto Kersten, Baron von Decken and Richard Brenner in East Africa had called forth a request from the Sultan Zimba of Wituland for the official protection of Prussia, coupled with an offer to render all aid and hospitality to German travellers and settlers.⁶ In 1864, Baron von Decken had written from the River Zuba that a colony there would be most advantageous, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal.⁷ Dr. Otto Kersten likewise shared and spread this idea in his work, *Über Kolonisation in Ost Afrika* (Wien, 1867), recommending the River Zuba as a most favorable means of entrance to the interior and the settlement of such regions as Momba and Victoria Nyanza.⁸ J. J. Stürz promoted the same plan later after Brenner's death. He advocated consuls for East Africa, the erection of a railroad and the payment of state

¹Chéradame, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

²*Ibid.*

³Coppius, *Hamburg's Bedeutung auf dem Gebiete der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik* (Berlin, 1905), p. 51.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵Chéradame, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁶Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁷Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 4, note 5.

⁸*Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 8, note 9.

subsidies to a steamship line from Germany.¹ All these men either lent the weight of their influence to the theorists who were building up the colonial idea or else, by their direct contributions, became members of the group themselves.

Many journeys to distant lands were undertaken at the expense of the German Society for the Discovery of the Interior of Africa, founded by Professor Bastian, on April 30, 1873,² as well as of the German African Society, founded in 1876, which was a branch of the International African Association.³

The contribution of scientists and travelers to the colonial theory received a decided stimulus from the International Congress called at Brussels by King Leopold of Belgium in 1876 and from the organization of the African International Society which resulted. Likewise, the journeys of Stanley, Nachtigall and Rholfs awakened new interest in the Dark Continent, in travel and exploration in general, and in the question of German colonization in particular.

Finally, missionary zeal contributed to the colonial theory which existed in 1871; and like the enthusiasms for emigration and exploration it had also crystallized into societies. These became active centers of agitation for national expansion. Before 1870, at least eight strong societies for work abroad had been founded, of which the Barmen Rhine Mission, the Bremen Mission and the Basel Mission were the most important.⁴ The missions encouraged trade and helped colonists and travelers wherever they carried on their work. Their publications, reports and presentation of their needs, formed another current of influence, within the life

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 28; Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

² Barth, *Die von 1865-1895 Fortschritten der Kenntniss* (Stuttgart, 1898), p. 73.

³ Keltie, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

⁴ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 103.

of Germany, which disseminated colonial information and aroused interest in expansion.

The Barmen Rhine Mission established its first settlement in Namaqualand in Southwest Africa. Knauer established a station there at Gibeon¹ in 1863 and in 1864 Hahn was sent to organize a missionary colony on the coast at Otymbingue, "in order through the example of German efficiency and activity to influence the natives."² As the missionary Büttner states in his book, entitled *Das Hinterland von Walfischbai und Angra Pequena*,³ this settlement is "the first piece of territory overseas acquired by Germans." Other stations were settled in Namaqualand: one at Windhook, in 1867 and one at Grootfontein in 1873.⁴ Indeed the missionaries became very much involved in trade throughout the region, gained a strong foothold and exerted a great influence upon German colonisation. In 1868,⁵ Dr. Fabri, Inspector of the Rhine Mission, asked from the Government protection of its work in the Herero land, but was refused. Nevertheless, by the year 1883, Fabri's society controlled ten stations or more, containing five thousand Christians, in South West Africa.⁶ Contemporaneously, the Basel Mission pursued its activities in a smaller way on the Gold Coast in Togoland, where it had first entered the English settlements in 1853.⁷

Among the South Sea Islands, German missionaries had also been active. Two missionaries had gone to New

¹ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 103.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 40.

³ Oberländer, *Deutsch-Afrika* (Leipzig, 1885), p. 162.

⁴ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 40.

⁵ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁶ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 40.

⁷ Chéradame, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

Guinea in 1855, several to North Borneo, the Marshall Islands and to the Samoan group.¹

The foregoing summary has shown that the first phase of the colonial movement in modern Germany was a theory, an idea. Professors, historians, political economists, scientists, explorers and missionaries had constructed and disseminated theoretical colonialism more or less unconsciously; they had made it a definite subject of discussion and treatise in the early seventies. Colonialism thus lived very vitally in the way that doctrines and convictions survive; but it was, at best, very abstract and largely impracticable. Indeed, as we have seen, the statesmen of the day viewed the "professor-led multitude" clamoring for expansion, with the hearty dislike with which the initiative of the people is apt to be regarded in Germany. Likewise, Bismarck's personal distaste for all things impractical, especially for "visionary" professors who belonged to the political opposition—as they did in the early seventies—militated strongly against the success of the colonial theory. In short, theoretical colonialism would have to attain a much more practical significance before its doctrinaire ideas, emanating chiefly from university circles, could command official attention and response.

¹ Chéradame, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL COLONIALISM : DIRECT ACTION VERSUS THE POWER OF IDEAS

DURING the early years of the German Empire, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, a sort of theoretical colonialism was developing. Beneath its surface, however, appeared the beginnings of a real commercial expansion, silently and independently transforming theory into practice.

A group from the upper, industrial and commercial classes, aided by the banking world, initiated the movement; and their unobserved activities, in contrast with the abstractions of colonial theorists, have suggested the sub-title of this chapter—direct action versus the power of ideas. Gradually they placed the colonial movement more in accord with the national German mind of 1871-1875, which was attuned to the pitch of practical, political and economic achievement, rather than to idealistic ventures and visions.

A survey of existing German trade settlements over seas, in the dawning years of the new empire, is essential to show the foundations upon which the group of commercial colonialists built. For, although the Prussian Government had officially renounced all such activities since 1725, individual merchants and traders had undertaken and accomplished much upon their own initiative.

The Hanse towns, in line with their old tradition, had provided the largest number of actors for the commercial drama, which was to form the first act of the great cycle of

German colonial activities. The towns of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck had never entered the *Zollverein*. They were free traders, and controlled the bulk of Germany's foreign commerce. They had brought up their children with ships for toys when their little Prussian cousins were playing with soldiers, and they had sent their youths over seas in large numbers. There was scarcely a family in these towns which could not count a relative or acquaintance *d' üben*.

Africa proved, at first, the chief scene of their activity. By 1871, many Hamburg and Bremen firms had secured strong commercial footholds on the coasts of the Dark Continent. To East Africa, as early as 1844, the firm of Herz¹ and Son had sent the first ship, building up an export trade in cowry shells. It was succeeded by the firms of Hansing and O'Swald.² They began by establishing a trade with the west coast, at Lagos, and then concentrated their efforts in East Africa at Zanzibar in 1850.³ So great was their success, that on June 13, 1859, a trade treaty was arranged between the Hanse towns and the Sultan of Zanzibar, which was subsequently extended to the North German Confederation in 1869 and later to the German Empire. The firm of O'Swald controlled most of the commerce and by the year 1874, the total German export trade from Zanzibar amounted to three and one half⁴ million marks, three times greater than that of England. Indeed, the Sultan hated the English and was the friend of the German merchants, to whose efforts must be entirely credited his offer⁵ to place his country under German protection, which was refused by

¹ Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, p. 50.

³ Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 51, and Koschitzky, vol. i, p. 244.

⁴ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 244-245.

⁵ *Cf. infra*, p. 50.

Bismarck in 1874. The Zanzibar trading-post was the most important in East Africa, although in Witu a travelling companion of Baron von Decken had established very friendly relations with the rulers. Later, Clemens Denhardt and his brother Gustav continued to foster the connection, and it became the nucleus of a company formed in Berlin in 1883.¹

The successors to the work of Hansing and O'Swald in West Africa were the Hamburg business houses of Witt and Büsch and G. S. Gaiser. But by far the most active firm in West Africa, dividing and sub-dividing itself and radiating out in all directions was that of C. Woermann. First entering Liberia in 1849,² it penetrated and spread through territory between Gabun and the Kamerouns, founding a factory in Gabun in 1862³ and trading stations on the Kameroun River in 1864. Jantzen, a manager for Woermann, 1861-1871, and Thormählen, another agent, formed an independent firm, setting up a factory in Kameroun in 1875.⁴ Their trade grew enormously and by 1879 they owned factories along the coast in Great-Batanga, on Bata Bay, and on the Ogowe River. Later, in 1879, two other managers for Woermann, Wölber and Broehm, formed a partnership on this coast, thereby giving the House of Woermann a firm grasp on the entire district and placing most of the commerce in its hands. Its packet boats carried on regular trade with all the West African coast, for Germany supplied the salt for most of this part of the world and Hamburg manufactured the gin "so dear to the hearts of the blacks."

¹ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

² Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

³ Chéradame, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁴ Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

Even the missionaries engaged largely in commerce in West Africa, indeed trade seems to have been a very vital part of their work. In 1864, a stock company, with capital of 700,000 M. was formed in Germany to support the commercial and religious work of the Rhine Barmen Mission at Otymbingue, which bought the land and buildings of the Walfisch Bay Copper Company and carried on an extensive business.¹ In the same way, the Basel Mission, working on the Gold Coast in Togoland, established in connection with its trade a large factory at Akra.²

The following figures will illustrate the subsequent growth of German trade in West Africa, arising from these foundations.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Exports to Africa</i>	<i>Imports to Hamburg</i>
1879	279,252 M.	5,196,520 M.
1880	335,080	6,735,090
1881	305,101	5,556,230
1882	417,513	8,475,100
1883	442,774	9,105,150 ³

Africa, however, did not represent the only stronghold of the practical colonialists. The Hanse towns were likewise pioneers of trade settlements in the South Seas. So great indeed was their influence, that, as early at 1858, a Prussian sea captain was asked whether Prussia was tributary to Hamburg.⁴

The American Captain Wakeman, in his report⁵ about Samoa, writes, in 1871, of calling upon T. Weber, agent of the Hamburg House of Godeffroy, and of finding him the

¹ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 49.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 104; Keltie, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

³ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 128.

⁴ Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁵ *Report of Captain Wakeman to H. Webb on Samoa, 1871* (New York, 1872).

controller of the Samoan copra trade. The House of Godeffroy became important in the island as early as 1857. It evidently realized that Samoa was, as Wakeman describes it, the garden of the Pacific as well as a strategic commercial centre. The firm began to buy land in 1857, and by 1859 monopolised all the trade. Its agent, Theodore Weber, entered the service as a lad, went to Samoa in 1861, and gradually assumed complete control. The North German Confederation assisted him by appointing him its official representative. It was due to his management that numerous trading depots in Oceania were created, that New Britain was added to the sphere of the firm's commerce in 1871, and that the traffic in oil of copra was organized on a vast scale.¹ Besides copra, this House carried on trade in cocoa, coffee, and sugar. Each year, large ships left Europe for Apia, the headquarters of Godeffroy, said by Wakeman to be the best distributing centre in the Samoan Islands. With its headquarters at Apia, the firm's activities ranged from Valparaiso to Cochin China. At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, its trade was tremendous; it controlled stations all over the South Seas, and the English referred to its head as the "South Sea King."² Rapidly the House of Godeffroy was outstripping the English, for whereas in 1868, there were thirty-four English ships in Samoan waters and twenty-four German, in 1871 there were twenty-six English and thirty-six German.³ Moreover, the activities of this firm were well known in Germany, or at least the House of Godeffroy endeavored to make them so. For in 1861, Johann Caesar Godeffroy founded the Godeffroy Museum in Hamburg to exhibit the geography,

¹ Chéradame, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

² *Geographische Zeitschrift*, vol. v, 1899, p. 494.

³ Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

ethnology and natural history of Samoa, for which purpose he sent out many expeditions. He also published the *Journal des Muséums Godeffroy's* from the year 1871 until 1879, when the firm went out of existence.¹

In addition to Godeffroy in the South Seas, was the firm of Henssler which had established trade and acquired land in New Britain in 1875, making its headquarters at White Bay on the island of Matupi.² These islands became valuable as a source of supply for workers on the German plantations in Samoa, and this firm superintended their organization and transportation. Henssler and Company also extended its business to the Caroline Islands, where it had interests in copra. These firms were forerunners of many powerful business houses trafficking in the South Seas. Likewise in the Fiji Islands, Hamburg merchants had found sources of rich vegetable products, had bought plantations and invested considerable capital;³ one firm alone had made an outlay of two and one half million.

The possibilities of New Guinea, where two missionaries had settled, were also apparent to German traders, as the many letters from the German settlers in Australia testified.⁴ Indeed the German colonists were continually writing to the Prussian Ministry of Trade, urging the settlement of colonies.

Though, unfortunately, no definite German trade statistics for the South Seas exist for these early years, the following figures, compiled from English sources for the years from 1868 to 1870 and from the reports of German consuls

¹ Meyers, *Konversation-Lexikon*, vol. viii, p. 74, art., "Godeffroy."

² Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 232-239.

³ *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1879, p. 1604.

⁴ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 201.

from the years 1873 to 1878, will convey some idea of its growth and extent.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Number Ships Trading with Samoa and Tonga Islands</i>	<i>German Ships</i>
1868	65	24
1869	56	22
1870	70	28
1873	57	21
1874	75	36
1875	97	50

<i>Year</i>	<i>Imports</i>		<i>Exports</i>		<i>Ships</i>	
	<i>Total Marks</i>	<i>German Marks</i>	<i>Total Marks</i>	<i>German Marks</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>German</i>
1876	1,606,000	1,290,000	2,566,000	2,386,000	149	89
1877	1,587,420	1,247,420	2,503,400	2,216,800	136	65
1878	1,595,600	1,395,600	2,576,400	2,427,200	120	72 ¹

In 1879, out of the seven existing firms in the Vavao group of the Tonga Islands, six were German.

In one other part of the world we find also a conspicuous example of individual German colonial initiative—in the province of Rio Grande du Sul in Brazil. South America had become, next to the United States, the great goal of German emigration, for during the years from 1871 to 1880,

556,142	emigrants	went to	the United States.
20,904	"	"	Brazil.
4,344	"	"	other South American States.
1,278	"	"	Africa.
1,301	"	"	Canada.
767	"	"	West Indies. ²

In 1872, there were fifty to sixty thousand Germans in the province of Rio Grande du Sul. They controlled trade and were predominant in agriculture and industry. Ham-

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages, 1877, Aktenstück, no. 80, p. 282.*

² *Jahrbuch für Nationökonomie und Statistik, 1884, p. 312.*

burg, alone, sent fifty shiploads of goods there annually and "a great future lay before this province as a support of German foreign trade and as an excellent acquisition for colonial expansion."¹

Such, then, was the status of economic ventures and settlements overseas during the first years of our period. By 1875, German merchants and traders had individually made themselves prominent in Africa, in the South Seas, and in South America, and their activities were the first symptoms of an unorganized, unarticulated, colonial policy. Unconsciously their work went on and prospered. "The majority of the German people did not know about the German expeditions overseas nor the settlements of Hamburg and Bremen merchants in Africa and other parts of the world."² But, as Coppius remarks in his excellent monograph on this subject, "The quiet pioneer activity of our Hamburg merchants could not fail to exert a great influence upon the German people, even though they did not understand the significance of it."³

Ever growing trade and constantly expanding merchant companies with their settlements naturally required protection; indeed the efforts of the commercial colonialists were, at the beginning of the seventies, attracting the attention of other Powers who had colonial interests at stake. These merchants and traders thought that the most ostensible advantages gained by the newly established German unity was a greatly enhanced national prestige; and they considered that it should now be depended upon to make itself felt where, from their point of view, it was most needed, namely, overseas. Foreign trade, they said, should no longer be

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1877, *Aktenstück*, no. 80.

² Charpentier, *Entwickelungs Geschichte der Kolonialpolitik des deutschen Reichs* (Berlin, 1886), p. 13.

³ Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

obliged to stand aside. "The German with his flag was destined no more to be an appendage of foreign nations; to go through the world with his cap in one hand and a piece of gold in the other." Had not these men risked everything to establish their factories and depots? Why should the now great and glorious Fatherland, in the first flush of its new life, hesitate to come to their aid?

Such was the new note which, during the first years of the empire, began to make itself heard above all the theoretical arguments for expansion. It possessed a tremendous advantage over all the other appeals, because it rested upon a practical reality. Its protagonists could, so to speak, meet the Government on its own ground. The group of practical, commercial colonists made no such demands upon administrative vision, imagination and faith, as the theorists did; theirs was a pragmatic position; they could point, with justifiable pride, to their own unsupported, colonial adventures in the shape of trade settlements, could demonstrate their success and could represent it as the duty and obligation of the nation to protect and foster these projects which were already on their feet. In short, the colonial movement became a business proposition and, as such, had as its chief promoters, keen business men.

At first, it was the merchants themselves who initiated the agitation by demanding protection and help. They made their common need and bond the subject of attack upon the administration, both by propaganda and by direct petition. Gradually they were joined by other groups of interested individuals, such as leaders of overseas trading speculations, possessors of land claims, *etc.*, so that amid the exhortations of the theoretical colonialists the voices of the commercial colonists began to make themselves heard.

The eve of the treaty of Frankfort afforded a brilliant opportunity for urging the cause of expansion on the

grounds of national, economic and commercial welfare of the new empire, since discussions relative to the dictation of a victorious peace are generally occasions conducive to the flaunting of a glorified nationalism. German merchants in Valparaiso, for instance, raised the question of taking possession of Patagonia. Others advised seizing Madagascar, the Zulu Islands, the purchase of Danish Saint Thomas. Many were the demands that the treaty of Frankfort should include France's colonies. The traveler, E. von Weber, wrote in the *National Zeitung*, September 20, 1870, advocating the acquisition of Cochin China, Tahiti, Marquesa Islands, Reunion.¹

The most significant documentary evidence, however, is a petition presented to the *Reichstag* of the North German Confederation on November 30, 1870.² The document earnestly requested that the port of Saigon, a strategic naval base in China, belonging to France, be demanded in the peace settlement. The petition was drawn up by a group of merchants in Bremen, the President of the Chamber of Commerce at Geuestemunde and by some merchants and scholars in Berlin. Herr Adicks, representing the firm of Rickmers and Company in Bremen, presented it and the signatories consisted of thirty-five Bremen firms, three Berlin firms and Professor von Holzendorf.³ It is significant to note that the most influential Bremen firm supporting it was Mosle and Company, whose chief, Alexander George Mosle, had gone to Brazil in 1848 and established his business at Rio Janiero, where he became German Con-

¹ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

² *Anlagen des Reichstages des Nord Deutschen Bundes*, 1870, petition no. 13 under no. 15.

³ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

sul from Bremen to Brazil.¹ Returning in 1862, he made Bremen the headquarters of his firm, became prominent personally as vice-president of the German Commercial Congress, and head of the Geographical Society in Bremen, and later emerged as one of the most vigorous agitators for colonialism and leaders of the colonial party. Furthermore, the petition was endorsed by Prince Adalbert of Prussia who tried to influence von Roon in its favor.²

The reason advanced for the acquisition of a naval station at Saigon was, that the considerable German trade between Hongkong, Shanghai and Europe, Japan and China, required protection. "As long as property on sea is not safe any more than on land, it is Germany's duty to afford it protection. German merchants and ship owners must not be obliged to turn to foreigners for protection."³

This reason was not considered sufficiently forceful, however, for the petition was dismissed before even being put to the vote. Although there was some discussion, everyone except its actual promoters spoke decidedly against it. The one significant exception was Meier,⁴ the great National Liberal merchant of Bremen, founder of the North German Lloyd. Later, in 1884, he became a warm supporter of colonialism, but, in 1870, he was a leading representative of the free-trade era. He was careful not to endorse the petition outright, because he thought it would lead to colonialism, which he conceived of as an outworn policy, an anachronism; but he did say that no one could claim that "German trade does not need protection."

¹ Poschinger, *Bismarck und die Parlamentarier*, 2 vols. (Breslau, 1894), vol. ii, p. 130.

² Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, 3 vols., vol. i, p. 63.

³ *Verhandlungen des Reichstages des Nord. Deut. Bundes*, Nov. 30, 1870, p. 42.

⁴ *Bremische Biographie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (Bremen, 1912), p. 309.

The petition from the merchants of Bremen, who were beginning to form the colonial party, was duplicated by one to Bismarck from the merchants of Hamburg, which also concerned the terms of the treaty of Frankfort. They desired that Germany, in the peace, should demand Cochin China, Martinique, St. Pierre and Miquelon.¹ Again Prince Adalbert of Prussia was a warm advocate and had his eye especially upon Guadeloupe. He urged von Roon to influence Bismarck but the latter was immovable. The treaty of Frankfort represented no interests of the merchant colonialists.

After the peace settlement, the economic enthusiasts for colonialism did not lose hope, but took refuge in propaganda, appealing still to the national sentiment. Some advocated annexing the Fiji Islands, the Hebrides, the Philippines; while from America came German voices clamoring for the acquisition of Cuba, Sumatra, New Guinea, Pondicherry. In 1871, Samoa was proposed as a naval station. *Das Kleine Journal* and *Die Welt Post*² supported the cause, and pamphlets appeared about Germany's interests in the East. In 1871, an anonymous brochure came out in Berlin entitled *Deutschlands Interessen in Ost Asien*, in which the author regretted that the treaty of Frankfort had not acquired Cochin China as a naval base to protect German trade.³

Some indication of the strength of all this agitation may be gauged by the fact that in 1871,⁴ Bismarck found it

¹ Poschinger, "Bismarck und die Anfänge der deutschen Kolonialpolitik. Nach unveröffentlichten Quellen," *Kölnische Zeitung*, August 19, 1907.

² Herrfurth, "Bismarck als Kolonialpolitiker," *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, Kolonialrecht*, October, 1909, p. 723.

³ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁴ Chéradame, *La Colonisation et les colonies allemandes*, p. 32.

necessary to announce officially in the press that Germany contemplated no expansion, so fearful was he lest the voices of these partisans might arouse the attention and suspicion of the foreign Powers. Indeed the press of America, Australia and Spain had shown itself apprehensively excited by the flood of German colonial propaganda.

Nothing daunted by the hostility of the administration, the merchants and traders, the practical colonialists, now inaugurated a direct "petition policy," consisting largely of attacks upon the Government. They demanded protection and extension of overseas trade by means of both consuls and trade treaties, and actual acquisition of territory, naval stations and the establishment of protectorates.

The consuls and other government officials living abroad assisted the merchants in many instances. Witnesses to the achievements of the commercial colonialists, they readily appreciated Germany's great opportunity to support trade and they added the weight of their influence in importuning governmental assistance. Conspicuous in this respect was Theodore Weber in his double capacity as agent for the House of Godeffroy and as German Consul in Samoa. In 1871, he notified Bismarck that the United States had purchased the harbor of Pago-Pago, was sending a war ship to Samoa, and was arranging treaties with other islands.¹ He considered that such aggressive acts should inspire Germany both to protect its already existent trade and to acquire an increased influence. He urged the speedy annexation by Germany of some point in Samoa.

The following year, Dettering, the Customs Commissioner in China, besought the Government to establish a foothold on the coast and encouraged individuals to acquire trade concessions in the Yangste valley. In this

¹Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

project the Crown Prince became profoundly interested but was silenced by Bismarck.¹

This same year, 1872, the Government was further assailed from the opposite part of the globe, by a petition from the colonists in the Province of Rio Grande du Sul in Brazil to protect and foster commercial interests, and also to abrogate the old Prussian restriction (1859) on emigration to Brazil, so that, "A modern colonial policy may be adopted, which by means of trade may become a strong support for home capital and industry."²

From Africa, the influential firm of Woermann on the west coast, through its agent, Joseph Thormählen, petitioned the administration, on April 22,³ 1874, for a consul to be stationed at Fernando Po, to protect its commercial interests in Kameroun. Likewise from South Africa came a petition from E. von Weber, who was developing a diamond mine. Weber tells about this in his book, *Vier Jahre in Afrika, 1871-1875*.⁴ "In response to a patriotic impulse which would not let me rest, I dispatched a memorandum to the Kaiser and Bismarck, urging a speedy annexation of Delagoa Bay and the establishment of a German protectorate over the Transvaal."⁵

Two men broached the same plan to the Chancellor later, in 1876, although by that time it had become much more fully developed. Lüderitz, the merchant, was one of them. They represented an interested group and they had gained a personal interview with Bismarck because of the rela-

¹ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

² *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1872, petition no. 51.

³ *Hamburgische Correspondenz*, 1874, no. 327, quoted by Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁴ Weber, *Vier Jahre in Afrika, 1871-1875*. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1879), vol. ii, p. 543.

⁵ Weber, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 543.

tionship of one of their number to a high official in the Foreign Office. They unfolded a complete scheme for founding a colony in South Africa, based upon the economic necessity of Germany, the crying need of directing emigration and the fact that the Boers desired German protection. Their plan was to establish a steamship line to South Africa and to construct a railway to the Transvaal. To finance these projects, they asked a state subsidy of 100,000,000 M. for ten years. Bismarck "met them courteously," but rejected the proposition on the grounds that the time was unpropitious politically, that Germany lacked sufficient navy, and that the necessary popular impulse for such a policy of expansion was wanting.¹

Again, from East Africa, came an offer in 1874 from the Sultan of Zanzibar to place his country under German protection. The offer was due to the activities of the firms of Hansing and O'Swald and also to the efforts of the explorers, Otto Kersten and Richard Brenner.² Bismarck refused it, although the situation for German traders became very critical in the following year. A German company had encountered some difficulty about the customs, since the old customs treaty, made in 1859 and renewed in 1869, had expired. England's attitude was also threatening. She had established a steamship line from Aden to Zanzibar and in 1875 had commanded an Egyptian fleet which had annexed two harbors on the coast to lower its flag.

In the same year, 1875, another request for German protection and activity in oversea control came from the South Seas. Von Overbeck, an Austrian, who had acquired some shares of an American land company in North Borneo and also the friendship and patronage of the Sultans of Zulu and Brunei, begged for the opportunity to surrender them to

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *Fürst Bismarck* (Berlin, 1891), vol. v, p. 4.

² Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 127.

Germany, offering to sell his rights and land shares to the Government.¹ Consent would have bound the Sultan of Zulu to Germany, reserved the north shore of Borneo for German commerce, and greatly strengthened Germany's trade position in the South Seas. Administrative heeding of Consul Sahl's² letters concerning the Fiji Islands, would have had a similar effect. Sahl was the German Consul in Sydney and wrote at various times calling the Government's attention to the fact, "that much German capital was invested there and that the islands owe their state of prosperity and progress, for the most part, to German energy and perseverance."

Ample proof exists that there were indeed innumerable petitions of the same kind. And it is without doubt that Germany, thereby, had countless opportunities to gain overseas positions of control, as urged by the commercial colonial partisans. H. Poschinger tells of the existence of a collection of documents in the Foreign Office entitled, *Concerning Plans for the Founding of Colonies and Naval Bases*, which by the year 1885, had come to include thirty volumes.³ Poschinger adds that Germany would have had many flourishing colonies, had these not been rejected; but even though rejected, they were not without a certain definite influence and force.

Another factor in the work of "direct action" for colonialism was the *Central Society for Commercial Geography and German Interests Abroad*.⁴ Founded in 1868, by the

¹ Herrfurth, *Bismarck und Die Kolonialpolitik* (Berlin, 1909), p. 6. *Vide*, also *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik*, October, 1909, *loc. cit.*, p. 725.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 185. *Weissbuch* 1885, part ii, p. 3.

³ Poschinger, "Fürst Bismarck und die Anfänge der Deut. Kolonialpolitik," *Kölnische Zeitung*, Aug. 31, 1906.

⁴ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 123. *Vide* also Jannarsch, "Zentrall Verein für Geographie," *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 1883, pp. 177-192.

traveler and explorer Otto Kersten, it had developed during the early seventies into one of the most important means for the fostering of German commercial interests overseas, and at home it represented the only hitherto organized agency for promoting the aims of economic colonialism. It established branches in all the leading German cities and in the chief foreign countries where Germans were settled, and its objects, as set down in its program, were those of distinctly practical colonialism:

1. Study of the lands where Germans had settled, their geographical, social and economic conditions and mercantile opportunities.
2. The methodical dissemination of knowledge and information about these countries.
3. The increase of communication, both physical and spiritual, between these countries and the Fatherland.
4. The encouragement and establishment of trade and naval stations.
5. The acquisition of colonies.

Moreover, *Der Export*, a monthly magazine, its official organ, which the Society regularly published, together with many other publications, occupied a prominent place in literature fostering colonialism.

To sum up, the second phase of the colonial movement was economic. Throughout the first five years of the empire, commercial colonialism had assumed definite proportions. Abroad, it had fostered individual, commercial activities in Africa, in the South Seas, and in Brazil; while at home, its protagonists had promoted a vigorous campaign both to secure governmental protection, the most urgent need of the overseas settlements, and to further the cause of expansion itself. Here was a movement which could not be so easily disposed of as that of the colonial theorists, its predecessor and contemporary. It could not be dismissed

as impractical because its actual achievements were too substantial and obvious; its needs and demands were too incessant and importunate. What was the reply of the Government? The answer must be reserved for the next chapter; but the fact that a situation had been created, requiring a response which must be sooner or later forthcoming, was significant. It demonstrated that the commercial colonialists, who represented only a small minority of the German people, had, by vitalizing the colonial issue, rescued it from the realm of theoretical debate and made it, instead, a practical and live reality with which the Government was forced to reckon.

CHAPTER IV

GOVERNMENT REACTION TO COMMERCIAL COLONIALISM AND THE APPEARANCE OF A COLONIAL PARTY

THE German Government was at first extremely weak and indefinite in its response to the demands of the commercial colonialists. Its policy consisted principally in an extension of the consular service, in a dependence upon the good offices of foreign consuls, and in a blind reliance upon the doctrine of free trade and equal opportunity, in short, in a mere "diplomatic guardianship." Such temporization and make-shift could not suffice for long, however: the interests of overseas trade were to become too great a factor in the national life. Indeed by the year 1874 the consequences of commercial colonialism began to expose the inadequacy of "diplomatic guardianship" as a policy of trade protection, to create a strain upon international diplomacy, and to force the administration to show its hand. Even the increased consular service—slight as it was in the eyes of those merchants eager for administrative colonial activity—began to arouse the jealousy and suspicion of other nations. The pressure of external events was to prove more potent than words, more comprehensible to Bismarck and his ministers than the weak voice of a small minority of the German people. It must be borne in mind, nevertheless, that this external pressure was, in its last analysis, caused by the very minority of practical colonialists whose activities, now to be reviewed, resulted in the formation of a definite colonial party.

During the years 1870 to 1875, the Government extended and increased the consular service and practiced "diplomatic guardianship" everywhere; but it emphatically refused and discouraged each explicit demand for the establishment of a protectorate or naval base or for the acquisition of territory. To illustrate: the petition of the Brazilian colonists for consular and postal service was granted, and consuls were stationed in Africa and the South Seas; but the proposed protectorates over Borneo, Zanzibar, and South Africa, and the acquisition of naval stations in China and Samoa, as well as the granting of a state subsidy in South Africa, were all rejected; indeed any projects bordering upon a direct colonial policy were discouraged.

The reasons vouchsafed for this negative and noncommittal attitude were, in the main, fear of foreign friction and lack of men and money. The brief discussion occasioned by the petition of the merchants on November 30, 1870, to include Saigon in the treaty of Frankfort, contained all the grounds of its refusal. Baron von Hoverbeck thought that the proposition was untimely and that Germany could not afford colonies. Dr. Schleiden, a Prussian official, agreed with Ross, a Hamburg merchant (not interested in any overseas ventures), that such a policy would be politically dangerous. Other objections were raised on the grounds of expense. In vain the petitioner Miguel argued that the acquisition of Saigon would not necessitate an expansion policy but was merely a guarantee of trade protection.¹ His argument, it might be noted, later became a classic one with the colonial party and the opponents of colonialism always recognized it as representing the entering wedge of expansion. Bismarck expressed the same negative policy in his refusals to engage in any active pro-

¹ *Verhandlungen des Reichstages des Norddeutschen Bundes*, Nov. 30, 1870, p. 42. Cf. *supra*, p. 45.

tection of the commercial colonialists. He rejected the Hamburgers' petition for French colonies with the rejoinder that any colonial undertaking was premature;¹ he declined Consul Weber's advice for colonial activity in Samoa, admonishing the Consul meanwhile so to conduct German affairs as to "avoid any friction with the United States," as well as to be most tactful and "to promote no independent policy;"² he dampened the enthusiasm of the Crown Prince for Commissioner Dettering's demands for a naval station in China by directing a member of the Foreign Office to instruct the young Prince that Germany possessed neither men nor money for such adventures and could not afford "to be weakened from without."³

It becomes apparent, therefore,—so far as we are able to determine with the materials at hand—that the official attitude towards the rise of commercial colonialism and its demands was, until 1876, a forced recognition of its existence and a refusal of its petitions for protection. The easy-going practice of "diplomatic guardianship" could hardly be termed a real response.

Commercial colonialism, however, was gaining a momentum and strength to be demonstrated not directly by its own advertisement but indirectly by events which it precipitated. In the year 1875 a political crisis arose in the South Seas in consequence of the activities of the commercial colonialists, and it at once challenged the immediate attention of the Government.

On October 10, 1874, England ordered Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of New South Wales, to annex the Fiji Islands. The act was an earnest of those prophetic

¹ *Cf. supra*, p. 47.

² Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

³ *Cf. supra*, p. 48.

grumblings in the English press against Germany's colonial ambitions as represented by other merchants and traders in Africa, South Seas and elsewhere. At first the German settlers greeted the English flag with joy because they thought it meant greater security. They had always been accustomed to depend on England or any other country for consular aid when their own was lacking. When the German Consul at Levuka wrote warningly to Bismarck on October 15, 1874,¹ and expressed apprehension for the threatened German interests, the Chancellor replied on January 17, 1875, that he "shared in no way the apprehension, being rather of the opinion that the English occupation would prove very advantageous to the German settlers; it would afford them the security and protection of a strong government."²

The English, however, speedily realized the worst fears of the settlers and consuls. In the first place, they enacted the *Statute of Limitations* which cancelled all debts contracted by the Fijian inhabitants before the year 1871, thereby dealing a severe blow to the German merchants, "who for many years had been creditors for considerable sums;" and in the second place, they dispossessed the German settlers and evicted them from their lands and buildings without indemnity. In his report to the Chancellor on October 31, 1874,³ Consul Sahl of Sydney made the first demands for reparation for damages caused by the *Statute of Limitations*. Letters from other consuls and petitions from those dispossessed followed. The House of Godfrey also raised a cry. Indeed the menace to German trade and commercial interests as indicated by England's action

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 185; *Weissbuch*, 1885, pt. ii, p. 4.

² *Weissbuch*, 1885, pt. ii, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

put terror into the hearts of German colonists and traders in the South Seas, and warned them that all other independent islands were in danger.

Affairs in Samoa, also, contributed to this crisis. A state of civil war had prevailed there since 1870. The conflicting interests of England and the United States had complicated and aggravated the situation. The two Powers had attempted to secure control by the time-honored method of playing off against one another the rival claimants to the throne, the families of Taimoa and Puletua. Further entanglements had ensued from the unscrupulous actions of a Colonel A. B. Steinberger, a wily and shrewd adventurer from America. Steinberger had been sent to Samoa by the State Department of the United State as a special agent in 1872, in response to a public demand for information about the island. Submitting his report in 1873, he was sent back again to Samoa, carrying a letter from the President and presents to the chiefs, his official relations with the United States to be severed when the presents were delivered.¹ Two months prior to this final mission, however,—as shown from his papers seized upon his subsequent arrest by the State Department in 1876—he was in Hamburg and there entered into an agreement with the House of Godeffroy to establish a government in Samoa and identify the interests of that government with those of the German firm. We quote several extracts from this important document which shows the power sought by the merchants in Samoa, and which illustrates the direct part played by the commercial colonialists in the subsequent political crisis.

Agreement between A. B. Steinberger and Messrs. John Ceo. Godeffroy and Son of Hamburg, for their establishment at Apia. 16 Sept. 1874.

Croze, *American Samoa. A General Report by the Governor* (Washington, 1913), pp. 6 *et seq.*

1. Col. A. B. Steinberger proceeds to the Samoan Islands as U. S. Commissioner, in order to establish there a fixed and stable government upon the principles of good administration.

2. Col. A. B. Steinberger, who by his future position at Samoa and his home endorsement, will evidently exercise a paramount influence in the Samoan Islands, hereby pledges himself to the proper and legitimate interests of the establishments of Godeffroy and Son, at Apia; and to avoid all other business connections *in toto* in America, Europe, Samoa.

4. J. C. Godeffroy and Son promise as soon as the established government in Samoa is recognized by U. S. of America, to use directly and through the German consul at Apia all the influence they possess to promote the recognition of the Samoan Government by the German Empire. . . .

In addition to the above general stipulations, it had been agreed between Col. A. B. Steinberger and Messrs. Godeffroy and Son

a. Col. Steinberger is to procure for J. C. Godeffroy and Son at Apia the Samoan Government's recognition of all land sales heretofore made to the managers of the same by the nations.

b. The Government is to permit the introduction of foreign labor. . . .

d. The harbor duties at Apia are not to exceed, say, 3 cts. per ton. . . .

f. A per cap. tax is to be levied upon each adult male inhabitant of the Samoan group, to be paid to Samoan Government in kind, say, copra, cocoanut fibre and other articles of export. . . .

h. All copra and cocoa fibre obtained by the Samoan Government through taxation is to be sold to J. C. Godeffroy and Son at Apia, at the price of 1½ cent per pound. . . .

l. The Government of Samoa is to grant monopoly for the exportation of bark of "Ua" or paper mulberry to J. C. Godeffroy & Son. . . .

p. The firm of J. C. Godeffroy & Son is to be appointed the banker and fiscal agent of the Samoan Government.

r. Col. A. B. Steinberger is to receive \$2. per ton weight on all the copra and government fibre sold to J. C. Godeffroy and Son.

s. Col. A. B. Steinberger is to receive a commission of 10% on the amount of purchase of all other produce or material sold by Government of Samoa to J. C. Godeffroy and Son.

t. Col. A. B. Steinberger is to receive a commission of 10% of amount of all purchases made by Government of Samoa from J. C. Godeffroy and Son.¹

Steinberger succeeded for a time in establishing a government in Samoa supported by the powerful German firm. With no authority whatsoever he declared Samoa an American Protectorate. The United States immediately repudiated the act, but was unable to destroy Steinberger's rule at once. England, however, during his temporary absence, overthrew his government by supporting a rival candidate for the throne; but Steinberger returned and set up a new king, Malietoa. A quarrel ensued with the United States consul resulting in the arrest of Steinberger's party which by that time had every faction against it. A united government, a republic, was then formed in 1877, which represented both royal families, Taimoa and Puletua, and which looked to the interested nations for support.

All these disturbances greatly endangered the possessions and interests of German settlers, and they therefore served to make prominent and pressing the demands of the commercial colonialists for governmental protection and expansion. As the preamble to the Samoan Treaty described the situation, "the rapid and incomparable development of German trade in the South Seas demands a place where it can be maintained in safety outside these conflicts, outside the spheres of influence of other nations."² Indeed it was apparent from the Australian and American newspapers, which began to urge the annexation of New Guinea and Samoa by their respective states, that other nations were already beginning to grow excited and to apprehend Germany's possible

¹ *Executive Documents of House of Representatives of the United States, for the second session of the forty-fourth Congress, 1876-1877, vol. ix, document 44, inclosure i.*

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 714.

expansion overseas; and this reacted in creating a counter apprehension in Germany.¹

Further confirmation of Germany's fears and additional support to the appeals for trade protection were not lacking. Spain also appeared to be alarmed by the activities of Germany's commercial colonialists. The Governor-General of the Philippines had for several years resented the extension of Germany's trade into the Spanish colonial possessions, particularly with the Zulu Islands and the north shore of Borneo. He began to take measures to stop it. In August 1873 he ordered the cargoes of the German ships *Gazelle* and *Marie Louise* to be seized by a Spanish warship.² A part of the cargo chanced to be English, which fact at once forged an Anglo-German bond of union against Spain. In 1874, Spain sent a note to both Germany and England, ordering all ships trading with the Pelew and Caroline Islands to touch first at the Philipinies in order to pay duty.³ She thus attempted to hamper effectually German trade and possible settlement in the archipelago.

It is evident from the foregoing accounts that the jostling claims of a new economic imperialism in the South Seas were becoming most apparent. Indeed conflicting national interests were rapidly creating a political and economic crisis. And it is clear from the statement of von Küsserow, a former Secretary in the Foreign office,⁴ that more such clashes in other parts of the world were apprehended. He

¹ Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

² *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1875, *Aktenstück* no. 205, pp. 556-557.

³ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 279.

⁴ Heinrich von Küsserow had entered the Foreign Office as an Under-Secretary in 1863, had served as Secretary-to-the-Legation in Paris, Washington, London, for Prussia and the North German Confederation, 1864-1874, and as delegate in the *Reichstag* of the German Empire, 1871-1874.

said, "It is becoming necessary to protect Germany's shipping from piratical attacks in Chinese waters and on the West Coast of Africa; to guard German trade settlements from acts of power in the South Seas; and to defend Germans from legislation directed against them in overseas states, such as Haiti, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Colombia, and from revolutions in South America."¹

Gradually external events were making the German Government realize the utter inadequacy of its policy of mere "diplomatic guardianship;" threatening dangers abroad were exposing the futility of attempting to protect the commercial colonialists only by means of consuls. Moreover, actual conditions resulting from the activities of the commercial colonialists, were demonstrating to Bismarck clearly and specifically a fundamental truth—that expansion was inextricably intertwined with political power and prestige. Facts were vindicating the demands of the commercial colonialists for aid. England's action in the Fiji Islands fully illustrated that she adhered to the doctrine of international free trade only when it was to her own advantage so to do; the dream of "equal opportunity" in overseas trade, at which the commercial colonialists had always scoffed, was being rudely and finally dispelled. Events were proving that the tactics pursued by England, Spain, and the United States in order to guard their several interests overseas could only be met on the part of Germany by the adoption of like tactics.

The year 1875 marked a distinct change in the attitude of Bismarck toward the commercial colonialists. Instead of his former attitude of antagonism, indifference or mere "diplomatic guardianship," he commenced to display an active interest in the demands for protection. At the end

¹ Herrfurth, *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpol.*, 1909, *loc. cit.*, p. 726.

of the year 1874, Bismarck had appointed von Küsserow Counsellor to the Foreign Office—and had entrusted to him the conduct of all the overseas trade affairs.¹ Von Küsserow was a close friend of Lothar Bucher, almost the only Prussian official who had been at all in favor of colonies during the years from 1868 to 1871. Influenced by Bucher, von Küsserow had absorbed an enthusiasm for expansion, and had proved his zeal by the assiduity with which he had negotiated the South Sea trade treaties. Indeed, as Poschinger says, von Küsserow's "greatest service to Germany was that he had gradually overcome Bismarck's objection to the annexation of colonies, according to the proverb '*Gutta cavat lapidem.*'" ²

To be sure, the Government did not manifest its altered policy toward commercial colonialism all at once, but rather by three progressive steps; first, by the registering of protests against the interference of other nations; second, by the negotiation of treaties of trade and amity involving in some instances the acquisition of naval stations; and finally, by the establishment of virtual protectorates. These steps formed the usual and inevitable prelude to a definite colonial policy.

Bismarck initiated the new policy in March, 1875: he sent a vigorous note to Spain protesting against her customs regulations which were hampering German trade in the Zulu Islands. On this occasion, he wrote: "Since the German Government has hitherto entirely refrained from following any definite colonial policy, *it is all the more called upon to defend its trade from attack* Spain cannot, according to any of the outworn mercantilist theories of

¹ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 18. Cf. p. 61, note 4.

² Poschinger, "Aus der Denkwürdigkeit Heinrich von Küsserow," *Deutsche Revue*, February, 1908, p. 189.

a past age of discovery, assert her sovereignty over lands hitherto open to trade, where German merchants have founded factories and depots at great cost, sacrifice and trouble.”¹ Spain left the note unanswered but desisted from her customs demands.

Also, in the same year, on April 27, 1875, the Foreign Secretary von Bülow directed the German Ambassador, Count Münster in London, to call the attention of the British Government to the claims of the German settlers in Fiji.² England vouchsafed no response, however, but Bismarck, in consequence of another adverse report from the consul at Levuka concerning Fijian affairs, adopted a much more emphatic tone and instructed the German Ambassador in London, “to lose no opportunity, to make it understood that the *Imperial Government has a vital interest in the welfare of its subjects overseas.*”³

The diplomatic correspondence concerning the unindemnified and “robbed” Germans in the South Seas, dragged on and on. It became more and more heated, it magnified the German grievance against England’s “crowding policy,” and proved a potent influence in the development of the colonial movement.

Meanwhile, the Government advanced a second step. It determined upon a policy of trade protection more vigorous than that of mere protest, with which to combat the imperialistic actions and designs of England, the United States and Spain in the South Pacific, as well as to demonstrate “its vital interest in the welfare of its subjects over seas.”

This second stage of the new policy was marked by the treaties of trade and amity drawn up between the years from 1876 to 1879. In these treaties the German Govern-

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1875, *Aktenstück*, no. 205.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 186.

Ibid., p. 187. *Vide*, also, *Weissbuch*, 1885, pt. ii, pp. 5-6.

ment finally departed from its hitherto ineffective custom of merely guaranteeing the independence and safety of its overseas subjects by diplomacy and consular protection. It was forced thereto, as we have seen, by the politico-economic crisis created by the activities of commercial colonialism. As Bismarck expressed it in the preamble to the Samoan Treaty, "Should the empire continue its policy of refusing the acquisition of colonies which has been followed heretofore, it would be all the more imperative for it to preserve the neutrality of its overseas settlements, and, at the same time, to establish the complete equality of opportunity for Germany with all other nations."¹

A brief account of the negotiation of the treaties of trade and amity will make clearer the circumstances of their origin as well as the influence of commercial colonialism upon their consummation. The Tongan Treaty introduced the new policy. The immediate causes of its negotiation were the crisis in the South Seas, rumors that England contemplated more annexations, the conclusion of a commercial treaty between the United States and the Sandwich Islands, and the conviction that the only independent islands remaining, as well as the most valuable to German trade, were the Samoan and Tongan groups. In 1875, Germany sent the *S. S. Gazelle* to spy out the land in the South Seas Archipelago. Her commander anchored in the harbor of Nukualofa on December 13, 1875; he saluted the Tongan flag and assured the king that he desired nothing more than to obtain news of German settlers. King George received him very cordially and seized the opportunity to let it be known that he desired a treaty with Germany² (according

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 714-715.

² *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages, 1877, Aktenstück no. 80, pp. 279 et seq.*

to the German account). On her way home, the *Gazelle* stopped at Apia in Samoa where her captain obtained the first information of the civil war described above. His report, taken in conjunction with consular and mercantile advices described fully the revolutionary state of affairs and their threatening menace to German interests, and finally induced the German Government to order the steamship *Hertha* to proceed from the East Asian Coast to Samoa.¹ The captain of the *Hertha* was instructed to cooperate with Consul Weber in maintaining the strict neutrality of Germany in the civil conflicts, in encouraging the establishment of a strong government, and in obtaining treaties of amity. The steamship *Hertha* arrived in Samoa on October 2, 1876, but the turbulent condition of the islands precluded a sufficiently stable government with which to negotiate treaties. Her captain then proceeded to Tonga where he began negotiations with King George on October 27, 1876. The result was the Tongan Treaty of November 1, 1876, which guaranteed reciprocal commercial freedom and ceded to Germany the right of establishing a naval station on the Vavao Islands.²

In Germany, the *Reichstag* discussed the Tongan Treaty on April 11, 1877, and ratified it on April 20, with little or no opposition. Everyone spoke in favor of it with the exception of Prince Radziwill, the Catholic Centrist, who thought it might be interpreted by England and France as a political move, and regretted exceedingly that the promoters of the treaty seemed more interested in its commercial advantages than in its cultural and religious opportunities.³

The discussions in the *Reichstag* emphasized two salient

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 714-715.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 5.

³ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 20, 1877, p. 634.

points: first, that the treaty was a new departure in policy; and second, that it inaugurated a policy of trade protection and not one of colonization,—in other words, that it was commercial rather than political.

"I welcome this treaty as the beginning of a new policy," said Dr. Kapp.¹ "Every German patriot must be filled with joy to see this new policy of the Foreign Office," added Dr. Bunsen.²

Von Philippssohn, Director of the Foreign Office, implied that it was the earnest desire and aim of the administration to protect German trade. He said: "A corner stone only is laid We have been considering this treaty for a long time on account of the important settlements which the Hanse Towns have made in these islands. But the circumstances had to be favorable."³

Not the slightest hint of an intended colonial policy appeared in the debates or in any documents relative to the treaty. Indeed, the preamble to the treaty expressly and emphatically stated in regard to Article V, providing for the acquisition of a naval base, that,

This should not be considered as the establishment of a colony, an idea which the *Government distinctly and particularly repudiates*. . . . The negotiators of the treaty purposely disregarded the opportunity of establishing a settlement (colony), and in accordance with the intention of the Imperial Government, secured the necessary land only for a naval base. . . . Also, in order that there should be no doubt that this settlement would not serve as an annexation to the German Empire, the term "coaling station" was significantly employed and the full sovereignty of the King of Tonga was expressly guaranteed.⁴

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 11, 1877, p. 378.

² *Ibid.*, April 29, 1877, p. 634.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1877, *Aktenstück* no. 80, p. 283.

Were any further proof necessary to substantiate the fact that, at this time, the administration contemplated no actual colonial annexation, but only overseas trade protection, we have Bismarck's pencilled notes upon the margin of the proposed Tongan Treaty, "What is a coaling station? Only a harbor or bay on the coast? Harbors for our exclusive use? . . . I am concerned lest we become involved in something *similar to an imperial colonial policy* by a factitious support of the navy."¹ And Bismarck stubbornly persevered in refusing to establish the coaling station in Tonga authorized by the treaty.² Nevertheless, the initial step of an imperial colonial policy had been taken, a naval base had been officially acquired, and had it been occupied, as Delavaud says, Germany's colonialism would have dated from 1876.³

Concurrently with the Tongan Treaty, the Government also adopted a more energetic policy toward Spain in regard to trade in the Zulu Islands. Although Spain had desisted from her customs demands after Germany's and England's note of March 4, 1875, she had interfered with the German Steamship *Minna* as well as with German and English merchants. For a long time Germany received no reply from Madrid to her many complaints and Spain's procrastination made her determine to effect a settlement which would be final. After protracted negotiations, an agreement was reached with Spain, on March 11, 1877, which was incorporated into a protocol.⁴ Thereby, Spain accorded to

¹ Herrfurth, *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik*, 1909, *loc. cit.*, p. 726. *Vide*, also, Poschinger, *Kölnische Zeitung*, *loc. cit.*, Aug. 31, 1906, a quotation from letter from Brauer to von Küsserow, June 30, 1876.

² *Deutsche Revue*, 1908, *loc. cit.*, p. 189.

³ Delavaud, "La Colonisation allemande," *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*, October, 1887, pp. 523-546.

⁴ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1877, *Aktenstück* no. 205, pp. 556-557.

Germany and England complete freedom of trade with Zulu.

The opportunity to rear the superstructure of the new policy of trade protection upon the "corner-stone," to which von Philippsohn had likened the Tongan Treaty, presented itself very speedily. Affairs rapidly shaped themselves for the negotiation of the Samoan Treaty which was to extend the practice of trade treaties, in short, to cap the climax of that system which the Tongan Treaty had begun. The Tongan Treaty had, in fact, accentuated the imperialistic tension and had increased the anxieties of watchful waiting. Civil war still persisted in Samoa and Germany adopted the aggressive method of stationing war ships near the islands to guard her interests; indeed for that one purpose, the Government expended 2,609,560 M. from 1877 to 1880.¹

Consul Weber strove to preserve the neutrality of the German districts in Samoa amid the clashes of English and Americal rivalry. When Malietoa was overthrown, upon the arrest of Steinberger, in 1877, and a united government, a republic, was established under the patronage of the families of Taimoa and Puletua, stability was not yet secured; for, while the Taimoa party turned to both the Queen of England and the President of the United States for protection, the Puletua party announced that Samoa wished to respect the equality of all nations therein. The German consul and the commander of the steamship *Augusta* seized this opportunity to conclude on July 2, 1877, with both these parties an agreement which promised protection to German settlers and merchants in case of civil war or interference from a third party, and which guaranteed the neutrality of Germany.²

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1880, *Aktenstück* no. 101, p. 724, *Denkschrift* to Samoa *Vorlage*.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 715.

Germany's agreement with the Samoan Government, of course, called forth "demonstrations of power" from both England and the United States. Sir Arthur Gordon, Governor of the Fijis, visited the islands in the capacity of "Lord High Commissioner," and established a court to judge all differences between English subjects in the Pacific and foreigners.¹ His action made it appear as though England were premeditating a protectorate or annexation, which alarmed the Americans. They feared losing the port of Pago-Pago, and in consequence, the United States concluded a treaty with the Samoan government to establish a coaling station at Pago-Pago.²

The German Government declared that the American-Samoan Treaty conceding advantages to the United States, constituted a violation of the German agreement with Samoa of 1877, and also that it would not tolerate the aggression of Americans upon its trade settlements. It therefore sent into Oceania the S. S. *Ariadne*, which anchored at Apia on June 28, 1878. On July 4, German warships occupied Apia and Saluafata on the Opolu Islands where German factories were located. The Germans forcibly expelled many California traders and began to fortify these two ports. Furthermore in November, 1879, the German Government appointed Captain Zembsh as Official Consul General to the islands of Samoa and Tonga and his instructions seemed to indicate the German intention of establishing a protectorate. The reply of the United States to this action was to send a warship to guard its interests. Although the Berlin Cabinet protested that it did not wish to take possession of Samoa, but desired only to protect German commercial establishments, it had created a "Samoa Crisis."

¹ *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*, loc. cit., 1887, p. 533.

² Crose, *American Samoa, Report of Governor* (Washington, 1913), p. 7.

Germany next proceeded to turn the "Samoa crisis" to her own advantage. On January 16, 1879, the German S. S. *Albatross* joined the S. S. *Ariadne* at Samoa, and on January 24, 1879, Captain Werner signed the Samoan Treaty of Amity with the *de facto* Government of Samoa (Taimoa-Faipula's), thereby acquiring the right to establish a coaling station at Saluafata on the Island of Opolu. Besides the usual provisions of reciprocal trade advantage, the treaty in Article V ceded to Germany "rights which the Government of Samoa is forbidden to grant to any other nation." Also, the "Samoa Government will not grant to any other nation any rights in Apia which it does not grant first to Germany."¹

In addition to the Samoan Treaty, other treaties negotiated by Captain Werner were signed at the same time and later with many small islands. They assured Germany equal rights of trade with other nations as well as additional coaling stations. These treaties were: on November 12, 1878, with the King of Ellice and Gilbert Islands; on November 29, 1878, with Chiefs of Marshall and Ralick Islands, article IX granting to Germany the port of Jaluit as a coaling station on the Island of Bonham;² on November 29, 1878, with Chiefs of Duke of York Islands and the northern coast of New Britain, ceding to Germany two coaling stations, Mioko and Makada;³ and on April 28, 1879, with the Queen of the Society Islands.³

A similar attempt to negotiate trade advantages with the Leeward Islands near Tahiti was less successful, however. In April, 1879, the frigate *Bismarck* conveying Zembsch, the Consul General of Samoa and Tonga, appeared at

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1879, *Aktenstück* no. 239, p. 725. *Vide*, also, *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1878-1879, p. 241.

² *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1879, *Aktenstück* no. 239.

³ *Ibid.*, 1880, *Aktenstück* no. 101.

Raiatea on these islands. The German consul at Tahiti joined him and the Germans remained fourteen days, making maps and trying to persuade the chiefs to sign treaties of amity and trade which would pave the way for the installation of a German consul. The chiefs refused to concede any privileges without the advice of England and France. The chiefs of Bora-Bora followed their example, even though some of them "had accepted as many as five hundred cigars from the Germans."¹

The *Reichstag* discussed the Samoan Treaty, together with the minor treaties with the small islands, on June 13, 1879, and ratified them by a large majority on June 16.

The documents and discussions of the Samoan Treaty stressed with greater emphasis the two points established by the Tongan Treaty debates: on the one hand, they indicated most clearly a changed attitude on the part of the Government toward trade protection overseas; and on the other hand, they proclaimed the new policy to be limited to trade protection only, and not to sanction the founding of colonies. Before the treaty was presented to the *Reichstag*, the official *Deutscher Reichs Anzeiger* published a "categorical explanation, that the administration did not think of occupying the Samoan Islands as a result of the difficulties there; that 'überhaupt' the Government contemplated no colonial annexations of any kind."² Likewise, von Bülow, the Foreign Secretary, in presenting the treaty said, "We regard it as our duty to protect German settlers and trade in Samoa, but *not to have those settlements regarded as colonies*. We do not wish to *found colonies*. We desire no monopoly against others. We only wish to guarantee the rights of German shipping and trade."³

¹ *Annales de l'école etc., loc. cit.*, 1887, p. 534.

² Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?* (Gotha, 1879), p. 53.

³ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 13, 1879, p. 1603.

To be sure, Dr. Gareis expressed the fear that, "Although we have heard repeatedly from all sources that the Government does not intend to carry on state-directed colonialism, I hope this is true . . . but there appear a few indications of it . . . as, for instance, the actual territory acquired by the Government,—the harbors of Makada and Mioko and the coaling station at Jaluit. If these are going to be regarded as still under the state to which they belong, then no colonial policy is to be feared; but if they are to be considered as parts of Germany, then the treaties mean colonialism."¹ But von Bülow replied: "It is '*durchaus*' no colonial nor monopolistic policy but merely the single principle that where I have planted my foot, there shall no other man be allowed to place his."²

Also, Prince Radziwill pleaded that, "an article should be added to the treaty providing for the propagation of religion, culture and civilization. Has Germany, the land of thought, no other interests to represent in these islands but those of the merchant and trader?"³ But von Küsserow responded: "Since the treaty only concerns our commercial policy, we cannot insert articles which do not deal directly with trade and commerce."⁴

Indeed, the administration registered itself in these debates as definitely inaugurating a system of trade protection. It indorsed even the acquisition and purchase of naval stations, the inevitable introduction to annexation, although, at the same time, it emphatically denied any intention of expanding this system into one of actual colonization.

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 13, p. 1612.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1614.

³ *Ibid.*, June 16, p. 1651.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 16, 1879, p. 1652.

However, before the expiration of the year 1879, already so replete with examples of a changed administrative attitude, the Government took the third step in its policy towards the protection of overseas trade—a step which stopped just short of actual colonialism.

After the ratification of the Samoan Treaty, affairs in Samoa again grew tumultuous. The troubles between Taimoa and the old King Mailetoa had not been settled. Sir Arthur Gordon had restored Malietoa to the throne and had obtained from him the right to establish a naval station. The German Consul did not oppose the revolution in government, but in order not to leave England predominant, he concluded with Gordon and the Commander of the United States warship *Lackawanna* a Convention designed to maintain order in Samoa. The Convention decreed that the port of Apia was henceforth to be governed by a municipal administration composed of the consuls of Germany, England and the United States and that Malietoa was to be recognized as king.¹ Furthermore, the agreement confirmed all Germany's rights acquired by the Samoan Treaty of January 24, 1879.² The Samoans were now practically under the joint protection of Germany, England, and the United States. Germany had established a virtual protectorate, although it was a joint one.

Meanwhile, the German Government was not confining its new policy to direct measures, such as treaties of trade and amity; it was furthering the interest of overseas trade by several indirect means. For example in 1879 the Government suddenly created a special department of the Foreign Office to supervise overseas trade which was beginning to assume large proportions. However, Bismarck's

¹ Malietoa was solemnly proclaimed king on December 23, 1879, on board the S. S. *Bismarck* in the harbor of Apia.

² *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1880, *Aktenstück* no. 101, p. 728.

"swing to protection," the reversal of the German fiscal system in 1879 from free-trade to protective tariff, stands out as the most important indirect influence upon commercial colonialism. Indeed recent imperialism is a natural and historical corollary to a protective tariff. And in Germany's case, the repudiation of free trade was a tremendous stimulus to the colonial movement. The time-honored argument, "Colonies are an anachronism in an era of cosmopolitanism, are out of spirit with the age," could now be completely refuted; "the spirit of the age" had changed.

It is an interesting question, though essentially outside the scope of this discussion, whether the activities of the commercial colonialists may not be considered as one of the many causes of Bismarck's "swing to protection." Had not their efforts demonstrated to Bismarck the utter futility of his dependence upon free-trade, as well as the inseparable connection of trade protection and political prestige? Who would appreciate more keenly than the Chancellor that, "as a result of the Samoan treaty, all changes henceforth in Samoa will depend upon the consent of Germany?"¹ Bismarck, as we have seen, had trusted, before 1874, to a liberal trade policy to open all countries and colonies to Germany; and this had worked fairly well so long as Gladstone had managed affairs in England. After 1874, the doctrines of the Manchester School began to seem more ideal than practical; agitation for the revival of protectionism commenced to appear; with the progress of industry and shipping and the increase of population, an imperialistic tendency took possession of every nation. The commercial colonialists had grasped these changed conditions and had

¹ *Annales de l'école etc.*, 1887, *loc. cit.*, p. 535, quoting *Nord. Deut. Allg. Zt.*

shown that equality of economic opportunity existed nowhere for Germany. May not some roots of the imperial tariff policy, perhaps, be found in the first responses of the Government, reviewed above, to the commercial colonialists and their importunities for trade protection? Was it not a logical step from these first responses of trade protection to a thorough-going adoption of a national protective tariff?

We have now reviewed the progressive attitude of the Government to commercial colonialism from 1871 to 1879. We have observed the administration gradually yielding to the pressure exerted by the petitions of the colonialists and by the political and economic crises which their activities caused. Step by step we have seen the Government advance from mere "diplomatic guardianship" to, first, an attitude of protest against foreign interference with German overseas merchants and traders, illustrated by the notes to Spain and the complaints to England; then, to a vigorous policy of direct and indirect protection and support, indicated by the Tongan, Samoan and other treaties and the adoption of protective tariff; and finally, to the introduction of a real, although unacknowledged colonialism by the acquisition of naval stations and the establishment of a quasi-protectorate in Samoa. We must now turn to the colonial movement itself and note the effect upon it of this changed administrative policy.

We last witnessed the colonial party merely in an embryonic stage. It consisted of a group of commercial colonialists, who based their claims upon their own achievements, who demanded that their commercial ventures be protected, and who crystallized themselves into a party by the similarity of their attacks upon the Government. By the year 1879, these protagonists of expansion had won governmental protection of overseas trade and had gained solid-

arity in their common victory. Emboldened by their success, they still remained in the vanguard of all colonialists, and they had the temerity to introduce into the *Reichstag* the subject of state-directed colonialism and the actual acquisition of territory for colonies. It is significant that they did not broach the subject in the Tongan Treaty discussions; but two years later, on the occasion of accepting the Samoan Treaty, they openly urged for the first time in the *Reichstag* official annexation of lands overseas.

The reasons for their confidence are obvious: in 1877, the Government had distinctly denied that it regarded the naval station acquired by the Tongan Treaty as in any sense a colony, and Bismarck had strongly asserted his objection even to naval stations; but in 1879, conditions had decidedly changed. The first sign of change had been in 1876, when Lüderitz and his friends had presented the project of a German colony and protectorate in the Transvaal. They were not curtly dismissed, as we have already noted; Bismarck's attitude was no longer one of absolute refusal, although he still regarded the project as immediately impracticable.¹ The Chancellor received the petitioners with great courtesy and personally appeared to sympathize with their plan. He said that he had studied the question of colonies for some years and had concluded that, "A great nation like Germany, in the end, could not dispense with colonies; but, as much as he was *in principle* in favor of the acquisition of colonies, the question appeared so complicated that he hesitated to embark upon colonization without adequate preparation and a definite impulse from the nation itself."² He added that the political situation was also unfavorable at that time—conditioned as it was by

¹ Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. i, p. 117. Cf. *supra*, chap. ii, p. 49.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 3-4.

the jealousy of France, the sensitiveness of England, the *Kulturkampf*—; but he held out the hope that something might be done in nine or ten years, “when there shall have been created a deep-seated, national movement in favor of it.” Besides this, the Chancellor said, “The internal situation must change.”¹

Fabri confirms for us the impression of a change in Bismarck’s attitude. He wrote in February, 1879, before the ratification of the Samoan Treaty, as follows:

“Regarding the position of the Chancellor, it seems to us doubtful whether he really maintains a merely negative attitude in regard to colonization. Until the present time it has always been well understood that the watchword in the Chancellor’s office and in the Foreign Office was to deny decisively any purpose of Germany to acquire colonies. But whether this decidedly negative policy, on the part of the Chancellor, himself, does not mean a ‘not yet’ rather than a ‘not at all,’ is today very doubtful.”²

Moreover, the economic situation, resulting from the crisis of 1873, would naturally reinforce a change in Bismarck’s point of view; in fact it exerted no inconsiderable influence upon it. The financial crisis of 1873 was aggravated by the parallel rise of socialism; by the consequent anti-socialist legislation; by a diminution of the labor market and by an increase in wages. In fact the suggestion has been advanced that, in order to divert men’s minds from the social struggle at home, Bismarck was more inclined to encourage colonial adventures abroad. Added to this, the startling statistics of emigration could not fail to impress the Chancellor.

¹ Poschinger, *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik*, October, 1909, *loc. cit.*, p. 725.

² Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?*, pp. 54-55.

Year	Number Emigrants
1871	75,912
1872	128,243
1873	110,414
1874	47,623
1875	32,362
1876	29,626
1877	21,964
1878	24,217 ¹

Also, by the year 1879, the *Kulturkampf* was drawing to a close, and the *Kulturkampf* had been mentioned by Bismarck himself as a deterrent to the official consideration of colonial expansion.

It is evident, therefore, that the domestic affairs of the nation, together with Bismarck's apparent transition to a more sympathetic viewpoint, created favorable conditions for the growth of the colonial party.

Foreign affairs likewise served to advance the colonial movement. As they had helped to precipitate governmental action abroad, so they justified and strengthened the position of the commercial colonialists at home. A newer foreign imperialism was becoming ever more threatening. England had commenced her ambitious activities in Egypt and in 1877 had annexed the Transvaal; France was on the eve of founding her second colonial empire. Furthermore, Great Britain continued to ignore Germany's claims in regard to the indemnities of her Fiji Island settlers. Bismarck had, significantly enough, revived the correspondence relative to this question on May 23, 1879.² His letter to the German Ambassador in London had only elicited on June 17, 1879, the unsatisfactory reply from Lord Salisbury, that the matter had been brought to the attention of

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1879, *Aktenstück* no. 187, p. 1431.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 187.

the Colonial Office. Furthermore, the Congress of Berlin in 1878 had served to bring the German public into closer contact with international affairs; it had revealed more clearly the aims, ambitions and relative strengths of the other great powers, while it must have demonstrated the necessity and advisability of Germany's speedy acquisition of possessions overseas in order to enable her also to take part in the imperialistic game.

The colonial party was encouraged and fortified by all these circumstances—the external and internal political and economic conditions, as well as Bismarck's apparently more favorable attitude. It saw the latter exemplified in the increasingly responsive reaction of the Government to commercial colonialism, in the definite yielding to demands for trade protection overseas, and in the almost aggressive actions of 1879—the acquisition of naval stations, the establishment of a protectorate and the adoption of a protective tariff. Hence, the leaders of the colonial movement were emboldened, as they had not been in 1876, to advocate publicly in the *Reichstag* the next steps of a colonial policy. And they dared to do this in spite of the Government's official and emphatic repudiations of any colonial intentions.

Mosle, the Bremen merchant of the firm so active in presenting the petition of 1870, was the spokesman for the new idea that Germany should acquire colonies at once.¹ He indicated the tremendous strength of German trade in the South Seas as an argument for adopting the Samoan Treaty, he welcomed the policy of trade protection most heartily, and then he suggested that he would like to see the policy carried further.

I am entirely agreed that the German Government should not

¹ Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

attempt to seize for itself any monopoly in Polynesia, but I would indeed rejoice, should the Government find it advantageous, in Polynesia or in any other part of the world, to progress from treaties of amity and trade to protectorate treaties, yes, even to the *annexation* or *seizure* of lands in order to establish its own colonies. Should a favorable occasion arise, I should not hesitate to encourage the empire to pursue such a policy at once. . . . The arguments against it are unfounded. . . . I consider the establishment of colonies, both for the encouragement of trade and industry, and the general prosperous development of the German empire and all German interests as not only highly advantageous, but indeed necessary.¹

Mosle went on to recommend state subsidies for steamship lines to Polynesia, to Japan, and to China.

The bold demand of the commercial colonialists for a thorough-going colonial policy did not pass unchallenged. Bamberger, a radical leader of the free-trade party, led the opposition to colonialism.² He not only attacked the commercial colonialists for taking advantage of the Samoan Treaty to press their extreme demands for colonial annexations, but he also accused the Government of a secret sympathy with colonial policy. In a sarcastic and bitter speech he said: "Perhaps Mosle is a truer interpreter of Bismarck's and the Government's attitude and position than the official press and the preamble to the treaty, as I note a difference between these and the opinions expressed by their advocates in the *Reichstag* I would certainly describe a treaty of amity, such as the Samoan, as cosmopolitan in character, but this one is not. We have heard

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 16, 1879, pp. 1603 et seq.

² Ludwig Bamberger (1833-1899), a prolific writer on political economy and a very influential member of the *Reichstag*. He belonged to the left wing of the National Liberal party, was a bitter enemy of Bismarck, and in 1880 was foremost among those who repudiated the National Liberal party and formed the *Liberale Vereinigung*.

cosmopolitanism decried here in these debates as a difficulty in the way of trade, as a defect in our political system. . . . The Government seems really intent upon adopting a colonial policy which is beneficial only to trade, very expensive and apt to result in slave labor."¹ Other members of the Opposition raised objections to the treaty on the same grounds, and they all confirmed the suspicion that a colonial policy was planned by the Government and concealed in the Samoan Treaty.²

The Opposition voted for the treaty in the end, however, but only as a treaty of trade and amity. They had evidently been convinced by the Government's emphatic disavowals of a colonial policy, which they accepted at their face value.³ The violent antagonism displayed toward the colonialists, nevertheless, marked the first cleavage of groups in the *Reichstag* on the colonial question and indicated the appearance of a definite colonial party in the National Assembly.

Other signs, also, pointed to the growth, coalescence and strength of a colonial party within the nation. Various groups which promoted expansion for different reasons rallied to the common cause and enlisted their energies under the leadership of the commercial colonialists. For example, the Central Association for Commercial Geography and German Interests Abroad, founded in 1868,⁴ underwent a reorganization and reinvigoration. At a meeting of the Geographical Society at Frankfort on January 16, 1878, Dr. Franz Moldenhauer presented his pamphlet, *Die Erörterung über Kolonial und Auswanderungswesen*. He proposed that all the geographical societies (branches of

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 13, 1879, pp. 1611 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, June 16, 1879, pp. 1650 *et seq.*

³ Cf. *supra*, chap. iv, p. 72.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 51.

the old Central Association), should unite in a reorganized and coöperative effort to promote colonialism and to direct emigration.¹ His suggestion was carried out, thanks partly to the influence of the meeting of the International Congress for Commercial Geography at Paris in 1878. The result was a new society, founded on October 9, 1878, in Berlin, by Dr. Jannarsch and Kersten, still called the Central Association and possessing practically the same objects as the original society described above. The new organization, according to its constitution, aimed to increase foreign trade, to direct emigration, to disseminate knowledge, and, most important of all, "to *bring about the founding of colonies* by establishing trade and naval stations." Furthermore, it continued to publish *Der Export*, the organ of the original society, and issued extensive colonial propaganda. It collected all sorts of information for merchants, geographers, and industrials, building up a considerable correspondence. In 1879, the Central Association sent an exhibit of German trade to an exposition in New South Wales and, in the year 1883, it opened a Commercial and Geographical Museum in Berlin and a library attached. With a steadily increasing membership reaching three thousand in 1883, the Society became an exceedingly influential factor in crystallizing public opinion in favor of colonization and in strengthening the colonial party.

It finally appears that the pressure of commercial colonialism upon the Government was too strong; that it induced the adoption of a vigorous policy of imperial trade protection overseas; and that the favorable reaction of the Government, in turn, resulted in the formation of a definite colonial party. In the words of Mosle, the colonialists welcomed the new administrative policy of trade protection,

¹ *Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 1882, p. 309, note. Vide, also, *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 1880, p. 12.

not only because " it guarantees the security of their business interests abroad," but, principally, because it " contradicts Bismarck's supposed indifference to commercial colonialism and points the *way to a new era*," namely, state-directed colonialism, the next phase of the expansion movement.

CHAPTER V

COLONIALISM A NATIONAL AND POLITICAL ISSUE

THE promoters of the colonial movement had won a significant victory in securing imperial protection for overseas trade. They lost no time in embarking upon a campaign for state-directed colonialism and a thorough-going policy of annexation. However, they were clever enough to remember the Chancellor's objection that state-directed colonialism could not be undertaken by the Government without a "deep-seated popular demand and approval." Bismarck's words furnished a cue as to how next to proceed; indeed they became a party slogan. It was, as Fabri said, "A difficult time in Germany to create a general and popular movement of public opinion in favor of colonies, which would overcome the party quarrels, . . . especially as the colonial party is lacking in political experience and individuality as well as in any influence or weight."¹ Nevertheless, the leaders devoted themselves to the task with diligence.

To achieve their purpose of making colonialism a political and national issue, the colonial partisans adopted three policies. They disseminated propaganda; they sought to create political influence for the colonial party in order to render it an important factor in party politics; and they exerted a special economic pressure upon the Government.

An idea of the efficacy and scope of the first part of their program may be obtained by a survey of the propagandist

¹ Fabri, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

literature during the years from 1879 to 1881. At least the quantity which they produced was impressive: forty books appeared upon the subject of colonization from 1880 to 1882.¹ All the propaganda was alike in that it based the arguments for colonial expansion upon vital political economic necessity and carried a stirring appeal to patriotic emotion, not without a certain jingoistic ring.

Foremost among the propagandists stood Hübbe-Schleiden and Fabri.² The former, a lawyer and statesman, was interested in a mercantile house in Hamburg, had been an explorer in equatorial Africa, and a merchant from 1875 to 1877 in Gabun. The latter, for twenty-seven years Inspector of the Rhine Mission, which, it will be remembered, engaged largely in trade in Namaqualand, became convinced of Germany's need of colonies and had devoted himself to the cause. He had promoted it by his books, by his articles in the *Kölnische Zeitung* and elsewhere, by his speeches at innumerable gatherings, and by a many-sided correspondence with friends of a colonial policy and with the great industrials. Fabri occupied the position of honorary professor at the University of Bonn, and founded in 1880 at Düsseldorf the *West Deutch Verein für Kolonisation und Export*.³ Hübbe-Schleiden later became business manager of this society. Under Woermann's influence, the organization tried to induce bankers to finance a plantation colony

¹ *Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 1884, p. 327.

² Mosle cited these two writers in the debates over the Samoan Treaty and urged that the Bureau of the Reichstag purchase copies of their books [Hübbe-Schleiden, *Die Ethiopieen: Studien über West Afrika* (Hamburg, 1879), an attempt to arouse interest in these sub-tropical people as affording a market for Germany. Fabri, *Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien* (Gotha, 1879)] and distribute them to all members of the national assembly. *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 13, 1879, p. 604.

³ *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. xlviii, pp. 473-475.

in Kameroun. Indeed, it is significant that both Hübbe-Schleiden's and Fabri's writings received the warm support and patronage of the firm of Woermann, which publicly expressed the hope that they might fall on fruitful ground so that steps would immediately be taken before all available territory was seized by other powers.¹

Thus we see that the two leading propagandists represented within their lives and experience all the various currents making for a colonial policy and underlying the "colonial idea." In presenting colonialism as a national and political question, however, they subordinated their ecclesiastical, intellectual and scientific interests to the commercial and economic.

Primarily, we may say, Hübbe-Schleiden represented the political and Fabri the economic aspects of the question. It is Hübbe-Schleiden, however, who must be credited with having been the first to elevate the subject of acquiring colonies to the plane of a distinctively national policy. A most prolific writer upon colonialism and a tremendously influential factor in the movement, his viewpoint is by far the most original and significant of any of the propagandists. He is the prophet of a new era for Germany; an era to be characterized by an intense, overgrown nationalism, developing into a grasping imperialism, which was to lead straight along the road to ultimate downfall. He it was who cleverly linked up colonialism with the contemporary transformation in the *Weltanschauung* of the empire, from a liberal, *laissez-faire* cosmopolitanism and internationalism to a conservative, individualized and narrow nationalism; and in so doing, he served further to accentuate and accelerate that change. He made the solution of the colonial question dependent upon the already visible shift in the

¹ *Mitteilungen der Hamburg-Geographische Gesellschaft*, 1878-1879, p. 58, quoted by Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

national mind of Germany; he identified himself and colonialism with the "younger generation," the more advanced thinkers, and thereby gained for the movement that stimulating quality inherent in all movements which claim to have escaped from the reactionaries and to be apprehended only by "more enlightened minds."

A quotation from Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell* on the fly leaf of Hübbe-Schleiden's book, *Deutsch Kolonisation*,¹ "*Es lebt ein anders-denkendes Geschlecht*," gives us the key note to his thesis. "To the old generation, the term 'nationality' has only an ethnographical content, but for the younger it has a political." Hence the outworn international idea clung to by the past generation must not be allowed to block the ambitions of the present. That would mean suicide for Germany. "The luxury of a cosmopolitan *Weltanschauung* can only be indulged in by the Great Powers, not those who still must struggle for greatness." This cosmopolitanism, he thinks, is too idealistic, too colorless; the practical fact remains that nations exist. As he phrases it, "This striving after cosmopolitanism, this internationalism, is today, for any non-Anglo-Saxon race, only a betrayal of its individual nationality to the English. . . . Germany has for one hundred years sacrificed its civilization to England."

Hübbe-Schleiden emphasized the fact that the development of a self-conscious national feeling as well as of a strong overseas policy, which in trade and emigration acknowledge only a national flag, were questions of life and death for Germany's future. "*Los von Nord Amerika, Los von Gross-Britanien*," was his slogan.

In order to demonstrate how the German nation, racially, economically and culturally might ultimately be absorbed by Great Britain, he drew a most graphic picture of the future, well calculated to strike terror into the soul of every patriot

¹ Hübbe-Schleiden, *Deutsche Kolonisation* (Hamburg, 1881).

and incidentally to incite a keen jealousy of England. He attempted to depict the result in the year 1980 of the gradual absorption of German emigrants into other lands, an absorption caused by the non-existence of German colonies. Estimating by the contemporary rate of emigration, he constructed the following table.

Race	1850	1875	1980
English	55,817,000	90,564,000	907,000,000
German	52,930,000	64,470,000	146,000,000
Dutch	7,500,000	9,202,000	20,500,000
Scandinavian	6,272,000	8,134,000	24,300,000
Russian	63,010,000	83,790,000	275,000,000
Romance (Latin)	113,142,000	127,588,000	212,202,000 ¹

Germany then, by the year 1980, would be in the present position of Spain as a nation and the Germans would be the slaves of England.

Likewise he exposed the "Free-Trade Parody," as he termed it. He showed how the practice of free trade, instead of creating equal opportunity for all merchants, had enabled England to increase her control of world trade within two decades (1855-1875) from sixty-one percent to seventy percent.

A natural corollary to the foregoing argument was Germany's mission to spread her *Kultur* as a means of maintaining *Deutschtum*. "In this manner a country exhibits before the world, her strength or weakness as a nation."² As Hübbe-Schleiden said, "How many inventions or discoveries are made by Germans decades before they are even thought of by Englishmen or by Frenchmen but are advertised to the world as of English or of French origin. Hence prestige and *Kultur* become submerged."³

¹ Hübbe-Schleiden, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

² Hübbe-Schleiden, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

In this same connection Hübbe-Schleiden emphasized the fact that it was Germany's duty to expand and preserve her *Kultur* not only for her own sake, but to advance the cause of world civilization. He also made this idea clear in an article entitled, *Kulturfähigkeit der Neger*, in which he pleaded that German *Kultur* if spread in Africa, would mean progress for the whole negro race. Unfortunately, we gain the impression that this would be true only if Africa proved "good business;" if not, the negro was incapable of culture.

In presenting such a conviction of the necessity for colonial expansion, it was but the next step to harp upon the "honor of Germany." This "honor" now demanded, Hübbe-Schleiden claimed, annexation to preserve the political position of the Fatherland, just as commercial colonialism had required a protective tariff. Indeed it did not demand much insight on the part of these national and colonial enthusiasts to cause them to point out various circumstances propitious for the speedy adoption of an annexationist policy, such as the new grouping of the powers after the German treaty with Austria in 1879; the growing strength of the navy after the Naval Bill of 1878; and the opportunity to attack other powers on economic grounds which a colonial policy would readily afford.

Supporting Hübbe-Schleiden in emphasizing the national-political aspect of colonialism were such men as E. von Weber,¹ who recommended the annexation of the Transvaal, Moldenhauer,² and Herman Wagner.³ And many publications of the Central Association advanced similar ideas. The following extract is an example: "We are convinced that the organization of German emigration is a phase in the

¹ E. von Weber, *op. cit.*

² Moldenhauer, *op. cit.*

³ Wagner, *Über Gründung deutschen Kolonien* (Heidelberg, 1881).

evolution of Germany towards independence. Just as the war of 1813 defeated the foreign invader, just as the revolution of 1848 made for freedom, just as the year 1866 delivered Germany from Austria, and finally just as the year 1870 rescued Germany from French domination, so today, in economic life, our slogan should be '*Los von Gross-Britanien, los von Nord Amerika.*' These words will lead to the establishment of pure German colonies and the expansion of *Deutschtum.*"¹

The economic side of the "question of life and death" for Germany was also exploited to the utmost by propaganda and here it is Fabri who takes the lead. He wrote in 1879, when he thought the fiscal and commercial crisis would win for him a ready ear. He represented Germany in his book, *Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?* as economically threatened and emphasized the social results of non-colonization. He presented the question as one not so much of political power and prestige as of actual national and material existence. "The colonial question is not primarily a political *Machtfrage*. It is much more a *Kulturfrage*. Economic needs in connection with general national crisis demand colonies."²

Fabri dealt in a practical manner with the ideas of the colonial theorists upon emigration and focussed attention upon what was rapidly becoming a dominant motive for expansion, the ever-swelling stream of emigrants from the Fatherland. Like the colonialists, he regarded emigration not as an isolated question, in the manner of the old economists, but as a subject closely connected with national and social questions. Many other writers between the years 1879 and 1881 followed his lead in this respect.

¹ *Der Export*, no. 38, Sept., 1880, quoted by Hübbe-Schleiden in *Deutsche Kolonisation*, p. 1.

² Fabri, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

Some idea of the emigration situation which furnished propagandists like Fabri and later writers with their alarming arguments may be gained by a glance at the following statistics.

<i>Years</i>	<i>Number of Emigrants</i>	<i>from Germany</i>
1871-1880	585,000	
1881-1883	570,000 ¹	
1881	210,547	to America.
1875-1888	815,374	to America from ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp, Stettin. ²

Pointing to these figures, Fabri led the way in urging state-directed emigration for the purpose of conserving Germany's very life. He demonstrated graphically and alarmingly how the constant loss to the Fatherland of youth, talent, skill, business ability and initiative (for it is always the best who go), was continually depleting Germany of her vitality. As Moldenhauer expressed it, "This stream of emigrants going out with all it has, furnishing knowledge and skill to our national enemies, is a tax in gold and blood paid by Germany to foreign lands."³ And he reckoned the tax at 300,000,000 M. annually.

Moreover, here was the economic situation at home of which the large emigration was only a symptom. Fabri, Professor Herman Wagner⁴ of the University of Göttingen, Adolph Wagner,⁵ Weber, Frey, Hübbe-Schleiden,⁶

¹ Herrfurth, *Bismarck und die Kolonialpolitik* (Berlin, 1909), p. 23.

² *Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 1882, p. 211.
Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 71.

³ Fabri, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁴ Wagner, H., *Über Gründung Deutschen Kolonien* (Heidelberg, 1881).

⁵ Wagner, A., "Volksmehrung und Auswanderung," *Augs. Allg. Zt.*, 1880, nos. 160-170.

⁶ Hübbe-Schleiden, *Weltwirtschaft und die Sie triebene Kraft* (Hamburg, 1881).

Geffcken and many others, all pointed out that only the acquisition of colonies could solve problems arising from the increase of population at home (a preponderance of birth rate over death rate amounting to 600,000 annually), the consequent over-stocking of the home market with both men and money, the lack of sufficient opportunity for investment, the necessity for raw materials,—all those conditions, in fine, which caused the material evil of emigration. They argued that capital was now engaged in wild speculation at home rather than in normal investment abroad; that even with the over-supply of the labor market, men of the first calibre were lacking for business enterprise, because they had emigrated to seek a less stifled atmosphere for the exercise of their ability. “The rapid increase of our universities has been our national pride; but it will cease to be so if our educated youth are not satisfied.” As they expressed it, “The superfluity of life and activity, the ambitious spirit of youth, satisfied neither by work nor by interest, cry aloud, ‘Let us live instead of dream.’” These propagandists went so far as to assert that “all the governmental, ecclesiastical and civil posts are over-crowded; and this situation together with the consequent enlarged competition is by far the most pressing problem. Markets for production, fields for labor and capital, are needed both to preserve German’s nationality in Europe and to prevent its loss to other countries through emigration.”¹ All sorts and kinds of statistics were adduced and manipulated to prove over-population, over-production of manufactured goods, insufficient increase in means of subsistence to keep pace with the growth of population, loss of man power and lack of efficient military service. And, it was claimed, social disorders and industrial unrest resulted therefrom, in

¹ Hübbe-Schleiden, *Die Ethiopien* (Hamburg, 1879).

which socialism had its roots. Hübbe-Schleiden in his *Überseeische Politik*, a *Kulturwirtschaftliche Studie*,¹ later dwelt upon this aspect. "More than anything else, the narrow, economic horizon of our nation is the cause of our lack of well-being, and the Germans are above everything else good peasants and good school masters." Fabri became so pessimistic about Germany's future without the adoption of a state-directed colonialism and a national direction of emigration, that he prophesied dire social and economic results, as follows: "Increasing imports of grain and beef, because German agriculture cannot meet the need, a resulting and ever increasing high cost of living, constantly decreasing wages, a lowered production of manufactured goods, . . . a rapid growth of pauperism and social need."² Like Hübbe-Schleiden, he laid great emphasis upon the mission of Germany and the task assigned her by universal history to spread *Kultur*. "Where semi-barbaric civilizations exist, the annexation of their lands by a great, strong power is an act of humanity,"³ he said.

Nor did all this politico-economic national propaganda lose itself in mere theory and dire prognostications of evil. Hübbe-Schleiden, Fabri, Weber, all in fact, make definite recommendations for possible German colonies. With their slogan, "*Los von Nord Amerika, los von Gross Britanien*," they cried also a definite "*Nach*,"—to agricultural colonies in South Africa, in Australia, and in South America, especially in Brazil (some of them even not hesitating to contemplate a conflict with the United States in the quest). They urged the foundation of trading colonies on the coast and in the interior of Africa, in Madagascar, in the Indian Archi-

¹ Hübbe-Schleiden, *Überseeische Politik* (Hamburg, 1881-1883).

² Fabri, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

pelago, and in Borneo. A group of travelers and missionaries joined the campaign; they omitted the theory of colonialism but supported the movement by recommendations derived from personal experience. To cite but a few, Karl von Scherzer¹ urged Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala; Richard Dilthey² promoted the idea of further colonization in Southern Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina; Liesenberg³ extolled Argentina and Paraguay; Wölfling⁴ and Bläser, who assumed that Germany would go to war for colonies, revived the question as a *Machtfrage* and advised activity in Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli; Grünewald⁵ recommended Ecuador.

Naturally, the flood of literature just reviewed, with its attempt to make the colonial question a national issue, did not go unchallenged by the opponents of a colonial policy. Indeed, the warfare of pamphlets, books and words that ensued, served, at least indirectly, the object of the colonial party to make the subject one of nation-wide discussion.

The combatants of overseas expansion consisted, in the main, of the old generation of cosmopolitans. They defined the issue squarely as one of nationalism versus internationalism, and opposed the struggle of the colonial party to raise the debate to a national plane. Prominent among the opponents was such a man as Dr. Friedrich Kapp, the great mediator between Germany and the Germans in the United

¹ von Scherzer, *Die Deutsche Arbeit in Fremden Erdtheilen* (Leipzig, 1880).

² Dilthey, *Die Deutsche Ansiedlungen in Südbrasilien, etc.* (Berlin, 1882).

³ Liesenberg, *Wohin Auswandern oder Deutschland über dem Meer* (Berlin, 1881).

⁴ Wölfling, *Der Erwerb von Ackerbau und Handelskolonien* (Köln, 1881).

⁵ Grünewald, *Wie Kann Deutschland Kolonialbesitz Erwerben?* (Mainz, 1879).

States, where he had lived for twenty years and where he had been commissioner for emigrants from 1866 to 1871.¹ From his experience he enjoyed a well-earned reputation on all colonial questions, and had also gained a high position as a scholar. His outlook was distinctly international and cosmopolitan. He believed in emigration and did his utmost to encourage the expansion of the German people. His purpose in doing so, however, was rather to extend German *Kultur* so that it might fuse with and enrich an "international race;" not to perpetuate nor to increase any single national or political power. He represented the thought of a generation of Germans against whom Hübbe-Schleiden directed his attacks. Indeed, Hübbe-Schleiden's book, *Deutsche Kolonisation* was a reply to Kapp's *Über Colonisation und Auswanderung*,² in which Kapp argued that the "international protection of emigrants is the most pressing question of the day." He deplored the proposed adoption of a state-directed emigration as a definite attack upon individual liberty. Philippsohn, an association of Dr. Kapp, a prosaic Hamburg business man, without much knowledge of the historic background, presented the point of view of the free-trade merchant. He illustrated the radical difference between the cosmopolitan and the national schools of thought when he said, "The German merchant is not, as they (the nationalists) want to make us think, a pariah among foreigners; just as little is the German emigrant. The position of the Germans abroad is an honorable one and the word *Völkerdünger* is a senseless term which aims at the sensational but can only impress the ignorant."³ Hübbe-Schleiden answered Philippsohn by saying, "No one

¹ *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. li, pp. 32-36.

² Kapp, F., *Über Colonisation und Auswanderung* (1880).

³ Philippsohn, F., "Über Colonisation," *Volkswirtschaftliche Zeitfragen*, vol. xii-xiii, p. 66.

claims that our merchants and emigrants are pariahs. On the contrary, they are often very influential persons and it is because of this that they have won the title, *Völkerdünger*. It is our people's honor that they are called *Völkerdünger*, but it is our nation's shame. Our nation has so far played a pitiful rôle in the world. But this disgrace may rest upon our old generation; the younger generation will endure it no longer, in spite of Herr Philippsohn and his companions." ¹

Other supporters of the negative side of the controversy were Peltz,² Loehnis,³ Fritz,⁴ and Zacharias,⁵ the last named being a member of the Malthusian League. Their principal arguments against state-directed colonialism may be summarized as follows. They considered that the Germans in the United States were far better off than those living in South America and that it was to the political interest of Germany to form independent national groups within the United States. They thought it unlikely that state-directed emigration would relieve the problem of over-population. They asserted, moreover, that in comparison with English, French and Scandinavian emigration, Germany's emigration was much less. They argued that German colonization would only be an imitation of the English who were far better fitted for it in every way, that colonization had never been the real tradition of Germany; and that Germany was furthermore lacking in all proper facilities for it, possessing neither a coast on an open sea nor an adequate navy. The Fatherland, they asserted, controlled an immense trade already, international trade was profitable to her at the

¹ Hübbe-Schleiden, *Deutsche Kolonisation*, p. 16.

² Peltz, *Katechismus der Auswanderung* (Leipzig, 1881).

³ Loehnis, *Die Europäische Kolonien* (Bonn, 1881).

⁴ Fritz, *Zur Auswanderungsfrage* (Wien, 1879).

⁵ Zacharias, *Die Bevölkerungsfrage etc.* (Hirschberg, 1880).

time, private trade interests should not be fostered, and trade did not always "follow the flag." They feared that agricultural colonies would mean slavery for the natives, tyranny, wars; that penal colonies would prove demoralizing and would prevent the proper treatment of crime. They contended that Germany's best statesmen realized that her true interests lay in Europe; that colonies would entail conflicts with other Powers and enormous expense; and that expansion into eastern and southern Europe was much more necessary, for Germany's aim should be, above all, to become the arbiter of the destinies of Europe.¹ Fritz and Loehnis, especially, urged colonization in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary;² while Loehnis specifically urged expansion in the Balkans. Philippsohn accused the colonial partisans of exploiting the national principle, of using it as a "mask of patriotism" to hide their desire for colonies. He carefully dissected the arguments of Fabri and Weber, one by one, and refuted them. He pointed out that all colonial enthusiasts had painted a picture in many respects far too black and indeed glaringly incorrect.³ For instance, he showed that, during the last twenty years German exports had continually increased instead of decreased; that criminal statistics, used as arguments for penal colonies, were erroneous; that the development of the navy was exaggerated by Fabri; that no such crisis due to the tariff as Fabri represented existed. He proved by statistics that, according to the population, the percentage of emigration had decreased, and that although the cost of living had increased, wages had increased also, as proved by savings banks accounts.

¹ Gebauer, H., articles in *Augsburg Allg. Zt., Beilage*, 1882, nos. 18, 20, 22, 25, 28, 30.

² Fritz, *op. cit.*, Loehnis, *op. cit.*, and *Die Deut. Kolonialprojecte und der Europäische Südosten* (Bonn, 1881).

³ Philippsohn, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

and the prosperity of the working class. He claimed that it was incorrect to argue that wages would decrease because of increasing population, since the land of Germany was capable of greater cultivation and development. He also asserted that the statistics regarding the loss of man-power and capital overseas were unreliable, Moldenhauer reckoning them at 15,000,000 M. annually¹ and Weber at 23,000,000 M.² In this same connection, Gebauer proved by figures that Germany was not over-populated³ and Philippsohn argued that, since the cost of state-directed emigration was very heavy, it would drive more men away to escape taxation, while only those would remain in Germany who made their living by taxes and monopolies.

Thus, these anti-expansionists pleaded for greater deliberation and a more correct knowledge of facts. "The exaggerations of the colonialists have long been recognized as the efforts of interested speculators," they said. As internationalists they thought that colonies were unnecessary, indeed, that they would be deleterious to German life.

Turning from the literary efforts and the propagandist campaign of the colonial party, we must observe its activity in the political field; for clever manipulations here constituted the second phase of its policy which was designed to render colonialism a national and political question. "The colonial party has no political identity or independence," said Fabri in 1879. But its leaders set themselves at once to the task of creating an "identity and independence."⁴ No one realized better than they the necessity of achieving a definite party status; and the existing

¹ Moldenhauer, *op. cit.*

² Weber, *Die Erweiterung des Deut. Wirtschaftsgebiete* (Leipzig, 1879).

³ Gebauer, *Augs. Allg. Zt., Beilage* no. 18.

⁴ Fabri, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

political situation, with its changing issues and shifting groups, afforded them at once an opportunity which they were not slow to grasp. A brief review of the domestic politics in Germany towards the close of the seventies will be necessary to illustrate the chances afforded to the colonial partisans of entering the arena of public life and thereby achieving a "political independence."

The year 1878 in Germany clearly marked the end of the "liberal era" and a definite reversion to the principles of conservatism. In the first place, the state of national psychology indicated the return to a reactionary point of view. The period from the years 1867 to 1878 had been a time of great theorizing, of extended discussion about general laws, of juridical debates, of the *Kulturkampf*; but after 1878, people no longer stressed theory—they were more concerned with practical interests. The economic progress of Germany and universal suffrage were largely responsible for the change. Since 1867, men had learned something practical in polity. "They began to ask themselves, 'What do you want of the man whom you send to Berlin?'"¹ They wanted their business concerns attended to." Before 1878, economic interests did not predominate as backgrounds to political parties; after 1878, they did. After 1878 the *Kulturkampf* and theories of government ceased to occupy the center of the stage; socialism and economic affairs took their place. As illustrative of this psychological change, the term "nationalism" had acquired a new meaning to the popular mind. From the years 1867 to 1878, the word "national" had been the slogan in the theoretical, idealistic, "liberal" sense; it had meant a purely political, patriotic enthusiasm; and it had helped to cement the smaller states into a union under the aegis of the Prussian Eagle. After 1878, however, the cry "national" was to

¹ Naumann, *Die politische Parteien* (Berlin, 1911).

connote something quite different and much more materialistic; henceforth, it was to concern itself more with economic life, it was to be identified with trade and commercial rivalry.

In the second place, the shift in the relative strength of the political parties in 1878 illustrated the waning of liberalism and showed the way in which the wind of political conviction blew. The National Liberals had attained the height of their power in the year 1874, with one hundred and fifty-two seats in the *Reichstag* and one million, three hundred and ninety-four thousand votes in the country. They began to decrease after that; and in the elections of 1878, their numbers in the *Reichstag* fell to ninety-eight, whereas the representation of the Conservatives and Free Conservatives soared to one hundred and sixteen and that of the Catholic Centrists to ninety-three.¹

Finally, Bismarck and his political opportunism completed the reversion from liberalism to conservatism. In the movement for unification of the empire, Bismarck had appealed to the Liberals and led them full cry ahead, "until, on the wave of military success, the vast apparatus of liberalism fell" and unity was achieved. But Bismarck, like the consummate engineer that he was, "had taken care to secure all the ways of escape, so that at a moment's notice, he could stay the consequences of this forward rush and regain that conservative ground for the whole empire, which he had deliberately sacrificed in detail until the country should be united."² In other words, Bismarck had pretended to espouse the cause of liberalism, had in fact made significant concessions to the Liberals for the sake of their support in the national movement; and in so doing he had

¹ Grotewold, *Die Parteien des Deutschen Reichstages* (Leipzig, 1908), p. 151.

² *Annual Register*, 1879, new series, p. 173.

bowed to their rather idealistic and theoretical interpretation of nationalism. Politically, during the early years of the empire, he had relied on the *Cartel*, consisting of the Free Conservatives and National Liberals, against the opposition parties of Progressives, Centrists, Socialists, and Particularists. By the year 1878, however, the Liberals had served his purpose. With their aid the Chancellor had achieved his triumph of a unified and centralized nation. In short, he had thoroughly finished with them and their liberal ideas and he was ready to return to more familiar principles and to more congenial friends. In the year 1878, therefore, opportunist that he was, he sensed not only the changing national temper, the waning of liberalism; but also the growing antagonism on the one hand, of the Conservatives, due to his continuance of the *Kulturkampf*, and, on the other, of the National Liberals, due to his conduct of the *Kulturkampf* as well as to his economic policy. A crisis had arisen and the Chancellor recognized that the time had come for him to make a choice between conservatism and liberalism. In that choice Bismarck reverted to type, he rediscovered his conservative soul, he was terrified by socialist activities, and he determined to end the liberal era.

In order to carry out his plan, the Chancellor was obliged to lean heavily upon the Conservatives and the Clericals. He made peace with the Clericals by a cessation of the *Kulturkampf*, and he won strong support from Conservatives and from a certain group of National Liberals by the adoption of a protective tariff and by indirect taxation. At the same time, however, the Chancellor seriously alienated from him the left wing of the National Liberals by his repudiation of free trade. The result was a split in the National Liberal party. The left wing finally broke off entirely on August 30, 1880, under the leadership of Bamberger, Braumbach, Forckenbeck, Rickert; it formed the

Libérale Vereinigung, endorsed all the traditional liberal ideas and joined the ranks of the Opposition.¹ This left the Chancellor, therefore, supported only by the Conservatives, Free Conservatives and Clericals at a time when he needed all the support he could master for his new economic policy, his anti-socialist legislation and for his social insurance laws; he was terrified by the growth of socialism, and he was in a position to welcome heartily any addition to his parliamentary group.

Such was the political upheaval which provided the colonial partisans with the opportunity they needed to achieve political identity and significance. That they immediately grasped the situation in all of its bearings and hastened to avail themselves of its potentialities will shortly appear; but a brief review of their former political affiliations will place the proceeding in a clearer light.

Since 1871, the colonial enthusiasts had belonged principally to the opposition parties. The professors, scientists, and a group of merchants came from the Progressives, a party utterly ignored by Bismarck until after 1874; the missionaries were for the most part Clericals, deadly enemies of the Chancellor until 1878; the commercial colonialists belonged partly to the Progressives and partly to the National Liberals, although not to the original National Liberal group who adhered to the simon-pure ideals of liberalism, but rather to a newer group of Liberals who were becoming more national than liberal. These new Liberals like the Hamburg and Bremen merchants, Woermann and Godeffroy, came to represent the modern type of National Liberals in Germany who broke with the real liberalism that had accepted the free-trade principles of the Hanse Towns. The new Liberals gradually influenced the Government's protection of overseas trade and its repudiation of the liberal

¹ Grotewold, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

policy of the empire. They cannot be classified as actual allies of Bismarck until after 1876.

Whereas, then, the colonial partisans in the main, had sat in the Opposition until 1878, the opponents of colonialism, on the other hand, had belonged at first to the governmental parties, to the Conservatives who firmly supported Bismarck's policy of German hegemony in Europe, or to the majority of National Liberals, simon-pure free traders.

A glance at the party affiliations of both advocates and opponents of colonialism upon all occasions when the subject was discussed in the *Reichstag* will prove the foregoing statement, will show a distinct cleavage of party in advocates and opponents of colonialism, and will indicate the shift of political support after the Government changed its attitude in 1876 and began to adopt explicit measures for overseas trade protection. In 1870, for example, when the petition for securing Saigon from France was discussed in the *Reichstag*, the political allegiance of those who spoke on the subject was as follows:

Opponents of the Petition

Meier (free-trader)

Ross

Baron von Overbeck

Party

National Liberal

" "

Conservative

Advocates of the Petition

Mosle

Adickes

Rickmers

Professor Holzendorf

Party

National Liberal (new type)

" " " "

" " " "

Progressive ¹

On April 11 and 20, 1877, when the Tongan Treaty was discussed, we find, as already noted, only advocates for it. It must be remembered that the Tongan Treaty, as interpreted by the Government, implied no colonial policy but only over-

¹ *Verhandlungen des Reichstages des Norddeutschen Bundes*, November 30, 1870.

seas trade protection; and furthermore, that it marked a distinct change in the attitude of the administration itself.¹

<i>Advocates</i>	<i>Party</i>
Radziwil	Centre
Kapp	National Liberal
(A free-trader, who later left the National Liberal party and joined the <i>Liberale-Vereinigung</i>)	
Reichensperger	Centre
Philippsborn (government official)	Conservative
Von Bunsen (like Kapp)	National Liberal
Von Bülow (Director of Foreign Office)	Conservative ²

On June 13 and 16, 1879, when the Samoan Treaty was discussed party divisions appeared clearer.

<i>Advocates</i>	<i>Party</i>
Von Bülow	Conservative
Küsserow	"
Lingens	Centre
Mosle	National Liberal (new type)
<i>Opponents</i>	<i>Party</i>
Bamberger	National Liberal
later, <i>Liberale-Vereinigung</i>	
Lowe	Progressive
Dr. Gareis	"
Haerle	" 3

The change in the Conservative position, as evident above, from opposition to support of colonialism may be explained by the fact that Bismarck thought it necessary to regain the wavering loyalty of the Conservatives towards 1878, as well as their support for the anti-socialist laws and for his other policies; that he consequently attached them to him by agrarian tariff and indirect taxation. Consequently,

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 67.

² *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 11, 20, 1877.

³ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 13, 16, 1879.

their hitherto antagonistic attitude towards expansion changed and they began to champion it vigorously, making it a part of their time-honored tradition to maintain the "honor of the Fatherland." The Conservatives explained their own change of opinion. "After 1876, new problems confronted the Conservative party; economic and social questions loomed large. Colonial questions produced a change in the party, for the principles of the Conservatives had always led them to concentrate upon the internal development of Germany. Colonialism is an entirely opposite policy: it is also a problem of capitalism. The Conservative party has made concessions here and *altered its old position*. It has sacrificed its long adherence to internal development to the *Idea of National Greatness*. It has allowed greater scope to *capitalism in the colonies than at home*. The Conservative party has had to *broaden its base*."¹ The Conservative party changed with Bismarck before the pressure of economic influence; hence it shifted its principles with those of the Government and it still remained a governmental party.

Comprehending the outlines of this political situation, it is most significant to observe, that, prior to 1878, Bismarck never needed the support of anyone advocating colonies, nor of the parties with which they were mainly affiliated; but after 1878, it was very patent, as we have seen, that he was in dire need of aid both for the protective tariff and his other policies. Conditions were now exactly reversed: before 1878, the governmental parties had opposed colonialism and the opposition parties were in favor of it; after 1878, the governmental parties were in favor of colonialism and the Opposition opposed it. On the one hand, the Chancellor had gained the hitherto strongest

¹ Stillich, *Die Politische Parteien in Deutschland* (Leipzig, 1908), vol. i, p. 234.

opposing party, the Centre, and had strengthened the adherence of the Conservatives and the National Liberals, all of whom now advocated a colonial policy; on the other hand, he had lost the old National Liberals, the Free Traders, who had gone over to the Opposition (ultimately uniting with the Progressives in the *Freisinnige Volkspartei* in 1884), and who were violently opposed to colonialism and bitterly antagonistic to Bismarck. The colonial party had now only to seize its opportunity and rally to Government support, to make itself a factor in party politics and so to establish its political identity. That it did this, we have ample proof.

In the early eighties, Bismarck was especially disposed to welcome any adherents to his fiscal policy in order to combat the attacks of the Opposition, as well as to fill up the ranks of his allies depleted by the defection of the left wing of the National Liberals. The Hanse towns,—Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck—were opposed to protection; they preferred, for the most part, to preserve their old tradition of free trade, which they found more profitable, and hence they constituted the strongest forces of the Opposition against the Chancellor. Now the firm of Godeffroy, by far the most influential firm both in Hamburg and in colonial activities of the South Seas, as well as a leader of the colonial party, stood firmly for protection, largely because of its overseas interests and its inevitable clashes with the commercial ambitions of other powers. It had indeed endeavored to make Hamburg enter the *Zollverein*. The same situation likewise prevailed in Bremen where the firm of Mosle and Company, equally influential in the colonial party, strongly advocated protectionism, against the majority opinion of the city. Naturally, Bismarck would be overjoyed to receive the support afforded by these two powerful firms, situated in the two enemy camps; it would prove in-

valuable in his determined effort to carry through his new protective tariff. Senator Gustav Godeffroy rendered very practical assistance to him by his articles in the *Hamburger Nachrichten* and by his speeches. One article, particularly, entitled *Extremer Freihandel*,¹ and a speech, afterwards published under the caption, *Schutzzoll und Freihandel unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zollprogrammas des Fürsten Bismarcks*, delivered before the Fourth Congress of the Tax and Economic Reformers League, indicated the strength of his adherence to the cause of protectionism. The concluding words of his speech were: "Let us faithfully follow the flag of our great Chancellor in his economic policy for the welfare of the empire."²

Again, Alexander Mosle expressed directly to Bismarck similar sentiments in the shape of a telegram which conveyed a resolution of confidence in his protectionist policy, passed at a meeting of over three thousand *Reichstag* electors in Bremen, on April 29, 1879. Certainly, it did not require a Bismarck to recognize the colonial party as a valuable electoral factor. In replying to this telegram with a letter of thanks, the Chancellor said he looked forward to doing much for the protection and encouragement of trade and shipping.³

Mosle affords us a true type of the "new" National Liberal, who forsook Liberalism for the sake of a greater nationalism. He had entered the *Reichstag* in 1871 as a free trader, like every representative from that city, but became personally very much attached to Bismarck, as various letters between them show. He was fascinated by the

¹ "Volkswirtschaftliche Aphorismes," *Vaterstädtischen Blättern der Hamburger Nachrichten*, Nov., 1877.

² *Handelspolitische Brochüren*, 1876-1877, no. 36.

³ Poschinger, *Fürst Bismarck als Volkswirt* (Berlin, 1899), vol. i, p. 216.

Chancellor's political skill and, as he himself expressed it, was "changed from a free trader to a protectionist by the pressure of Bismarck's handshake."¹ When one considers Mosle's interest in colonial activity, one might assume that a pressure greater than "Bismarck's handshake" was possibly responsible for his indorsement of protectionism in which respect he represented a large and politically influential group of the colonial enthusiasts.

Thus the colonial party joined the Government's supporting parties and it had only to add to the platform of the administration the plank of a colonial policy with which the other governmental parties,—the Conservatives, the National Liberals, and the Centre,—were already in sympathy.

The propaganda and political influence of the colonial party almost succeeded in attaining the desired publicity and national importance for the question of colonialism, but one other way still remained. It was an effort to involve the Government, both personally and officially, in financial connections with overseas expansion, and to make a state-directed colonialism absolutely indispensable by identifying commercial colonization with national interests.

It will be recalled that Bismarck had become increasingly interested and influenced by the bankers and captains of industry after the panic of 1873, a result largely of the tremendous economic and industrial progress which began to overshadow all other elements in German domestic affairs. Indeed, the Conservatives, jealous of an undue amount of attention and solicitude which they thought was accorded to capitalistic interests, coined the phrase "*Bleichröder era*," to designate the period from 1876 to 1880. They claimed that, during that time, Jewish bankers, Bleichröder,

¹ Poschinger, *Fürst Bismarck und die Parlamentarier* (Breslau, 1894), vol. ii, p. 330.

especially, had bought Bismarck and had wielded, in company with such state officials as Delbrück and Camphausen, an altogether unwarranted power in the administration. Whatever exaggeration existed in the extreme charges of the Conservatives in 1876 and 1877, it was certainly true that Bismarck was hand in glove with the two great banking houses of Bleichröder and von Hanseemann. Gerson Bleichröder had made his bank one of the first in Europe through his connection with the Rothschilds. He had long enjoyed the confidence of the Chancellor and he had often come to the rescue of the Government. Bismarck, for instance, had summoned him to Versailles in 1871 to arrange the French war indemnity. The other chief financial adviser of Bismarck was Adolf von Hanseemann. Since 1864, he had been head of the powerful *Diskonto Company*¹ of Berlin and was, moreover, a brother-in-law of von Küserow, who had been manager of the department for overseas trade in the Foreign Office since 1874.² Küserow, it will be remembered, was a keen colonial enthusiast, mentioned by Zimmermann as being "personally interested in South Sea trade." It is also not without significance, perhaps, that among its officials, the Diskonto Company numbered Miguel, one of the vigorous *Reichstag* advocates of the merchants' petition of November 30, 1870. He was a Director of the Diskonto Company from 1869 to 1873. Woermann, of the great Woermann firm interested in African ventures, was another official of the company.

Furthermore, one other link between national finance, the administration and colonial speculation, was Senator Gustav Godeffroy,³ a strong supporter of Bismarck's protection policy and head of the *Norddeutsche Bank*.

¹ *Die Diskonto Gesellschaft: Denkschrift zum 50 Jährige Jubiläum, 1851-1901* (Hamburg, 1901).

² Cf. *supra*, p. 63.

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 107.

Now, Germany's political position in Samoa was entirely the result of her commercial interests which were largely in the control of the House of Godeffroy. By the year 1880, German trade in the South Seas had assumed unprecedented proportions, stimulated by the effects of the Tongan and Samoan treaties. The necessity of maintaining Germany's political prestige had already, as we have seen, forced the Government to protect the merchants; but there were other pressing reasons demanding administrative support. The commercial colonialists had identified the financial interests of the Government with the South Sea trade. In 1877, a company had been formed under the auspices of Bismarck in an effort to enlarge and consolidate the already flourishing trade in Oceania. The House of Godeffroy was the soul of the company, but its name was *la Compagnie Océanique*.¹ It included the firms of Memel, Wilkins and Schlubuch, possessed a capital of 1, 563,500 M., established headquarters at Hamburg, and aimed to monopolize the commercial exploitation in the archipelago of northern Oceania, especially in the Island of Tahiti. It appears that Bismarck was personally interested in the company and that other state officials participated in overseas speculations. As Bamberger asserted in his speeches in the *Reichstag*, the administration were thus naturally inclined to further imperial trade protection.² Among other accusations, Bamberger sarcastically explained the Government's solicitude for South Seas trade by showing how governmental connivance with commercial colonialism began under the regime of the Foreign Minister von Bülow. Von Bülow's diplomatic duties as well as his marriage had

¹ *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*, 1887, *loc. cit.*, p. 535.

² *Ibid.* *Vide*, also, *La Grande Encyclopedie*, vol. xi, p. 1116, art. "Colonisation".

³ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 23, 1880, p. 876.

brought him into close connection with the commercial interests of Hamburg and he had been especially active in promoting the Tongan and Samoan Treaties, "those first steps in colonial policy."¹ Unfortunately von Bülow had died in the fall of 1879 and an appeal to respect for the dead enabled the colonial party in the *Reichstag* to prevent Bamberger from casting any further or more definite aspersions upon him.

The colonial party thus made colonialism a national and political question. Its three policies of literary propaganda, seizure of political advantage through the exigencies of party revolution, and identification of the financial interests, both personal and official, of the administration with overseas speculations, had finally succeeded. It projected the whole subject from a weak and obscure position where it was advocated by a group with only limited recognition and no political power, to the fore-front of national affairs. The colonial party focussed general attention upon state directed colonialism; and in the midst of its efforts, it precipitated a political and national crisis which submitted the entire movement to the test of public opinion.

¹ *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. xlvii, pp. 352-354.

CHAPTER VI

THE TEST

COLONIALISM suddenly became a concrete issue in national and political affairs when the Government introduced the Samoan Subsidy Bill into the *Reichstag* in the year 1880. Briefly, the bill proposed that the Government should grant an annual subsidy to Godeffroy & Son to enable them to promote their trade in the South Seas. Hence, the acceptance or rejection of the bill meant the acceptance or rejection of commercial colonialism. In other words, the Samoan Subsidy Bill became a test-case of the whole colonial movement.

The immediate antecedents to the introduction of the Subsidy Bill into the *Reichstag* can be briefly stated. In the year 1878, the house of Godeffroy, not satisfied with its commercial success, attempted higher financial and speculative flights. It formed a "merger" and consolidated all its South Sea business into a stock company, the *Deutsche Handels und Plantagengesellschaft der Süd See Inseln*.¹ In spite of the extensive advertisement of stock in the German papers, the majority of the shares of the new company remained in the hands of Godeffroy & Son. During the year 1879, the House encountered serious financial difficulties owing to the failure of mining speculations in Europe.² It was unable to secure aid in Hamburg because it already controlled considerable capital from that city; and it soon

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1880, *Aktenstück* no. 101, p. 723.

² Coppius, *Hamburgs Bedeutung auf dem Gebiete der Deutschen Kolonialpolitik* (Berlin, 1905), p. 67.

exhausted all efforts to obtain loans from other commercial houses. Finally, the House of Godeffroy & Son submitted to extreme financial pressure and borrowed money from Baring Brothers of London, giving as security its shares in the *Deutsche Handels und Plantagengesellschaft der Süd See Inseln*, together with its holdings in Samoa amounting to one hundred and sixty thousand Prussian acres. The loan only postponed disaster; the House of Godeffroy failed late in 1879; and its failure spelled ruin for the vast German interests in the South Seas which were now in danger of falling into foreign hands.

The resulting situation involved political and economic, national and international, consequences. The commercial interests in the South Seas besieged the Government with letters. These merchants represented the threatened ruin to German trade, political position and prestige in Samoa if the house of Godeffroy were not resuscitated at once and if all its influence and holdings were not prevented from passing under the control of England. Part of the German press urged the Government to intervene in order to prevent British appropriation of the Samoan lands. It proposed, specifically, that the Government or a syndicate of bankers should buy up the *Deutsche Handels und Plantagengesellschaft*. The *Kölnische Zeitung* recalled Disraeli's purchase of the shares of the Suez Canal Company.

Furthermore, one must needs recall the contemporary situation in Samoa at the end of the year 1879, in order to realize all the various currents at work in this political and economic crisis. For it will be remembered that Germany, in company with England and the United States, had assumed a municipal protectorate over Apia by negotiations during the month of December;¹ and such a protectorate

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1880, Aktenstück no. 101, *Unterlage* no. 2, p. 728.

necessitated the maintenance of a strong political prestige which the failure of Godeffroy & Son, if unredeemed, would seriously jeopardize.

It was of course to be expected that the German bankers, already much interested in South Sea enterprises, would intervene and come to the rescue; but that they would do so on purely patriotic and national grounds was unlikely. Here, however, was an ideal occasion for the coöperation of colonialists, financial interests, and the Government; and such was the connection existing already between them, that their combination at this juncture was well nigh inevitable. Godeffroy waited upon von Hanseemann, who in turn influenced Bismarck. The Chancellor, although earlier in the year (1879) he had refused to help the house of Godeffroy,¹ now agreed to rescue its interests from the grasp of Baring Brothers of London and to promote a government subsidy for a stock company to indemnify and replace Godeffroy.² Accordingly, a new company was formed in Berlin, called *Die Deutsche See Handelsgesellschaft*, "auf Anregung" of the administration and on the condition that the Government underwrite it.³ It was von Hanseemann, himself, who instructed the Secretary of the Imperial Treasury, Geheimrat Burchard, that this plan "will not only rescue German trade but expand German colonial interests in the South Seas."⁴

It was not at all unnatural that Bismarck should thus come to the rescue of Godeffroy, and his act affords but another proof of his real, though unacknowledged, sympathy with the aims of the colonialists. The senior partner of the house of Godeffroy and the Chancellor had been great

¹ Poschinger, *Fürst Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. i, p. 269.

² *Annual Register*, 1879, p. 170.

³ Poschinger, *Fürst Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. i, p. 166.

⁴ *Die Diskonto Gesellschaft*, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

friends in their youth, and, before 1870, Bismarck had supported his scheme of peopling with German immigrants the land owned by the Godeffroy firm in Samoa. This support had taken the form of investing German consuls at Samoa with extraordinary powers, of granting arms from the royal arsenals, and of sending the *S. S. Hertha* to Samoa. A program of future colonization drawn up and laid before the Berlin Government had elicited the promise of further aid to Godeffroy;¹ but the intervention of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 and the consequent change in Bismarck's policies occasioned by the founding of the empire, had prevented its realization. Now, ten years later, came an opportunity to fulfill the promise.

Toward the end of December, 1879, therefore, the official press announced that in order to prevent the ruin of trade in the South Pacific by foreign creditors of Godeffroy & Son, the Government had decided to demand a subsidy from the *Reichstag* for a new company.² On January 1, 1880, Bismarck in a letter to Scholz, Under Secretary of the Treasury, unfolded the completed plan:

You are aware of the solicitude with which the empire has always regarded German activities in Oceania. A celebrated Hamburg firm, for reasons not connected with its South Sea trade, has encountered financial difficulties which threaten the loss of all its possessions and establishments. . . . In the interests of overseas trade, therefore, I think the Imperial Government should ask the cooperation of the legislative bodies in order to supply the means necessary to avert this danger. I am all the more persuaded thereto, since lately captains of finance have declared themselves ready and willing in the national interests to undertake the establishment of such a company, if the Government will support them.³

¹ Lowe, *Prince Bismarck* (London, 1885), vol. ii, p. 210.

² *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*, loc. cit., p. 535.

³ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1880, *Aktenstück* no. 101, *Anlage* no. 5.

The proposed plan was that the Government should guarantee to the company an annual subsidy of four percent of its total capitalization for twenty years, or not more than 300,000 M., which was to be entirely repaid as soon as its dividends should exceed a specified percent.¹ The new company was to purchase all the assets and possessions of the *Deutsche Handels und Plantagengesellschaft*, in accordance with the latter's own offer of December 26, 1879,² which would seem to indicate a thorough and pre-arranged understanding with Godeffroy & Son. The Chancellor was to appoint a commissioner, representing the Government, on the board of directors. Everything appeared to have been completely planned and the *Deutsche See Handelsgesellschaft* was duly constituted on January 21, 1880, consisting of fourteen share holders and having von Hanseemann and Bleichröder as directors-in-chief.³

On April 15, 1880, the Samoan Subsidy Bill passed the *Bundesrat* against the votes of Hamburg and Bremen, and on April 22, it came up for its first reading in the *Reichstag*.⁴ Throughout the entire course of the debates, the supporters of the scheme masked the whole question of colonial expansion, which the proposed subsidy raised, behind an inflamed appeal to national patriotism to protect German trade and political prestige in the South Seas. Never once did they meet squarely the issue of colonial policy as such, although their opponents flung down the gauntlet many times. And in reading the debates, it is most evident, as indeed it

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1880, *Aktenstück* no. 101, p. 720; Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, *Aktenstück* no. 101, no. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, *Aktenstück* no. 101, *Unterlage* no. 6; Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. i, p. 166; Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 5-6.

⁴ *Europäische Geschichtskalender*, April 15, 1880.

was to the Opposition, that all the cards were not on the table; that something lay beneath this bill which, if indorsed, would commit the nation to a thoroughgoing policy of overseas expansion.

An analysis of Bismarck's announcements concerning the newly formed company, of the speech from the throne at the opening of the *Reichstag* session, of the explanatory documents with which the bill was accompanied, and of the speeches of the administrative officials in the debates, reveals the Government's argument and appeal to the nation for an indorsement of the Subsidy Bill. The Government seemed to rest its case simply upon the plea that the Samoan Subsidy was in line with the overseas trade protection policy as inaugurated by the Tongan Treaty in 1877, and was in fact but a continuation thereof. For instance, the preamble to the bill declared: "Ever since the news about the failure of the house of Godeffroy, consular reports and other communications have represented to the Government that the loss of territory in Samoa, now in German hands, will result in a loss of German prestige and commercial position in Oceania hardly to be recovered. The Imperial Cabinet, convinced of the national significance of the matter could not permit itself to neglect an attempt to avert this disaster."¹

The same note was struck by the speech from the throne of February 10, 1880: "The empire is deeply concerned to provide protection and encouragement for trade and shipping. For this purpose, it presents for ratification a treaty of trade and amity with the Hawaiian Islands and the *Samoan Bill*."²

Again, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, officially

¹ *Anlagen des Deutschen Reichstages*, 1880, *Aktenstück* no. 101, p. 721.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 2.

advocating the subsidy, in a special article on April 17, 1880, contradicted flatly that the bill meant a colonial policy, or even the support of the House of Godeffroy.¹

In the debates, every speaker who officially represented the Government, was most particular to emphasize the position which the administration had adopted. In fact, Under-Secretary Scholz, introducing the proposition on April 22, 1880, began by denying what he termed "the misrepresentation of the subject as colonialism by the press of the Opposition." . . . "The Government is merely following a course similar to that followed in subsidizing the Saint Gotthard Tunnel."²

Von Küsserow's masterly summary of the whole administrative policy concerning overseas trade protection closed by stating that the Samoan Subsidy was merely a continuation thereof. "It is not a question of party, of free trade or protection, but one of the honor and glory of Germany."³ He exaggerated the menace of England and expatiated at length upon the threatened calamity which Germany's failure to act would bring about in Samoa. These two national dangers provided a convenient flagstaff, upon which to unfurl and wave against the winds of the Opposition, the red, white and black flag of the German Empire.

"Nations only respect a nation that can exert might and power," said Hohenlohe-Schillingfürst, the provisional State Secretary in the Foreign Office.⁴ This point of view was epitomized by Staudy, who spoke for the Conservative party, which, while opposed to the subsidy as helping in-

¹ *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 17, 1880, no. 179, quoted by Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. i, p. 275.

² *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 22, 1880, p. 857.

³ *Ibid.*, April 23, 1880, pp. 888 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, April 27, 1880, pp. 945 *et seq.*

dustrial capital, emphasized the importance of upholding the honor of the Fatherland. "How would she appear in the eyes of the world, if she did not take a definite position? . . . It is superfluous to speak of a colonial policy, as the proposition before us does not mention it." ¹

Significantly enough, Bismarck did not appear personally in the *Reichstag* during the Samoan debate. At the time he was living within the shadow of one of his periodical "requests for leave to resign."

On the other hand the colonial enthusiasts, just as previously in the debates on the Samoan treaty, did not hesitate to call the proposed subsidy another step in the direction of colonial policy and to welcome it heartily as such.

Prince Hohenlöße-Langenberg came out openly in favor of expansion. "I have noted with joy the movement of the last year towards it. Colonial policy is a great necessity; immigration makes it so. . . . Today, for the first time, we officially confront the question of its adoption. . . . Great political interests are at stake." ²

Mosle, in his turn, rejoiced that "the Prince Hohenlöße-Langenberg has so spoken. I am convinced that the Government will soon adopt a colonial policy. It will become a necessity. It is a pity that influences have hitherto restrained the Chancellor. . . . The treaty with Samoa will only last so long as we can dominate the island. . . . This has been the history of all colonial powers. England is our model." ³

The claims of these enthusiasts, however, did not alarm the opponents of colonialism so much as the facts, which they later pointed out, that the Samoan Subsidy as advo-

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 23, 1880, pp. 890 et seq.

² *Ibid.*, April 22, 1880, pp. 858 et seq.

³ *Ibid.*, April 23, 1880, pp. 879 et seq.

cated by the Government, was but the beginning of a colonial policy, that it would lead to more expansion, and that it represented the real attitude of the Government, which its advocates merely "try to cover up with their cry of national glory."

Tearing off this disguise and at once proclaiming the issue to be one of state colonialism, the Opposition centered its attack in two main arguments; first, that the Samoan Subsidy, as a step in the direction of colonialism, would not be for the ultimate national interests; and, second, that it merely represented governmental support of a private firm, which would prove very bad business for Germany, another South Sea Bubble.

In dispelling "the national glory" illusion, Bamberger, the leader of the Opposition, claimed that the affair was represented in one way by the governmental press and in quite a different manner by that of Hamburg and Bremen. "They (the Government) say it is national interest. It is really speculation. . . . Bismarck has issued a circular which accompanies the stock subscription list of the *Deutsche See Handels Gesellschaft*, claiming it to be a national, patriotic duty to subscribe.¹ . . . In intellectual circles, in clubs, in newspapers, and in pamphlets, an active propaganda has been carried on in order to make the German people believe that the commercial interests of the whole German nation are involved in the affairs of this single firm. This is really nothing but the beginning of a colonial policy and I am opposed to it."²

The misrepresentation was occasioned, Bamberger thought, because of "the ecstasy of colonialism which is in

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 22, 1880, pp. 862 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, April 27, 1880, pp. 945 *et seq.*

the air, and also because of the waving of the national flag and the blaring of trumpets." And, instead of the entire world waiting, as the colonialists would have everyone believe, to watch what Germany does in Samoa, no one is at all concerned about it. "*In England und France, kein Hund und keine Katze fragt danach.*"

Arguing along the same line, Löwe, a Progressive, showed that the Government was involved in an economic colonial enterprise, which "the Conservatives attempt to disguise by the cry of national glory. . . . They will only demand more subsidies in order to hoist the German flag higher. . . . The purpose clearly is to inaugurate a colonial policy. . . . And I consider it wrong to conceal the real issue in this matter, by continually asserting that the subsidy is to insure national interests when, in reality, it is merely to promote trade." ¹

Having fearlessly called the Samoan proposition state-directed colonialism, the Opposition proceeded to demonstrate how it was contrary to the real commercial and financial interests of Germany. Thus, Meier, who, as he claimed, expressed the opinion of the whole Hamburg Exchange, and who was well acquainted with the House of Godeffroy and in possession of many facts concerning the situation, vigorously opposed the project. He said that German merchants did not need to be subsidized. "I am opposed to state help and am convinced that if we wish our nation strong, we must reject it; we must allow people to depend on themselves. . . . If we reject this proposed subsidy, we will be doing a service to the nation as well as to the stockholders." ²

Bamberger elaborated Meier's argument with many detailed figures, designed to show the relative insignificance

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 27, 1880, pp. 945 et seq.

² *Ibid.*, April 23, 1880, pp. 881 et seq.

of the Samoan trade. He asked why the German people should take 300,000 M. out of its pocket every year and make "poor Michael" pay to assist a bankrupt business, especially when there exist many successful firms in the South Seas. "It is unjust to injure other interests in Samoa which have been and are doing well."¹

The House of Godeffroy, in business since 1860, has had many financial embarrassments . . . and has finally gone on the rocks. . . . This is not a sound business; should we support it? . . . The House of Godeffroy differs from all other firms in its large landed possessions overseas; this means colonialism, which has been sown with blood for the past three hundred years.² . . . There is little import trade, since the natives are too primitive. The Leipzig Chamber of Commerce has telegraphed a resolution in favor of the Subsidy Bill. Why? Leipzig can export only woven underwear and for this the natives have no use. It is only an illusion, this idea that trade will be improved by subsidies. The import trade in Samoa is mainly English—seventy-eight percent of it—while only twenty-two percent is German. The Samoan trade really amounts to little.³

Bamberger as well as Löwe considered the whole project a repetition of the South Sea Bubble. "The Government is misled, does not understand business and sees visions. . . . Enthusiasts for colonies always go into ecstasies over visions of commercial advantage, and others, whom I call 'Oceaniden,' whenever the sea is mentioned cry out, 'Thalatta,' like the ten thousand Greeks."⁴

Resorting to personal attacks, Bamberger accused Godeffroy & Son of unscrupulous monopolistic methods. "Con-

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 23, 1880, pp. 893 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, April 22, 1880, pp. 862 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, April 22, 1880, pp. 893 *et seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, April 27, 1880, pp. 954 *et seq.*

sul Weber, Agent of the House of Godeffroy, has misused his powers. . . . In 1876, the firm of Ruge, Heedermann & Company, wrote to Bismarck complaining that the German Consul Weber, who is also agent of Godeffroy & Son, was threatening the inhabitants of Samoa that if they did not sell exclusively to Godeffroy, they would have to pay a fine of 250 M., every month."¹ And we already know how Bamberger exposed the connection between the financial interests of Godeffroy & Son, the great German bankers, and the Government.² He also said, "I believe with Meier that the 'financial experts' like Bleichröder and Hardt have started and managed the whole affair and have issued the new company's stock, 'under a strong moral pressure.' These are the gentlemen who composed the company and everyone knows what good business they have already done in Prussia and the empire."³

The fate of the proposed subsidy proved without doubt that the opposition in the *Reichstag* reflected correctly the prevailing public opinion; for the bill failed to pass the *Reichstag* by one hundred and twenty-eight to one hundred and twelve votes, in spite of the efforts of the colonial party and Bismarck.⁴ The concentrated and bitter opposition of the left wing of the National Liberals, numbering twenty-one, of the Progressives, the Centrists, the Poles, the Particularists and the Socialists had triumphed over the strong union of the Conservatives and the right wing of the National Liberals, the latter numbering thirty-six. The Centre was here among the opponents and was conspicuously absent

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 22, 1880, pp. 863 et seq.

² Cf. *supra*, p. III.

³ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, April 27, 1880, pp. 894 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 960, list of votes.

in the debates, because, while strongly in favor of overseas expansion, the Catholic party always blocked a colonialism which provided solely for the commercial and political, to the total exclusion of any cultural or religious objects. The emphatic "No" of this party, together with the absence of many Conservative representatives, proved decisive. One hundred and forty members abstained from voting, indicating that a considerable group still reserved judgment or were unwilling to commit themselves upon the vital issue of a national colonial policy.

The press further reflected the temper of the country as it was revealed by the discussion of the Samoan affair; it confirmed the attitude and reiterated the arguments adopted by both sides which the debates had already indicated. The government organs, notably the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, partly owned by members of the House of God-effroy, fought for the subsidy with great fervor.¹ At first, it took every occasion to deny that the Samoan proposition meant a colonial policy or a means of support for the House of Godeffroy. It criticised bitterly the method employed by the Opposition, particularly its personal attacks, and tried to dispel all suspicion and yet, when an adverse outcome seemed likely, it adopted an attitude of naive indifference, attaching apparently no great significance to either failure or success.² "We hear that only a very acute neuralgic attack with which Bismarck has been afflicted for the past three weeks, prevented him from personally taking part in the debates."³

When the subsidy was irreparably defeated, however, the paper in its disappointment and anger, discarded all diplo-

¹ Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

² *Norddeut. Allg. Zt.*, 1880, April 17, 18, 21, 22, nos. 179, 181, 185, 186, quoted by Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. i, p. 275.

³ *Ibid.*, April 25, 1880, no. 191.

macy and revealed its true position: "It is probable that had the country been consulted, the verdict would have been very different. The Samoan Subsidy was a prelude to a German colonial policy and the first practical expression of it. Neither the enemies of our greatness, nor the doctrinaires of the Manchester School, will succeed in preventing Germany from embarking upon that course which other nations have followed with advantage."¹

Indeed the German Government seemed more dissatisfied than discouraged, since another official paper, *Die Post*, advised the administration to take possession of the Samoan Islands and merely to announce the fact to the *Reichstag*. "If a people suitable for the work of colonization exists, it is the German people. A large part of the world's commerce is in their hands. German colonies are necessary."²

The *Kölnische Zeitung*, a semi-official organ, representing the opinions of inland Germany, where paradoxically there has always existed a romantic sentiment and enthusiasm for overseas exploits and for the navy, said, in commenting upon the result: "It is an indisputable fact that the need of colonies for economic reasons has already attained a strong hold on the official mind. . . . The victory of the Opposition will bring disappointment to many circles and is contrary to the wishes of a large majority of our people. . . . The national interest was foremost here. . . . The parliament of no other great state would sacrifice political prestige for so small a financial consideration or on account of the risk of the venture."³

Naturally, the organs of the colonial party united with the

¹ *Norddeut. Allg. Zt.*, April 28, 1880, quoted by *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*, *loc. cit.*, 1887, p. 537, and Giordani, *The German Colonial Empire* (London, 1916), p. 15.

² *Die Post*, April 23, 1880, quoted by Giordani, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

³ *Die Kölnische Zeitung*, April 30, 1880.

governmental press in deploring the failure of the subsidy. "Our political position in Samoa depends upon our economic status. Whoever has lived in the colonies will know with what hearty laughter our withdrawal from Samoa will be greeted."¹

The press of Hamburg and Bremen was most significant; it might have been expected energetically to have vociferated the strong support of the subsidy on the part of these commercial cities, since the Government claimed that the bill was to foster shipping and trade; but it failed to fulfill such expectations.

The Hamburg press showed that city as maintaining a somewhat reserved attitude, in spite of the attacks upon its local patriotism by *Der Export*. Hamburg, generally, had always been in favor of colonial expansion, but unlike the theorists of the inland, did not talk so much about it, because it was better informed regarding the dangers and difficulties, and was not so hot-headed, nor so ready to inaugurate state-directed colonialism at a stroke. Furthermore, the free-trade party still prevailed there in large measure and the *Hamburger Börsenhalle* took the point of view that other German firms were active in the South Seas and Godeffroy & Son ought to help itself.²

The Bremen press opposed the Subsidy Bill more completely and exhibited greater jealousy. The *Bremer Handelsblatt* anticipated "grave political results" of such a departure and entirely discredited the "national argument."²

Perhaps the whole Samoan affair was most correctly interpreted by the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, when it asserted, despite the claims of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, that the proposed subsidy was only in the interests of German trade and the protection of its South Sea

¹ *Der Export*, April 27, 1880.

² Coppius, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

property. "All the commercial interests, with the exception of the Leipsic Chamber of Commerce, denied that they would be helped by it. . . . The Samoan Subsidy was refused by the *Reichstag* because something lay underneath it, and it was made to cover up political motives. . . . Above everything else, the Samoan Subsidy appeared to anyone who voted for it as a new departure. Many a representative would willingly have supported *one* such innovation, but the question arose whether this would not *inaugurate a new policy*." ¹

The results of the Samoan project and its failure were far-reaching in their effects upon the colonial movement. While temporarily appearing to check it they were ultimately most favorable to its progress. In the first place, we note the effect upon the Government's attitude towards colonialism. The Subsidy Bill had forced the administration to abandon the reserve hitherto displayed towards the whole matter and to take a definite stand. Modern German colonialism, that is state-directed colonialism, would doubtless have begun in 1880, had it not received this set-back. There was, as we have seen, every indication that the inauguration of a state-directed colonialism through the Samoan Subsidy had been the intention of the administration. "Bismarck, thereby, had hoped to launch his *Lieb-lingsplan*, namely, a colonial policy." ² The rejection of the project by the *Reichstag*, however, influenced Bismarck to drop temporarily all support of the colonial movement and all official coöperation with it; he fell back upon his maxim that, "It is impossible to enter upon a colonial policy without a national impulse." He saw that the majority of the country was against him and he was too clever a statesman to make the mistake of openly pressing an already defeated

¹ *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 30, 1880.

² Coppius, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

issue in the face of a powerful Opposition. The Chancellor was also politician enough to realize that a policy which he had strongly advocated had been repudiated by a too independent *Reichstag*. And he appreciated only too well the importance of not letting such a *Reichstag* get out of hand, especially at this crisis in political affairs. He felt that, "by this decision, his authority was compromised, his duty and policy injured by party strife," and that caution was necessary.¹ Hence, after May, 1880, we find the Chancellor playing a double game, for how otherwise explain his very contradictory conduct? He seemed at one time, indirectly and secretly, to support the colonial movement; and at another time, to repudiate it officially and openly, by refusing to accede to any demands for assistance and protection.

As evidence, on the one hand, of the Chancellor's support of colonialism, is a letter written on May 7, 1880, to the Board of Directors of the *Deutsche See Handels Gesellschaft*. This Board had come to the rescue of the company upon the failure of the subsidy, and had personally assumed the debts of Godeffroy & Son, thereby preventing their property in Samoa from falling into English hands. In the letter, Bismarck expressed the greatest approval and appreciation of their action. "The conviction that you have rendered a worthy service to the Fatherland by supporting existing enterprises in the South Seas will not only be gratefully appreciated by His Majesty and the governments of the states united with his, but also by wide circles of the German population."²

¹ Account of Bismarck's conversation with prominent diplomat, in *Nord. Deut. Allg. Zt.*, May 1, 1880, quoted by Poschinger in *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. i, p. 276.

² Poschinger, *Aktenstücke zur Wirtschaftspolitik des Fürsten Bismarcks* (Berlin, 1890), vol. i, p. 332.

Again on July 6, 1880, he expressed the following sentiments in the government press:

The *Compagnie Oceanique* has established at great expense a factory in the island of Raiatea, whose independence is considered incontrovertible by international law. . . . It can be readily understood that the desire of the authorities in Tahiti to extend the French protectorate there, causes disquiet among the German inhabitants. This is a serious matter and something should be done. . . . We doubt whether the German Imperial Government will intervene for the protection of German commerce in Raiatea, in case France interferes, . . . or that it will take any commercial initiative in Polynesia, if negotiations with England or America become necessary. For the German National Assembly by rejecting the Samoan Subsidy has solemnly discredited in the eyes of Germany and the Powers the Government's solicitude for German interests in the South Seas. The Government should determine to assist overseas trade in opposition to the sentiment of the *Reichstag*.¹

On the other hand, there exists abundant evidence that the Chancellor officially repudiated any movement towards colonialism. In the year 1880, he ignored Mosle's petition for a state subsidy for a company established to buy up and develop land in North Borneo, owned by von Overbeck;² likewise on November 11, he rejected Hansemann's request for a state guarantee of a steamship line between Mioko, the German admiralty port in the Duke of York Islands, and other South Sea Islands, as well as a plan for the colonization of New Guinea.³ Again, in the year 1881, we find the

¹ *Nord. Deut. Allg.*, July 6, 1880, quoted by *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*, *loc. cit.*, p. 538. Also, *cf. supra*, p. 111. The *Compagnie Oceanique* was a company founded to extend Germany's commercial settlements in the South Seas with which Bismarck was closely connected.

² Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 72.

Chancellor saying to a member of the *Reichstag*, in relation to the failure of the Samoan Subsidy, "As long as I am Chancellor, we will carry on no colonial policy. We have a navy incapable of going far and we cannot afford to own waste places in other parts of the earth which will only revert to the French."¹

At the same time (1880) Bismarck created the Economic Council of Prussia,² to support his political and commercial policy; and the Council forthwith passed a resolution that the empire appropriate 100,000,000 M. to purchase territory outside of Europe for the purpose of establishing colonies.

The only interpretation of this paradoxical policy would seem to be that Bismarck, fearful of political opposition, was "feeling his way," was advancing as best he could towards a colonial policy, and at the same time was avoiding any possible opportunity for another vote in the *Reichstag* indicating "no confidence."

The failure of the Samoan Subsidy Bill thus seriously affected the Government's relation to the colonial question. It drove the Chancellor into an equivocal position after first forcing him to show his hand in favor of colonies. It prevented the movement from achieving its goal of state-directed colonialism in the year 1880, and compelled it to develop through one or more phases, during which the administration remained in the position of a silent and secret partner of the colonial party.

In the second place, we have to consider the result of the failure of the Samoan Subsidy Bill upon the colonial party itself. Stung by defeat into greater effort, it redoubled its exertions both in individual attempts at economic colonialism and in propaganda to convert public opinion. A

¹ Poschinger, *Fürst Bismarck und Die Parlamentarier*, vol. iii, p. 54.

² *Ibid.*, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. ii, p. 11.

multitude of independent overseas enterprises as well as a tremendous outburst of literature were the result of the party's defeat in the *Reichstag*. Immeasurably strengthened by the open and avowed support of the Government, disclosed by the whole Samoan affair, it felt all the more keenly the public withdrawal of administrative coöperation, and was therefore absolutely determined to regain governmental support. Moreover, the manner in which the opponents of the Samoan Subsidy Bill, especially Bamberger, had handled their case and had attacked imperial officials, resulted in winning many supporters who had been otherwise indifferent to the cause. Even the enemies of a colonial policy resented the bitter insinuations uttered against state officials by the Opposition and sympathized with the colonialists on that account.

Indirectly also, the failure of the Samoan Subsidy Bill strengthened the position of the colonial party: the loss of German prestige, incident upon the defeat of the proposed Samoan policy, encouraged the rival efforts of England and France; it made the "foreign menace over seas" loom larger upon the horizon; and it supplied the colonial enthusiasts and patriots with abundant material for specific appeals for protection. For instance, the English firm of McArthur in New Zealand, which had possessed trade and plantation settlements in Samoa since 1870, secured the buildings and leases of the German firm, Ruge, Heedemann, on the Tonga Islands, after the subsidy's failure; it sent ships and projected a steamship line between Tonga and New Zealand, thus causing the Germans to fear English annexation.¹ Also England annexed to the Fiji Islands the Island of Rotuman, where Germany had hitherto controlled trade. England then forbade German ships to proceed thither di-

¹ Poschinger, *Aktenstücke*, vol. i, p. 332.

rectly, obliging them to stop first at an English customs port in Fiji.¹

France's desire to extend her Protectorate from Tahiti to the island of Raiatea, has already been mentioned; and this she finally accomplished when she raised her flag in Raiatea on May 25, 1881.²

The most important result, however, which the Samoan Subsidy accomplished for the colonial party and the entire movement was that, in common with most test cases, it clarified the issue and defined more precisely the friendly and hostile elements. It forced groups and individuals into taking sides. By means of the publicity and discussion which the affair occasioned, the colonial party could now distinguish between its supporters and its opponents. For instance, the colonialists realized after April, 1880, that colonialism has become a political issue, that it was party politics for their enemies to fight colonialism in any shape whatsoever in the *Reichstag*; that indeed these enemies fought it more because of mere political tactics and a desire for revenge against Bismarck, and his protective tariff, than because of any actual disagreement with the colonial movement. In fact the non-governmental parties, the left wing of the National Liberalists, the Progressives, the Poles, and the Socialists, indirectly influenced affairs abroad to the detriment of German colonial plans. In England, especially, they contributed indirectly to stirring up a movement to block Germany, which in 1880 eventuated in the formation of a company that bought and developed the land shares owned by von Overbeck in North Borneo and checkmated Mosle's plan.³ Indeed the English papers made no secret of

¹ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 30.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 130.

³ Herrfurth, *Bismarck und die Kolonialpolitik*, p. 20.

saying that the company was organized in order to forestall Germany.

Nowhere was the cleavage which the Samoan affair wrought in public opinion, more apparent than at the first annual Congress of the *Centralverein für Handels Geographie* and the Nineteenth Annual Congress of the *Deutsche Volkswirte*. The two organizations chanced to meet simultaneously in Berlin during October, 1880, and officially discussed the colonial issue; in fact their debates echoed those of the *Reichstag* over the Samoan affair.¹ While the Congress of the *Centralverein* was wholly in favor of state-directed colonialism and state-directed emigration (although all the speakers did not go so far as the colonialist leaders, such as Dr. Jannarsch, Weber and Fabri, in advocating governmental acquisition of territory) the Congress of *Deutsche Volkswirte*, led by Dr. Kapp, supported by Loehnis and Philipppsohn, passed a resolution of opposite tenor. "While the Government feels obliged, under the present law, to allow emigration to proceed unchecked, yet protects it from exploitation and interference, the Congress of *Deutsche Volkswirte* declines to indorse any attempt to establish colonies at the cost of the state in order merely to benefit certain rich groups."

The two congresses thus expressed a division of public sentiment which typified the situation throughout the nation. It was the old, internationally-minded generation pitted futilely, as time was to prove, against the representatives of the new age, fresh in their industrial, economic and national strength. Which had the greater chance?

The Samoan Subsidy Bill, the test-case, had failed imme-

¹ *Verhandlungen des Erstens Kongresses des Centralvereins. Verhandlungen des Neunzehnten Kongresses Deutschen Volkswirte*, quoted by Hübbe-Schleiden, *Deutsche Kolonisation*. Vide, also, *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, 1881, pp. 325 et seq.

diately in furthering a colonial policy. Nevertheless, it advanced the colonial movement a long way on the road to success, by clearly defining the issue, by disclosing the avowed support of the Government, by giving wide publicity to the subject, by definitely lining up the supporters and opponents and, finally, by indicating the work still to be accomplished. We shall next follow the colonial party and the Government, working side by side as partners, to promote the movement through its final stage which ended in the ultimate triumph of a state-directed colonialism.

CHAPTER VII

THE TRIUMPH

BETWEEN the years 1881 and 1884 the colonial party and the Government endeavored each in its way to achieve the triumph of a state-directed colonialism. Their task was to create a powerful public opinion in favor of expansion sufficient to enable the administration to emerge from the position of hesitancy and political precaution into which it had been driven by the failure of the Samoan Subsidy. Throughout these four years the colonial party coöperated with and supplemented the policy and tactics of the Government. Indeed, the inter-action of these two forces supplies the keynote to the period and the explanation of the final triumph of colonialism in 1884. For the colonialist leaders and the administration finally succeeded in initiating a state-directed colonial policy by a bold stroke, although they discovered, at the same time, that they had to reckon still with a formidable opposition in the country and that they had on their hands another year's fight to secure parliamentary ratification.

We will trace first the work of the colonial party, as it was the leader in the campaign until the year 1883. After the defeat of the Samoan Subsidy Bill, the party lined up its cohorts of every kind and united all the scattered enthusiasts for colonialism in a definite organization—the *Kolonialverein*. Indeed the history of the *Kolonialverein* presents an excellent picture of the convergence into one main and deep channel of all the streams, currents and

eddies, which went to make up the entire colonial movement, and in its final organization it exhibits the union of the theorists and the practical colonialists under the leadership of the latter.

Several societies had already appeared in Germany as forerunners of the *Kolonialverein*. The first of these, the *West Deutsch Verein für Colonisation und Export*, founded by Fabri at Düsseldorf in 1880, was an offshoot from the Central Association for Commercial Geography and German Interests Abroad. The Society's avowed purpose was to devote all its activity solely to the establishment of colonies; its special aim, as announced in 1880, "to influence the Government in acquiring German trade and plantation settlements." It directed its attention to trade and business projects, endeavoring particularly to prepare a place for Germans in South America. This active society later joined the *Kolonialverein* in 1883.

Next in importance as a forerunner was the *Leipzig Verein für Handels Geographie* which boasted objects similar to those of the *West Deutsch Verein*. In 1882 both these societies sent a commission to Argentina and Paraguay to study the possibilities and opportunities in those lands. Also they were both instrumental in founding in Leipzig in 1884 the South American Colonial Company. And together with the Central Association they contributed to the establishment of rich trade museums, which the Prussian Government welcomed with the warmest sympathy.

The Central Association for Commercial Geography also formed many branches which emphasized colonial interests. The year 1882, alone, witnessed the founding of Geographical Societies at Jena, at Königsberg and at Lübeck.¹

Together with these societies there existed various others for exploration and travel, groups of Rhenish Industrials

¹ *Globus*, 1882, pp. 126, 239.

like Friederichs, Hasenklever, and Heindahl, who were very much in favor of economic expansion over-seas, and associations of Hanse merchants such as Woermann and Mosle, Godeffroy's successors.¹

Thus there were many movements, all unrelated, uncoördinated. But there was no one concerted effort for colonization, and, moreover, the existing societies and groups were small in themselves. A central organization which would unite all these various efforts was conspicuously lacking. The preparation for it was complete.

The idea of a plan for one large, all-inclusive colonial society may be credited to three men, who gave it expression almost simultaneously—Friedrich von Maltzan, von der Brüggen and Prince Hohenlöhe-Langenburg. Von Maltzan as a naturalist had just returned in 1882 from a journey in Senegambia, where he had stayed for some time with Friedrich Colin, a German merchant from the Rhine district. Colin, representing a French house, had been in Senegambia twelve years and regretted exceedingly to see France, England, Portugal and not Germany, acquiring land there for commercial advantage. Von Maltzan, influenced by Colin, and likewise impressed himself by Germany's inaction, wrote two stirring articles on the subject which appeared in the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*, in May, 1882, and which were subsequently published in a brochure, entitled *Handels Kolonien, Ein Lebensfrage für Deutschland*. Likewise, with Colin's aid, von Maltzan had reached the conclusion that the only way to secure an opening for Germany in Senegambia or anywhere in Africa was to form a national society of all those interested in colonial enterprise, to finance a commercial occupation by a private

¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, 1882-1907* (Berlin, 1908), p. 5.

² *Augsburg Allg. Zeitung*, May, 1882.

company, and then to apply for imperial support and protection. He therefore wrote invitations to all persons known to be in favor of colonialism and also inserted a notice to the same effect in the newspapers. Hübbe-Schleiden replied to von Maltzan's invitation on June 8, 1882, and promised support. He wrote as follows: "I came to Berlin a short time ago in order to organize just such a central focus for colonial efforts as you plan for your *Kolonialverein*. But, in the meantime, I have become persuaded that the time is not ripe to aim at such a practical goal. Practical ends [in colonization] are not achieved by such organizations. They serve rather for political and cultural agitation."¹

Von Maltzan received this reply, together with a similar one from Freytag, and grew very much discouraged by the general lack of response to his appeal. Soon, however, Prince Hohenlöhe-Langenburg, attracted by the newspaper notice, wrote him that he had realized for a long time the political need of colonies; that he, in fact, had been in correspondence about the project with von der Brüggén, a traveller and man of means, the author of several articles on expansion which had appeared during the year 1882 in the *Preussisches Jahrbuch*.² One of these articles had expressed the sentiment that, "It would be an incalculable tragedy for Germany if finally colonization was not carried on by a great company." Prince Hohenlöhe was inspired by study and travel with colonial ideas; he had been Vice President of the *Reichstag* when the Samoan project failed; and he had evidently gained an appreciation of the political need of colonies. He had experienced, furthermore, the advantage of national organization in the *Yacht Club* of which he was president. Hohenlohe invited von

¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, pp. 6, 7.

² *Preussisches Jahrbuch*, March, 1882.

Maltzan to cooperate with von der Brüggen and himself in a national society. Thus he formed the connecting link which was needed between von Maltzan and von der Brüggen. Hohenlöwe united the economic and political colonial interests and the motives of trade, travel, exploration, science, and national necessity, although it is significant to note that von Maltzan, who had taken the first real initiative in the affair, primarily represented the economic motive.

The result of the cooperation of these three men was a summons to all those interested in colonialism in any way—the great industrials, representatives from societies, and the Boards of Trade of Frankfort and Offenbach—to meet in Frankfort (since Miguel, the Bürgermeister of Frankfort was an ardent colonialist), to discuss the question of placing the colonial ambition of Germans upon a broader base. The preparatory meeting was held on August 26, 1882; it appointed a committee which issued, on September 12, a circular embodying the objects of the proposed society and an appeal for members. The objects were stated as follows: "To extend to a larger circle the realization of the necessity of applying national energy to the field of colonization.

"To form a central organization for all the hitherto scattered efforts for expansion.

"To create some method for the practical solution of the question."¹

The circular and invitation was signed by representative colonial leaders and protagonists. We quote some of the names of the signers, in order to illustrate the coöperation of all phases of colonial theory and practice in the foundation of the *Kolonialverein*: Dr. Emile Jung, firm of Jantzen and Thormälhen of Hamburg; Lammers, Editor of the

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 8.

Bremen Handelsblatt; Dr. Oscar Lenz; Meier of Bremen, Head of the North German Lloyd; Dr. A. B. Meyer, Director of the Royal Zoological and Anthropological Museum of Dresden; Moldenhauer, an engineer and writer for colonialism; Dr. Kirchhoff, Head of the Geographical Society in Halle; F. Loesen, a ship owner of Hamburg; Rohlf, an African explorer; Professor Schmoller, of Berlin; Schloeman, a shipper of Hamburg; Clemens Denhardt, a merchant of Berlin; Dr. Fischer, Professor of Geography in the University of Kiel; Dr. Gustav Freytag; Fabri; and Hübbe-Schleiden.¹

The circular was then published in the papers together with a manifesto addressed to the country. The latter showed the need of increasing commercial outlets, in order to establish and maintain close touch with Germans over seas, and called attention in quite an alarming way to Germany's position as growing more and more restricted abroad. Most of the German press gave it space, but the only acknowledgment of the *Bayerische Vaterland* was the comment, "It is very kind of the *Kolonialverein* to send us their long announcement, but I and most of my readers are not interested in colonies, unless a colony should be established within a couple of dozen miles where Prussians might be exported. In that case then, we would be much in favor of them!"

Many leading men, however, responded to the call, particularly the industrial magnates of the West and South and members of societies already organized. Some difficulty was encountered at first with the citizens of the Hanse Towns, the leading circles of Bremen and Lübeck, in spite of the great efforts made to win them by literature and lectures. Hübbe-Schleiden constituted himself a special

¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, p. 12.

emissary to them and wrote that they held aloof because of suspicion and that their attitude seemed to be, "We know those Frankforters, their ideas sound well, but at bottom they only want our money and wish to supplement their capital with ours."¹ The criticism was also made that the *Kolonialverein* represented no definite enterprise, that it appeared to business men entirely too theoretical. Lammers of Bremen wrote that not a voice in its favor was to be heard there. Senator Klugman wrote from Lübeck that he foresaw no increase of industrial opportunity in the *Kolonialverein*. Professor Rein of Marburg expressed the opinion that the *Verein* was all theory and lacked money and power.² All these men represented the point of view of the extreme type of practical colonialists, men who were too impatient to adopt the slow method of educating public opinion. Gradually, nevertheless, they were won over in sufficient numbers to warrant the establishment of an organization. The *Kolonialverein* was accordingly founded and its constitution drawn up on December 6, 1882, at Frankfort. The president, Prince Hohenlöhe-Langenburg, announced on that occasion that, "The *Verein* was founded by men of all parties and positions in life and had met with an entirely unexpected response."³

The "parties and positions" were indeed most evident in the discussions over the constitution. Here again appeared the clash and final compromise among the various motives and aims of colonialism. For instance, Rohlf's wished the Society to engage merely in scientific study and to determine what areas were of greatest economic value for the Fatherland. Fabri spoke in favor of the guidance of emigration

¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, p. 13.

² Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

³ *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, p. 18.

and the establishment of colonies as the primary object. Fabri emphasized also the great necessity of avoiding antagonism with the Government; he stipulated as a condition of the union of his *West Deutsch Verein* with the *Kolonialverein*, that "no sentence appear in the constitution which might offend the Government." . . . "We cannot afford to hit our heads against a stone wall or to deal with an antagonistic Government." Meier, on the other hand, thought it impossible and inexpedient to found colonies and urged that the object of the Society should be the furtherance of imperial protection of trade and commerce. Miguel agreed with Meier that the purpose of the *Verein* should be not to establish colonies or financial enterprises, but to work for the governmental protection of already existing establishments and to make the colonial issue something upon which the entire nation and not a small group might unite.

The result of the discussion was the usual result—a compromise, and hence we find the aims of the *Kolonialverein*, as expressed by its constitution, very general and elastic, in order to suit the minds of all those present. "Its principal work is to educate public opinion; . . . to form a central organization for colonial ambitions; . . . not to found colonies which would involve the Government in serious political difficulties; but to confine its efforts to the establishment of small trading stations and to strive for the official protection of the administration."¹

The method pursued by the *Kolonialverein* consisted chiefly of organizing branches, publishing propaganda, sending out lecturers, and striving to establish friendly and coöperative relationships with other societies. Its success was shown when the *West Deutsch Verein* with its five hundred members joined the *Kolonialverein* in 1883. The only practical work of the Society, although many such

¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, pp. 9, 10.

schemes were projected, consisted in a settlement in Paraguay, whither a commission was despatched on October 23, 1882, and where the German flag was raised (without official authority) in 1883.¹ Thus, in spite of tremendous opposition, von Maltzan even going so far as to resign from the *Kolonialverein*, the Society achieved in its second year a real settlement under the red, black and white flag.

The growth and success of the *Kolonialverein* in winning adherence to the cause was remarkable, for by December 31, 1883, after one year's work, it numbered three thousand two hundred and sixty members and had foot-holds in four hundred and ninety-two places in Germany and in forty-three abroad including nineteen outside of Europe.² Furthermore, it was strong enough to launch an official organ, the *Kolonialzeitung*,³ whose first issue, appearing in January, 1884, stated in its introductory article that the *Kolonialverein* had been founded by men from all parts of Germany in response to a general expression of a national desire. The journal called upon all patriotic men to further the work of the colonial party. Its appeal was not political or partisan, but rather universal and national. Two years of active propaganda achieved wonders in shaping public opinion. "Men of all parties now belong to the *Kolonialverein*. The *Kolonialverein* stands far removed from the strife of parties and represents only a national purpose," said President Hohenlöhe-Langenburg at the first general convention held in Eisenach, on September 4, 1884.⁴ In one year, 1884-1885, the membership increased over three hundred percent, rising to ten thousand, two hundred and seventy-five.

¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, p. 26.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ *Die Kolonialzeitung*, 1884.

⁴ *Der Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, December 31, 1883.

Another organization—*Die Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation*—was, in addition to the *Kolonialverein*, a moulder of public opinion and an influence for the growth of colonialism. It was founded by Karl Peters in Berlin on April 3, 1884, for the very practical object of raising capital to finance colonies in East Africa.¹ When Dr. Peters attempted to win official interest for the Society, he encountered the lively opposition of the *Kolonialverein*, whose members thought that any scattering of effort would weaken the whole movement. An amalgamation of the two societies was proposed but great difficulties lay in the way: Peters stood for an active policy of immediate annexation; while the *Kolonialverein* was more cultural, more educational, more interested in supporting enterprises already started. A long debate ensued and resulted in a decision against amalgamation. It had the advantage, however, of eliciting protracted discussion in the press, which drew public attention to the colonial question and inflamed party spirit. Final amalgamation with the *Kolonialverein* ultimately came about, however, on November 19, 1887. The result was the foundation of a single great society, *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, which became a powerful and influential factor in the later history of German colonialism.²

The colonial party accompanied its work of organizing and consolidating its scattered forces by a renewal of vigorous public propaganda. We have seen what a firm foundation the colonialists had already laid in this respect during the years from 1879 to 1881. Now, the defeat of the Samoan project served to enlist scores of new apologists for the cause. The new literature embodied for the most part the same arguments as that preceding it, which has all

¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, pp. 36, 37.

² Herrfurth, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

been described in Chapter IV and needs no further exposition here. But the new propaganda possessed several characteristics novel in kind or tone.

First, the prevalence of articles dealing with colonialism became conspicuous in German periodicals after 1881. This was not evident formerly, when the propaganda consisted principally of brochures, pamphlets, and books privately published. The change indicated, perhaps, that colonialism now occupied a more prominent place in general discussion and had been promoted to a position of more or less national interest. Efforts of the colonial party were bearing fruit. The *Preussisches Jahrbuch*, especially, abounded in articles on colonization, a fact which, if we bear in mind its semi-official character, serves to confirm the idea that the Government was, if not actually sympathetic, at least not antagonistic to the movement.¹

Another characteristic of the literature of the period was the publication of new editions of former works which had supported the expansion movement directly or indirectly. For instance, Roscher's book, *Kolonial Politik, Kolonien und Auswanderung* was re-edited for the third time in 1885 and was followed shortly by a flood of literature which exalted and advertised the colonial exploits of Brandenburg-Prussia and the Great Elector.² The best of these new editions, however, belong rather beyond our period.

¹ Von der Brüggén, "Auswanderung, Kolonisation," "Der Deutsche Kolonialverein," "Einige Worte zur Kolonisation," "Der Kanzler und Kolonialpol," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, March, 1882, p. 290; January, 1883, p. 64; July, 1884, p. 34; February, 1885, p. 171. Treitschke, "Die Ersten Versuchen Deutscher Kolonialpolitik," *Preussisches Jahrbuch*, December, 1884, p. 555. Among other articles were: Geffcken, "Deutsche Kolonialpolitik," *Der Deutsche Rundschau*, April, May, 1882, pp. 33, 206, and October, 1884, p. 120; Gebauer, "Zur Deutschen Kolonialfragen," *Augsburg Allg. Zt.*, 1882, *Beilage*, nos. 18, 20, 22, 25, 28, 30, 32.

² Hoffmeister, *Die Maritimen und Kolonialen Bestrebungen des Grossen Kurfürstens* (Emden, 1886); Hyack, *Brandenburgische-Deutsche Kolonialpläne* (1887).

Prominent among new works on colonialism appearing during these years, were further works by Hübbe-Schleiden,¹ Emil Deckert's two hundred and fifty page volume containing every known argument for colonies,² and a descriptive book on Africa by Oberländer.³

It must be observed, moreover, that the opposition literature, the attacks and protests of the enemies of colonialism, decreased in number. The one important work of this character, during these years was Stegemann's *Deutschlands Kolonialpolitik*.⁴ The book summarized the arguments of expense, political difficulties, and the disadvantage of a colonial policy which was always striving to promote the economic welfare of a nation at the expense of the political. Stegemann was forced to admit that "the colonial literature has grown very much," but claimed that "the German press, with the exception of the *Kölnische Zeitung* (also semi-official), has not shown any definite support," and hence, he argued, "must not be in favor of colonialism."⁵ It is interesting to note that Stegemann did not say that the German press showed any signs of hostility as he doubtless would have said had he been able to prove it. E. Hasse reviewed the book, unfavorably, in the *Kolonial Zeitung*;⁶ he set it down as the view of the "old generation of internationalists," who believed not in the expression of an individual culture and nationalism through colonies, but in "a mixing of German culture with others—an

¹ Hübbe-Schleiden, *Kolonisations Politik und Technik* (Hamburg, 1883); *Überseeische Politik* (Hamburg, 1881).

² Deckert, E., *Die Kolonialreiche*, pt. ii (1883); Deckert, E., *und Kolonisationsobjecte* (Leipzig, 1885).

³ Oberländer, *Deutsch-Afrika* (Leipzig, 1885).

⁴ Stegemann, *Deutschlands Kolonialpolitik* (Berlin, 1884).

⁵ Stegemann, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁶ *Die Kolonialzeitung*, 1884, vol. iii, p. 6.

internationalism." Indeed this "old generation," so termed by the colonialists, were becoming literally old; their voices in opposition to a national colonialism were growing weaker and weaker. Minor objections, however, began to be voiced by another group, the Socialists, as illustrated by Max Schippel in his book, *Das Moderne Elend*,¹ and by Karl Kautsky,² who attempted to show that the economic unrest of Germany was due to social mal-adjustment and not to over-population. These Socialists claimed that colonies would not relieve all social ills, and, also, that money expended on colonization would be better spent upon the improvement of conditions at home. It must be noted, however that the Socialists' hostility did not spring from an undivided opposition to colonialism, but rather from an antagonism towards the entire "bourgeois system," and from a primary desire to propagate the gospel of Karl Marx.

Finally, we have to consider as part of the colonial party's work, during the years from 1881 to 1884, its further efforts in behalf of direct colonial action in overseas expansion. It continued to encourage industrial initiative in founding trade settlements and to solicit governmental support for these ventures. In this way it indirectly influenced public opinion and served to keep before the nation thriving examples of colonial undertakings and the need of administrative protection. The merchants, traders and speculators, all the commercial colonialists, were apparently not in the least discouraged by the defeat of the Samoan Subsidy and were enormously encouraged by the Government's sympathy and coöperation on that occasion. They redoubled their efforts to increase the sphere of overseas

¹ Schippel, *Das Moderne Elend und die Moderne Übervölkung: Ein Wort gegen Kolonien* (Leipzig, 1883).

² Kautsky, "Auswanderung und Kolonisation," *Die Neue Zeit*, 1883, pp. 365-393.

mercantile opportunity and endeavored simultaneously to win back the administrative support so summarily withdrawn after the defeat of the Subsidy Bill.

We have already seen how both Mosle and von Hanse-mann applied to the Chancellor for a state subsidy the very year of the Samoan failure.¹ Old and new colonial adventurers and promoters followed them. For instance, the Barmen Mission petitioned in 1881 for commercial protection for its settlement in Africa;² in September, 1882, Gustav and Clemens Denhardt petitioned the Government for support of a proposed establishment in Tana.³ The Denhardt brothers had made considerable progress in Africa: they had continued the friendly relations established by the explorers Brenner and von Decken with the chiefs of Witu, and had drawn up a plan for a colony. In order to finance the venture they influenced the formation of a "quiet company" in Berlin in 1883, after they had applied to the *Kolonialverein* in vain.⁴ Moreover, Colin of Stuttgart, long in the service of a French house in Senegambia, decided, towards the end of the year 1883, to settle there for himself. The *Kolonialverein* refused him aid, for it adhered to its announced policy of avoiding direct action in colonialism which might involve Germany in difficulties with foreign Powers. However, Colin secured support from his brother, from the director of the *Württemberg Vereinsbank*, and from several others. He chose Denbiah for his establishment, persuaded the chiefs to ask for German protection, and carried their request for the same to Berlin, early in the year 1884.⁵ So great indeed was the

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 130.

² Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Koschitzky, vol. i, p. 243.

⁵ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 190.

growth of trade settlements in West Africa along the Gold Coast, that the following firms, in addition to those already there, either entered for the first time, or enlarged their former holdings between the years 1880 and 1884: Woelber and Brothers of Hamburg, settling at Lome, Bageida and Klein Popo; Goldelt of Hamburg, at Lome and Wydah; Vietor and Sons of Bremen, at Lome, Bageida and Klein Popo; Witt and Büsch; Gaiser Voight and Company, at Porto Novo; Muller, Rosenbusch, and Lüderitz.¹ Several firms established German factories in Togoland, preferring to make their own settlements largely because England imposed on all trade in that district her burdensome customs duties. So considerable had become the trade, moreover, that the firm of Woerman, of long standing in Africa, founded in 1882 a steamship line running from Hamburg to West Africa, thus forming a direct connection between Germany and the commercial colonial posts.²

The South Seas exhibited no less an increase of commercial and colonial activity than did West Africa, after the failure of the Samoan Subsidy, although von Hanseemann had represented the situation in his memorial as quite the contrary.³ The *Deutsche Handels und Plantagengesellschaft*, successors to Godeffroy, had proceeded, as will be recalled, without the Samoan Subsidy. In 1883, the company was controlling eighteen trading stations in New Britain, the Hermit and Duke of York Islands.⁴ Indeed it seemed to be prospering without administrative aid. On February 23, 1884, the German North Borneo Company sprang into existence at Hamburg and bought ten thousand acres from the English North Borneo Company. Consul

¹ *Weissbuch*, 1885, p. 24. *Vide*, also, Cheradame, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

² Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

³ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 72.

⁴ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 232.

Struebel summed up the prosperous condition of the South Sea trade, as well as the great opportunities still open to German merchants, in his report to the Chancellor on December 18, 1883.¹ He stated therein that Germany's copra import amounted in one year to from two to three thousand tons, whereas the need of supplies, food, clothes, and all sorts of manufactured goods, was so great as to afford a tremendous market for export. Furthermore, the consuls and merchants were continually urging upon the Government, and hence indirectly upon the nation, the pressing need for imperial protection of all trade and commercial effort in the South Pacific. They asked for the extension of consular and naval service, as well as for the appointment of special officials whose duty it would be to supervise overseas trade.

The Government was far more subtle in its attempt to sway public opinion for colonialism than was the colonial party; it employed the finesse of diplomacy rather than a direct attack. Unlike the colonial party, whose leaders could openly strike at ignorance, indifference, opposition and every obstacle to expansion, the Government felt constrained to proceed with greater caution. Bismarck, as we have already noted, found himself in a difficult position after the defeat of the Samoan Subsidy. Heartily in sympathy with expansion, as he had then revealed himself in 1880, he seemed, during the years 1880-1885, to become firmly determined to establish a colonial policy for the empire. The pressure of external circumstances, such as the imperialistic acquisitions of France in Tonkin and Tunis, of Italy in the Red Sea, and of England in Egypt and India, evidently strengthened his decision. On the other hand, however, he dared not alienate the supporters of his policy in the *Reich-*

¹ *Weissbuch*, 1885, pp. 131-150.

stag who were none too strong or numerous. For, during the early eighties, he was struggling against the opposition to his new tariff policy, his social insurance legislation and his increasingly sympathetic support of commercial and economic interests. Illustrative of the antagonism which he met, was his attempt throughout the entire year 1881 to form an Economic Council for the empire similar to the one already successfully established for Prussia,¹ but the proposal twice suffered defeat in the *Reichstag*.² Again, his assumption of the office of Minister of Trade and Commerce at the end of the year 1880, another proof of his sympathy with the business interests, created grave suspicion in the minds of his political opponents.³ Hampered by this decided antagonism and mindful of political considerations, Bismarck employed two means of arousing a public sentiment in favor of colonialism. The first was a secret encouragement of the colonial party, accompanied by a continual testing of the temper of the nation to determine how far his support might go; the other was a revival of his characteristic policy of creating a chauvinistic attitude in Germany, especially towards England, with the ulterior purpose of arousing an enthusiasm for colonial expansion.

In regard to the first means, Bismarck, as it were, kept one hand on the pulse of public opinion, while with the other he cautiously aided and abetted the colonial movement, quickly withdrawing his aid, however, the minute that national antagonism approached the danger point. Is this not his position, in the first place, in relation to the *Kolonialverein*? Would an organization of so universal and powerful a character have been permitted to form or proceed at

¹ Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. ii, p. 9.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 96.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

all, in a country like Germany, had the administration not been somewhat in sympathy with its aims? Let us examine the relations between Bismarck and the Society and observe how the Chancellor, on the one hand, withheld any definite and outspoken support, and, on the other, refrained from exerting the slightest opposition.

From the outset, its leaders strictly defined the attitude of the *Kolonialverein* toward the administration as one of keen solicitude to avoid any friction or any interference with the foreign policy of the empire. Hübbe-Schleiden and Freytag clearly enunciated this attitude in their letters to von Maltzan.¹ Fabri expressed it by stipulating non-interference with the administration as the one condition of the union of his society with the *Kolonialverein*; while Hohenlöhe-Langenburg officially proclaimed it in his speech at the first general meeting of the *Verein* at Frankfort, where he related how he had made an especial effort to win the sympathy and support of the Government. He said, "At first the Foreign Office held rather aloof, because it had the idea that the *Verein* aimed to encourage emigration, but as a result of further explanation of the *Verein's* real object, it displayed a friendly attitude. . . . We must endeavor to stand in as much accord with the Government as possible."²

Toward the end of December, 1882, von Maltzan had an interview with the Crown Prince in which the latter manifested great interest in the work of the Society but showed a decided disinclination to take any direct part in its work. The political situation, as an article in the official press announced, precluded any such action on the part of the Government at this unsettled time.³

¹ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

² *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, p. 24.

³ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

Furthermore, the constitution of the *Verein* emphasized its position as "not wishing to involve the Government in any political difficulties," while the "aim of the *Verein* was not to work against the Government but with it; to prepare its way to educating public opinion." It is also of importance to note that the *Verein* first applied to von Küsserow, the colonial enthusiast in the Foreign Office, for support, sending him one of the original prospectuses, but obtaining no answer.¹ Knowing von Küsserow's sympathy with colonialism, did a cautious silence imply consent? Indeed there exists no evidence whatsoever of the slightest friction or antagonism between the Government and the *Kolonialverein*, a fact which would appear to substantiate the theory that they were, in reality, thoroughly in sympathy with one another as to aims; and were only biding their time when public opinion and the political condition in Germany could warrant their open and acknowledged cooperation.

In the next place, Bismarck's attitude towards the activities and petitions of the commercial colonialists affords us more evidence of his scheme of direct and indirect support. It will be recalled that both Mosle and von Hansemann did not hesitate to besiege the Chancellor in 1880 for cooperation with their colonial plans, six months after the defeat of the Samoan Subsidy. They were both very close to him and could not fail to be aware of his attitude. To be sure their requests met with a refusal, which at that time agreed with the temper of the nation. It must be noted, however, that it was at the Chancellor's request that von Hansemann drew up and presented the memorial on the condition of South Sea trade and had it published in February, 1881.² Bismarck evidently wished the country to know

¹ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

² Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 202.

that, "after the rejection of the Samoan Subsidy, it is impossible to take any strong initiative in the South Seas; a great set-back to trade must be expected unless Germany energetically supports it."¹

Meanwhile, von Hanseemann received a reply from the Chancellor to the effect that, "The Chancellor considers that after the defeat of the Samoan project, it is impracticable for him to take any initiative in this direction. The country's inclination is not strong enough to warrant support of this plan now. As affairs are at present, it would have to be left to the action of private initiative, to which the Government can only afford consular protection."²

The Government, however, followed with great care all the activities of the company formed as successors to Godeffroy in the South Seas and kept its consuls there informed of administrative plans. Thus the Chancellor allayed any suspicion of governmental action in Oceania which had been a particularly tender subject with the Opposition since the Samoan Subsidy Bill.

Bismarck was not idle in other directions, and in contradiction to the sentiments expressed by him on February 18, 1881, to von Hanseemann, he began as early as March 1, 1881, to broach cautiously, in the official press, the subject of state support for a steamship line to the East.³ He followed up this scheme with a memorial presented to the *Reichstag*, on May 27, 1881, on the necessity of a state subsidy for the proposed line,⁴ with more articles in the press, during the summer, entitled, *Zur Hebung des Deutschen*

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 72.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 73.

³ Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. ii, p. 32, quoting the *Nord. Deut. Allg. Zt.*, March 1, 1881.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 74. Vide, also, *Anlagen des Deut. Reichstages*, 1881, *Aktenstück* no. 200.

Ausfuhrhandels,¹ and with an assurance to the Conservative *Verein* of Schöneberg that, "He clung to his economic policy with the firm hope that it would result in freeing the economic interest of Germany from oppression of servitude in which they had, until the present, been held by political parties for a political purpose."

Bismarck's memorial, however, was never even placed upon the order of the day and was utterly disregarded. The implied rebuff from the *Reichstag* warned him to take care and consequently he turned a deaf ear to the petition of the Barmen Mission for protection in 1881 and to the petition of the brothers Denhardt on September 15, 1882.² Indeed, his mood revealed itself, we take it, in the somewhat peevish tone of his reply to the Counsellor for Commerce, Baare, in Bochum, who at the beginning of 1883, recommended the annexation of Formosa. "Colonies only belong to a mother country in which national feeling is stronger than party spirit. The attitude of this *Reichstag* is such, that it is difficult enough to maintain what we already have, even to support an army for home defense. So long as the empire is so financially disabled, we dare not embark on such expensive undertakings. The responsibility of colonies would only increase the (exercise ground) of the *Reichstag*. We cannot bear the burden of colonies, we can only support trading companies; but even for that it would be necessary to have a national *Reichstag* which would have other and higher objects than constant discussion and the creation of difficulties for the administration."³

Meanwhile, however, Bismarck was beginning to aid the colonial movement secretly in a very material manner, although his many refusals of support indicated that he did

¹ Poschinger, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 149.

³ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

not dare as yet openly to encourage it. For instance, on November 16, 1882, Lüderitz, the Bremen merchant long active in African trade at Lagos, applied to the Foreign Office for imperial protection of the contracts he was about to consummate with native chiefs for trade and for the establishment of a factory on the Southwest Coast of Africa.¹ Bismarck, at the beginning of the year 1883, secretly promised him that protection would be afforded if he could acquire a harbor to which no other nation might rightfully asserted a claim.² Lüderitz, fortified by this promise, went ahead with his plans and took possession of the harbor of Angra Pequena in April, 1883. He further extended his operations by sending his agent Vogelsang into the interior in the following summer for the purpose of making treaties and settlements. The latter concluded a treaty with the native chiefs on May 1, 1883, acquiring a territory of considerable area with all sovereign rights.³ Lüderitz would hardly have embarked upon such an expedition had he not had definite assurances of imperial protection from Bismarck—and that he did possess assurances is proved by the governmental instructions of August 18, 1883, to the German Consul in Capetown to accord protection and aid to Lüderitz: "Herr Lüderitz can count on the protection of the Imperial Government, so long as his actions are based upon justly won rights and do not clash with the legitimate claims of others, be they native or English."⁴

Furthermore, the Chancellor sent the gun-boat *Nautilus*

¹ *Weissbuch*, 1885, pt. i, p. 77.

² *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, p. 32.

³ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 148-150. *Vide*, also, Cheradame, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁴ *Weissbuch*, 1885, pt. i, p. 79.

to Angra Pequena and another warship to Little Popo in the month of January, 1884.

Likewise, Bismarck accorded direct support and protection to the South Sea traders: in response to their petitions, especially to the memorial of Consul Struebel in Apia of December 18, 1883, the Chancellor replied that he was appointing special commissioners to whom he would entrust all German interests in the Islands of New Britain and New Ireland and whose authority he would further reinforce by German warships.¹

Bismarck not only met the individual colonialists half way, so far as it was possible without exciting suspicion, but he took a most decided initiative in 1883 in advancing a colonial policy.² Indeed, after Lüderitz applied to him for protection and after the German people received Lüderitz's exploits with approval, he seems to have decided that the time was ripe for colonial activity, and that public opinion was more favorable.³ He still realized, however, that necessity for caution was great and he therefore drew closer to the merchants, the commercial colonialists, for advice and guidance in his more definite policy.

The apparently unfriendly action of England and France in concluding a Colonial Convention on June 28, 1882,⁴ strengthened the Chancellor in his decision to launch a colonial policy of his own. The Convention negotiated a demarcation line for the extension of English and French territory northward from Sierra Leone, and it also established high custom duties which were resented by German firms, especially by Woermann. Bismarck seized the opportunity afforded by the Convention to ask the Senates

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 75.

² Herrfurth, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 150.

⁴ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 32. *Vide*, also, Cheradame, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

of the Hanse towns on April 14, 1883, to submit suggestions to the Government for the protection of German trade in Africa; and in so doing he both tested public opinion and promoted colonial interests. The suggestions, embodied in *Denkschriften* from the German firms, were accordingly submitted in July, 1883. We summarize their principal ideas in order to show the strength of public opinion in the Hanse towns in favor of imperialism and to indicate how far the commercial colonialists thought that the government should embark at that time upon a state-directed colonialism.

Lübeck expressed the need of direct communication with the African Coast.

Bremen desired the protection of warships and treaties with the local chiefs to offset the burdens laid upon German trade by England and France.¹

Hamburg gave the most valuable advice of all, as follows: (1) German Consul on the Gold Coast; (2) more extended consular treaties; (3) commercial treaties with independent negro princes on the Coast, supported by warships; (4) stationing of warships near, and establishment of naval base on, the Spanish Island of Fernando Po; (5) neutralizing the mouth of the Congo River; and (6) founding of a trade colony at Biafra Bay.²

On December 22, 1883, the Foreign Office notified the petitioners that their demands were being considered, that it would be grateful for even more information, and, finally, that it had already made provision for, (1) The appointment of a consul; (2) the creation of a commission to supervise German interests on the West Coast of Africa; (3) the stationing of warships on the Coast; and (4) the dispatching of the S.S. *Sophie* to North Africa.³

¹ *Weissbuch*, July 9, 1883, p. 5.

² *Weissbuch*, July 6, 1883, no. 3.

³ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 22.

The Chancellor thus applied his first scheme of dealing with public opinion: he afforded a discreet encouragement to the colonial movement and a cautious direct support, but he never once allowed himself to go too far and arouse hostility or antagonism, for he cleverly remained constantly in touch with the fluctuations of colonial sentiment in Germany. The closer he drew to the commercial colonialists, the more he sympathized with their point of view, and the stronger became his resolution and conviction that colonialism was essential to the empire. Nevertheless as late as July, 1883, after he had definitely promised support to Lüderitz and invoked petitions from the Hanse towns, he publicly announced in the press that, "The purchase and support of colonies would entail financial sacrifices for which the German states had not now the money. . . . The German Empire would place about its neck a tremendous burden of responsibility if it should acquire colonies at present."¹

Circumstances, however, were becoming propitious for the Chancellor to set in motion his second scheme of manipulating public opinion in favor of a colonial policy. Indeed, the opportunity lay ready at hand to enable him to use his remarkable diplomatic skill to arouse a chauvinistic patriotism in Germany towards the threatening colonial encroachments of England. He first employed such tactics in May, 1882, in relation to the South Sea affairs. He then deliberately revived the unsettled question of England's indemnities to the dispossessed Fijian settlers. The Chancellor sent a note to the English Government recalling the fact that the claims had been urged for eight years, ever since 1875, and he enclosed a petition, lately received from one of the injured German interests in Fiji, the firm of Rabone, Feez and Company.² The note elicited from Eng-

¹ Herrfurth, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 187-188.

land only another promise; and Bismarck heard, on November 7, 1882, from his representative, Count Münster in London, that the "English Government, as a result of the findings of the land commission in Fiji, seemed little inclined to examine their claims as they were made from a very biased point of view."¹ It had become only too evident that England meant to postpone the entire Fijian settlement indefinitely. The Chancellor then decided to take vigorous action in the matter. He asked England on April 16, 1883, to submit the claims to a joint commission composed of Englishmen and Germans.² England seemed not at all disposed to consent to this proposal and the diplomatic correspondence dragged on with increasingly peremptory notes from Bismarck on October 18, and December 27, 1883, and April 8, 1884.³ Not until June 19, 1884, did England agree to the establishment of a joint commission.⁴ The correspondence and the attitude of the Chancellor, however, had had their effect, for they served to create the impression in Germany that not only were England's commercial and colonial methods a menace to the Fatherland, but that any country might in the same manner infringe upon the property rights of Germans anywhere overseas without reparation. The affairs stirred up the people to a keen realization of the need of actual annexation in order to secure adequate protection; even "the enemies of colonialism began to debate the question favorably."⁵

Fiji, however, was not the only spot in the South Seas which could cause German feeling to run high and national

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 188.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 190. *Vide*, also, Herrfurth, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-22.

⁵ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 145.

and patriotic passions to become inflamed under the careful guidance of the Chancellor. On November 27, 1882, the *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung* published an article by Emil Deckert, advising the Government to annex and colonize New Guinea.¹ The *Sydney Morning Herald* copied the article and succeeded in arousing a strong anti-German feeling in Australia.² The Australian press demanded that England annex New Guinea. The excitement became so intense that the Governor of Queensland overstepped his authority in his zeal and took it upon himself to occupy a section of New Guinea in the name of Great Britain on April 4, 1883. The British Colonial Office speedily repudiated the act and intimated that it could not be responsible financially for such an occupation and that the Australian colonies would have to bear the burden of expense. The Australian colonies consequently adopted a sort of Monroe Doctrine for the South Seas, which was contained in the resolutions passed at the Inter-Colonial Convention held in Sydney, December 3, 1883. One resolution proposed the formation of an Australian League; another favored the annexation of New Guinea and the neighboring islands not held by the Dutch; and finally, a third opposed the annexation by a foreign Power of any land in the South Seas below the equator.³ Consul Krauel of Sydney and Consul Struebel of Apia, as well as interested business firms, duly reported to Bismarck the news of Australia's aggressive imperialism. Consul Struebel also prepared a long report urging the official protection of labor transportation to the German plantations in Samoa by specially appointed officers supported by warships. He said: "It is a question not only of providing labor for the German plan-

¹ *Augsburg Allg. Zt.*, Nov. 27, 1882.

² Cheradame, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

³ Koschitzky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 236.

tations but of winning almost half of the South Sea Islands' trade, as yet untouched, for Germany. We must either do it at once and take the wind out of England's sails or else lose it entirely."¹

Furthermore, Consul Hertsheim of Jaluit reported the situation in the South Seas to be more serious. He complained to the Chancellor of the trespassing and interference of the English labor ships, of the disturbance of German freedom of trade with the natives, and of the destruction of a German trade station on the Laughlan Islands by the English steamer *Stanley*.² Petitions and complaints from private business firms increased the urgent need of official action.

In response to all these reports, Bismarck assumed a firm stand towards England. On January 5, 1884, he demanded reparation for the damage wrought by the S. S. *Stanley*, and on April 5, 1884, he claimed compensation for other injuries inflicted by the destruction of a German trading post at Nufa and of a Hamburg schooner. He further emphasized these claims by sending the warship *Hyane* to the scene of trouble.³ Altogether, his immediate, active response to the consular reports dealing with Germany's threatened commercial interests, as well as his unyielding and aggressive attitude towards England, could not fail to have an effect in winning approval throughout the country and in thus creating a far more sympathetic mood for the launching of an official colonial policy.

It was in relation to African affairs, however, that the Chancellor pushed his policy to a climax; a climax, which in conjunction with the conditions in the South Seas, created an international crisis and caused an outburst of patriotic

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 75-76.

² *Weissbuch*, 1885, pt. i, pp. 131-150.

³ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 76.

and national enthusiasm powerful enough to launch a state-directed colonialism. Fortunately for the success of Bismarck's plans, England's policy could easily be made to appear as monopolistic and selfish in Africa as in the South Seas, a fact which was most effective in influencing the German mind, for during the early eighties explorers were directing the eyes of all nations towards Africa as the continent which alone afforded great stretches of territory still unclaimed.

We have already noted one instance of England's exclusive tendency in Africa, her Convention with France of June 1882, which aroused such resentment in German trading circles and afforded Bismarck an opportunity to assist directly the Hanse merchants.¹ In line with the Anglo-French Convention, England concluded on February 26, 1884, the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty,² which established a monopolistic control of the Congo River. This treaty met with bitter and outspoken antagonism from German business interests. The Boards of Trade of Hamburg, Solingen, Bremen and Mannheim sent protests to the Government, and the firms in Loanda dispatched representatives to Berlin in order to plead their cause.³ The Society for German Colonization and the German-African Society protested vehemently against the proposed customs duties in favor of Portugal and England and against the Anglo-Portuguese Commission on Navigation.⁴ Patriotic excitement spread throughout Germany and an enraged public sentiment arose against England. To the popular mind, England appeared to wish to monopolize the control of all

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 158.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 432.

³ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁴ *Kolonialgesellschaft*, pp. 36-37.

affairs in Africa. The Chancellor cleverly nursed the national resentment and turned it to his own account. He sent a protest against the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty to Portugal, April 18, 1884;¹ he repudiated any intention of accepting its terms; and, at the same time, he instructed his ambassador in Paris to approach France with a proposal to unite the commercial interests of France and Germany in the Congo against England.² On April 24, 1884, he received a response wherein France promised her full support.³ France's coöperation in maintaining the principle of equality of trade in the Congo finally led to the calling of the Congo Conference on November 15, 1884. Thus Bismarck attempted to isolate England so far as her colonial aims in Africa were concerned; and he thereby encouraged and increased the growing anti-English sentiment already very prevalent in Germany.

Finally, to cap the climax, England's procrastination and pusillanimity in regard to her Southwest African claims supplied the Chancellor with an opportunity to crown his work with success. The story of England's and Germany's counter claims to Southwest Africa will bear repetition here in order to demonstrate Bismarck's subtlety, precaution and skill in cultivating anti-English sentiment and securing a public opinion in Germany favorable to a colonial policy. Shortly after Lüderitz had applied for imperial protection in November, 1882, Bismarck had addressed a note to England on the subject (February 4, 1883). He couched it in very courteous terms and asked if England exercised any authority over the Angra-Pequena region. "If not, Germany intends to afford to her subjects in that region the

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 473-474.

² *Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft*, p. 32-33.

³ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 474.

protection which they need.”¹ The note conveyed the impression, however, confirmed later by Secretary Pouncefote’s minute of his conversation with Count Herbert Bismarck on the subject, that Germany “had not the least design of establishing a foothold in Southwest Africa,” and would prefer to leave the responsibility of protection to England.²

England replied to the note on February 23, 1883, that, “the Cape Colony Government has certain establishments along the coast, but without more precise information as to the exact location of Lüderitz’s factory, it is impossible for the British Government to say whether it could afford this protection in case of need.”³

The reply was extremely evasive; and it appeared all the more so, since England had already declared that this part of the coast was outside her jurisdiction. Indeed, when Bismarck had asked the British Government, on November 4, 1880, to extend its protection to German missionaries in this region on an occasion of a native war, England had replied (November 29, 1880), “The British Government cannot accept responsibility for anything occurring outside of British territory, which includes only Whale Bay and its immediate region.”⁴

England had further confirmed her attitude, in regard to the district, by instructions to the Governor of Cape Colony to consider the Orange River as the boundary to England’s territory; and he, in consequence, had refused to afford any protection to the missionaries settled beyond the river.

All this former correspondence, which had definitely de-

¹ *Weissbuch*, pt. i, p. 78.

² *British Sessional Papers*, 1884-1885, vol. lvi, p. 100.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁴ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 10.

limited England's claims, had really made Bismarck's inquiries of 1883 superfluous, as he himself admitted; and it also indicated that the Chancellor had made such polite inquiries merely from the motive of wishing to maintain Germany scrupulously in the right, should a complication with England arise, and of desiring to quiet any suspicion in England of Germany's actual plans. The Chancellor also clearly realized that his note might incite England to take active measures to block Germany; indeed it caused him no regret when she did so almost immediately.

England proceeded to employ the time gained by her vague reply to Germany of February 23, 1883, by attempting to make the Cape Government assert its claim to the territory beyond the Orange River.¹ Bismarck also improved the time, as we have already seen, by granting to Lüderitz so definite a promise of imperial protection that he felt warranted in seizing the harbor of Angra-Pequena and the surrounding districts in April, 1883.

Fortified by the news of Lüderitz's definite settlements in Africa, the Chancellor realized that, because of his precaution and diplomacy, he had the best of England, whatever she did. He, therefore, sent the peremptory note of November 12, 1883, asking once more if England claimed sovereignty over the bay of Angra-Pequena.² England vouchsafed no immediate reply; and Lüderitz, certain of imperial support, was accordingly emboldened to announce publicly his acquisition (November 20, 1883) of a strip of coast extending from the Orange River to 26° south latitude and twenty miles inland.³ England, aroused by Germany's

¹ *British Sessional Papers, Correspondence*, vol. lv, nos. 16, 17, 21, 24 et seq.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 11.

³ *Ibid.* Vide also, *British Sessional Papers*, 1884-1885, vol. lvi, pp. 91-95.

action, immediately sent a note (November 22, 1883) stating, "that, although Her Majesty's Government has not proclaimed the Queen's sovereignty along the whole coast, but only at certain points, such as Whale Bay and Angra-Pequena Island, it considers that any claim for sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign Power between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction, 18° south latitude, and the frontier of Cape Colony would infringe upon its legitimate rights."¹

England was now in exactly the position where Bismarck wished her to be, with respect to public opinion in Germany. To patriotic Germans she was the dog-in-the-manger. Bismarck's reply of December 31, 1883, demanded by what right or title England could claim sovereignty over a territory formerly considered independent; and his note revealed a tone hitherto lacking in his communications.² He was sure of his ground and could afford to be defiant. Moreover, the German people now wanted him to be defiant, was Germany not the injured nation, in more respects than one? We need only to remember, in order to appreciate the full force of the Chancellor's diplomacy at this point, that its harsh tone synchronized with his ultimatum upon the Fijian claims and with his promise of vigorous action in the South Seas.³ The cumulative effect of these clashes with England was tremendous in Germany.

Indeed, from December, 1883, the thermometer of popular indignation and national chauvinism steadily and rapidly rose until in April, 1884, it finally indicated a state of feverish excitement. For England sent no reply to the note of December 31, 1883, and her procrastination aroused in Germany a resentful hatred—a hatred augmented by articles

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 10.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³ *Cf. supra*, pp. 161, 163.

in the official press,¹ by the Chancellor's attitude towards Great Britain's aggressive interference with German trade in the South Seas, and by the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of February, 1884. Bismarck realized that the crisis had arrived. He at once took advantage of the state of the popular mind and by the telegram of April 24, 1884,² officially proclaimed Lüderitz's settlements in Southwest Africa under the direct protection of the empire. With a bold stroke, the Chancellor had thus inaugurated a state-directed colonialism for Germany.

The telegram of April 24, 1884, carried no national sanction, except by implication. However, it would seem that, had Bismarck not been convinced his action would receive ratification and already possessed the hearty approval of a large majority of the German people, he would never have dared to take it, any more than he would have dared to carry through the Samoan Subsidy Bill in 1880 without support. The consciousness of an entire change in the national mind, with which he had kept himself so closely in touch, would seem to have sustained him in his bold and independent policy. Nevertheless, state-directed colonialism could not be termed an official imperial policy until it had received national ratification. To that final stage of the development of the colonial movement, during its period, of origin, the last chapter is devoted.

¹ *Annales de l'école libre etc.*, January, 1888, *loc. cit.*, p. 2; *Kölnische Zt.*, Sept. 1883, nos. 9, 10, 11, 12 (Fabri).

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 13.

CHAPTER VIII

NATIONAL INAUGURATION OF COLONIALISM

THE effort to secure national ratification of state-directed colonialism covered the entire year from April, 1884, to March, 1885. It was primarily a political struggle carried on in the *Reichstag* and in the country by the forces of the Government and the colonialists, now openly united. Unlike the preceding phase of the movement, the Government this time took the lead. The battle was bitterly contested; and the distinctly limited colonial program adopted in 1885 reflected the incompleteness of the victory.

The central issue of the parliamentary struggle was the Steamship Subsidy Bill. This bill had had a long history. The plan for a steamship line to the East first came to Bismarck's attention as early as 1876.¹ He had not promoted it, however, until 1881,² when he aired it in the official press, requested the imperial representative in Hamburg to test opinion there about it, and made it a subject of correspondence with Mosle.³ Thwarted by the *Reichstag's* rejection of his memorial on the subject in May, 1881, he had temporarily abandoned the whole scheme, but he revived it in 1884, encouraged by the same stimulus of popular support which had impelled him to send the telegram to Lüderitz. On March 23, 1884, Bismarck asked the Kaiser's permission to present the project.⁴ He introduced it into the *Bundesrat* on April 23, and into the *Reichstag* on May 23.

¹ Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. iii, p. xxix.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 155.

³ Poschinger, *Volkswirtschaftliche Aktenstücke*, p. 42.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

The Steamship Subsidy Bill provided for : (1) steamship connections with eastern Asia through a main line to Hong Kong by way of Rotterdam, Antwerp, Naples, Port Said, Suez, Aden, Colombo and Singapore and through a branch line between Hong Kong and Yokohama by way of Shanghai and Korea; and (2) connections with Australia through a main line to Sydney, by way of Naples, Port Said, Suez, Aden, Adelaide, and Melbourne, and through a branch line from Sydney to Tonga and Samoa. The Government was to subsidize these lines for fifteen years with the sum of 4,000,000 M. annually.¹

It was pointed out by the Government that Germany possessed at the time only ten steamship lines to America, a freight line to East Africa, the Sloman line to East Africa, and the Woermann line to West Africa, all supported entirely by private means, except that the Government paid 300,000 M. annually for mail service and that the eastern trade was not great enough to support steamship lines without state aid.

The struggle over the bill began on June 23, 1884, in the session of the Budget Commission to which the whole matter had been referred after its first reading in the *Reichstag* on June 14. So important did the Chancellor consider the issue that he personally appeared in a *Reichstag* committee for the first time since 1871. In answer to Hammacher's question whether the bill was connected with foreign policy, he replied that it stood in direct relation to it. He said, "The verdict which the *Reichstag* pronounces on the Steamship Subsidy Bill will be decisive for the colonial policy of the Government. The *Reichstag's* decision was against the Samoan Subsidy Bill and opposed to the wishes of the administration. Hence the Government has for a long time been thwarted."²

¹ *Anlagen des Deut. Reichstages*, 1884, *Aktenstück* no. III.

² Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. ii, p. 183. Account of session of Budget Commission, June 23, 1884.

Thus the Chancellor himself threw down the gauntlet; he clearly defined the issue. The bill was to constitute a test-case, just as the Samoa Subsidy Bill had done; but, this time, the national vote would signify either the rejection or the confirmation of an imperial state colonialism already adopted, instead of one merely proposed.

From the outset, Bismarck appeared to be justified in his statement that, "It seems very likely that this first attempt since the Samoan affair to promote the overseas interests of the empire will meet with the favor of the *Reichstag*. The notes and telegrams expressing approval which are received almost daily from circles which I had no idea possessed such a lively interest in the matter, bear witness to the fact."¹

The first organization to rush publicly to the Chancellor's aid was, of course, the *Kolonialverein*. On April 26, 1884, it passed a resolution approving the change of policy on the part of the Government which the Steamship Subsidy Bill indicated. Bismarck thanked the Society in a letter of May 4, 1884, saying, "Even though I can hardly count on an immediate success for this present bill when I remember the Samoan affair and consider the prevailing tendencies in the *Reichstag*, still I consider it the duty of my administration to endeavor to promote the national welfare in spite of the hostile attitude of the present *Reichstag*."²

Thus the hitherto silent partners, the administration and the *Kolonialverein*, openly acknowledged their close co-operation. Bismarck showed by the tone of the above letter what a tower of strength and support he expected the *Kolonialverein* to be to him in his fight with the refractory assembly. And indeed it proved so to be. It adopted further resolutions on June 28, 1884, thanking the Chan-

¹ Poschinger, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 183.

² *Die Kolonialzeitung*, 1884, vol. xi, p. 213.

cellor for his famous colonial speeches of June 26. and urging all to work for the success of the bill. The Society held a monster General Convention at Eisenach, on September 21, 1884, which overwhelmingly indorsed the new policy of the Government and attempted to raise the whole issue above party politics to the national and patriotic sphere. The more the *Reichstag* blocked the Subsidy Bill, the longer grew the membership roll of the *Kolonialverein*.

Other organizations, likewise, rallied strongly to the support of the Government, among them the powerful Central Association for Commercial Geography. Bahse, speaking at its meeting on May 8, 1884, said, "Trade has failed to keep pace with industry. . . . The hesitation of the Government in the Samoan affair played into the hands of England. . . ."

Politically, the Chancellor received expressions of support not only from his allies in the *Reichstag*, the Conservatives and National Liberals, but also from groups throughout the country. Special committees of Conservatives and National Liberals formed to discuss the colonial issue; the second Chamber of Baden passed a resolution on April 28, 1884, urging the Government to adopt a definite colonial policy;¹ special petitions and resolutions came from the National Liberal Committee in Wiesbaden, from the Hessian Progressive Committee in Darmstadt, and from the *Deutsch-Freisinnige* Committee in Würzburg; while Dr. Stephan, the Imperial Postmaster General, produced any number of petitions in the *Reichstag* on June 14, when he introduced the Subsidy Bill and stated, "The press of almost all parties greets the project with favor, even the *Demokratische Correspondenz*."²

¹ *Die Deutsche Kolonialzeitung*, 1884, p. 194.

² *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 14, 1884, pp. 720 et seq.

Most of the promises of support came naturally from the industrial and commercial world. The Society of German Jute Makers sent a letter to Bismarck on his birthday thanking him for his economic policies since 1879;¹ the citizens of Dortmund, the helmet makers of Düsseldorf, the ship-builders of Hamburg, and many Chambers of Commerce, all committed themselves to the new policy in writing.² In a telegram thanking the Dresden Chamber of Commerce, Bismarck said on June 28, 1884, "Other information from all parts of Germany confirms my opinion that our people follow the lead of their own hearts and minds when it is a question of the empire's political and economic strength."³

The Government could count on the support of all the Conservatives, of most of the National Liberals, and of groups of Progressives and *Deutsch-Freisinnige*—all who were interested from a business standpoint—commercial colonialists, many industrials and merchants. It is not strange, then, that Bismarck assumed the tone revealed in his replies to the *Kolonialverein* and the Dresden Chamber of Commerce.

The other factor in the contest, the Opposition, remains to be estimated. Bamberger and Richter of the *Deutsch-Freisinnige Partei* appeared as the leaders of the doctrinaire group. They based their objections upon the same ground as that taken in the Samoan affair, namely, that the proposed steamship lines represented mercantile interests which in turn concealed colonial aims. Bamberger cited the fact that Postmaster General Stephan definitely stated in presenting the bill that it had no connection whatever with the colonial

¹ Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. ii, p. 184, quoting *Die Post*, 1884, nos. 178, 184, 186.

² *Ibid.*, 1884, nos. 172, 343, 347.

³ Poschinger, *Aktenstücke*, p. 154.

policy, whereas, Bismarck, when cornered in the Budget Commission, admitted the close relation of the two and outlined a program of expansion.¹ They accused the Chancellor of misrepresenting his plans and his foreign policy and of failing to admit earlier the connection of subsidy bills with overseas expansion. They harped upon the danger of friction with foreign Powers and illustrated the foolishness and futility of overseas possessions by references to the experiences of other countries. In all these arguments they were supported by the Socialists who, of course, held similar doctrine, party convictions.

A far more serious aspect of the Opposition, however, was its partisan character. A party spirit apparently actuated the Radicals as much if not more than their liberal doctrines—a spirit of revenge and hatred of Bismarck and all his new policies, as well as of determination to contest his absolute control of foreign affairs. The same feeling of animosity attracted to the Radical Opposition all dissident elements, who merely seized the Subsidy Bill as something tangible upon which to fasten their antagonism to the Government. Prominent among them was the Centre party, led by Windthorst, Bismarck's bitter enemy. Although the Centre party theoretically and practically believed in a moderate colonialism, it was still smarting from the *Kulturkampf*; always posing as the party of economy, it resented the great expenditure required by the bill; it was becoming aroused by the proposed anti-Polish policy; and finally, under Windthorst's influence, it could not afford to lose this unparalleled opportunity to combat the Chancellor. Hence, the Catholic party sacrificed conviction to partisanship and joined forces with the Radicals. As the Centre held the balance in the *Reichstag* in 1884-1885 and could determine any issue by combining with the Right or the Left, it created a serious problem for the Government.

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 26, 1884, p. 1064.

The Clerical-Radical Opposition employed two methods against the Government. First, it revived the practice, in which the Radicals had acquired considerable technique in the Samoan affair, of "throwing mud" at their opponents. Richter condemned all who favored the bill as being financially interested in it. Bamberger accused von Küsserow of a direct business connection between the proposed subsidy and the recent purchase by a Berlin banking house of the shares of the *Samoa-Handels und Plantagen Gesellschaft* in the hands of Baring Brothers of London. He also pointed out that the recent formation of a *Consortium* to buy land in New Guinea was coincident with the proposal of the government subsidy for a South Pacific Steamship Line and that von Hanseemann, director of the *Diskonto Company*, and Ohlendorf, owner of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, were its promoters. "If these connections between the business interests and the Government really exist," said Bamberger, "the Subsidy Bill will appear in a clearer light, for then it will merely mean an additional support for the Samoan Company." Bamberger called upon von Küsserow to explain the situation if he could. A personal quarrel arose and a duel became imminent, but the principals settled the matter without recourse to such violent means.¹

In the second place, the Radical-Clerical Opposition used "obstruction tactics" and carried them likewise to great extremes. It prevented the second reading of the Steamship Subsidy Bill on June 14, 1884, and had the bill referred to the Budget Commission. Whereupon Windthorst, the chairman, on June 23, postponed the next sitting of the Budget Commission to June 27. The postponement precluded any further discussion of the bill, since the *Reichstag* session

¹ Poschinger, "Der Konflikt Küsserow-Bamberger," *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, etc.*, May, 1908, p. 363.

terminated on June 28, and thus afforded an opportunity to the hostile forces to strengthen themselves for the combat at the next session of the *Reichstag* in the autumn. The new *Reichstag*, elected on October 28, 1884, exhibited little appreciable change in the balance of the parties; although whatever variation did occur was favorable to the Government in relation to the colonial issue.

	Conserv.	D. Conserv.	Centre	Nat. Libs.	Deut. Freisinnige	Socialist
1881.....	50	28	99	45	114	12
1884.....	78	30	100	50	74	24 ¹

The figures show that the Radicals suffered a heavy loss, in spite of the one hundred per cent gain of the Socialists. The election gave Bismarck two more colonialists as supporters, one of whom was Woermann, the powerful National Liberal merchant. The Centre, however, maintained its commanding position and hence the political situation remained unchanged. When the new *Reichstag* met, therefore, its disposition, as determined by the same Clerical-Radical majority, was for war against the Chancellor. Bismarck was further handicapped by the necessity of presenting a huge budget which showed a large deficit and which naturally provided the Opposition with a weapon against him. Again the Radical-Clericals succeeded, upon the first reading of the new Subsidy Bill, in having it referred to the Budget Commission. The Commission consisted of six Centrists, four *Freisinnige*, two Socialists, three National Liberals, four Conservatives, and two *Deutsch* Conservatives, a majority of twelve to nine against the bill, which meant its certain death.¹ Moreover, the opponents decided upon a general obstruction policy further to embarrass the Chancellor. They blocked every measure pro-

¹ Rehm, *Deutschlands Politische Parteien* (Jena, 1912), p. 85.

² *Europäische Geschichtskalender*, 1884, p. 130.

posed by him and created, in the autumn of 1884, an absolute parliamentary deadlock.

Such was the character of the Opposition which Bismarck had to face: the doctrinaire Liberal-Radicals, plus all cautious citizens who traditionally opposed expense, risk and any departure from the beaten path, and the far more dangerous parliamentary and partisan enemies represented by the Clerical-Radical majority, supplemented by discontented and dissident nationalist groups who were traditional foes of the Chancellor. Indeed, the situation presented a splendid opportunity for the Chancellor to display his best powers; and he rose to the occasion with his characteristic cleverness.

We can distinguish three definite stratagems in Bismarck's campaign, diligently and untiringly waged against the parliamentary Opposition, from April, 1884, to March, 1885. In the first place, the Chancellor and the colonial party proceeded with startling rapidity to execute plans of colonial settlement. They wished to be able to point to a colonial empire already in the making. On May 19, 1884, Bismarck sent official orders to Dr. Nachtigal, whom he had already appointed Consul to the West Coast of Africa (April 17, 1884), to place certain districts under imperial protection, namely, Angra-Pequena with an extension of its original boundaries, the strip between the Niger Delta and Gabun, especially that part opposite the Island of Fernando Po in Biafra Bay, and Little Popo in Togoland.¹ Dr. Nachtigal obeyed the orders with the utmost speed and Bismarck announced on October 13, 1884, that the districts named were under German protection.² On October 1, the Chancellor appointed Dr. Rohlfs, Consul for East Africa, and extended imperial protection, on February 7, 1885, to all lands acquired by the Society for German Colonization.³ The Gov-

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 163-165.

ernment also made an unsuccessful effort to secure through diplomacy the Island of Fernando Po from Spain. In the South Seas, activity was even more strenuous. On May 13, a German *Consortium*, founded in Hamburg, bought the shares of the *Samoa Handels und Plantagen Gesellschaft*, until then in English possession, and established an Overseas Bank.¹ On August 20, the Chancellor notified Bleichröder and von Hanseemann that all their settlements would be placed under the same imperial protection as that afforded Southwest Africa, as soon as they should be freed from the claims of other powers.² And on December 23, 1884, Bismarck notified the Powers that German imperial protection had been extended to settlements on the North Coast of the New Britain archipelago.³ Thus the nucleus of a very respectable colonial empire was acquired in an astonishingly brief space of time. The actual existence of such an embryonic overseas Germany proved a potent weapon in the Chancellor's hand when it came to his final struggle with his refractory, obstructionist *Reichstag*.

The vigorous prosecution of overseas expansion required some explanation from the Government. In fact the Opposition vehemently demanded such a statement of purpose and plan at the very outset. The manner in which Bismarck responded to the demand constitutes his second stratagem in defeating the parliamentary Opposition. He diplomatically presented his program bit by bit. He gradually evolved it throughout the year and he did not attempt to force through an inflexible, determined policy, which would have afforded opportunity for greater resistance and would have jeopardized his entire plan. The Chancellor anticipated that he

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 77.

² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

would be called upon to define and delimit the new colonial policy as soon as it was launched and consequently he gave the matter careful attention. He instructed von Küsserow to draw up a program for colonization, and that official duly presented one to the Chancellor on April 8, 1884. Von Küsserow's plan provided for the extension of the same governmental protection to the commercial colonialists as was implied by the Royal Charters of England, but not for the acquisition of territory directly by the state. It left all responsibility to the merchants and involved for the empire "no expense except for warships and consuls."¹ On April 28, 1884, Bismarck elaborated von Küsserow's scheme at a meeting of merchants attended by von Küsserow, Woermann, Dyes of Bremen, and Lüderitz. The Chancellor summed up his opinion as follows: "The German Empire cannot carry on a system of colonization like France's. It cannot send out warships to conquer overseas lands, that is, it will not take the initiative; but it will protect the German merchant *even in the land which he acquires*. Germany will do what England has always done, establish Chartered Companies, *so that the responsibility entirely rests with them*."²

The definition and limitation of Germany's new policy laid down by the Chancellor, in close cooperation with the commercial colonialists, first found public expression when the Chancellor expounded it in the Budget Commission on June 23, 1884.³ And on June 26, in the *Reichstag*, Bismarck skilfully met the objections of Richter that a colonial policy would involve expense and naval power and would precipitate wars, by falling back upon his apparently cautious and un-

¹ Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

² Herrfurth, "Bismarck als Kolonialpolitiker," *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik etc.*, 1909, p. 736.

³ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 42.

ambitious program which repudiated all conscious creation of colonies: "I would follow the example of England in granting to these merchants something like Royal Charters. . . . I do not wish to found provinces, but to protect commercial establishments in their own development. . . . We hope that the tree will flourish in proportion to the activity of the gardener, but if it does not, the whole responsibility rests with him and not with the empire, which will lose *nothing*."¹

The Chancellor made his task of dealing with the Opposition much easier by adopting a limited colonial program at the very outset, rather than by insisting upon the immediate imperial annexation of territory. Very likely also, at this stage, Bismarck was convinced of the unwisdom, from an international viewpoint, of embarking at once upon any vigorous policy. There are many indications, however, that as the struggle progressed, and as he grew more and more confident of ultimate success in winning national support, he expanded his first unpretentious and unassuming plan. Early in 1885, we find him no longer talking merely about the empire's duty to protect commercial settlements, with all responsibility relegated to merchants, but about the value of colonies for their own sake. Indeed, he began to stress their economic aspect and he prophesied the greatest national benefit therefrom. He thought that Germany should be made economically independent. "Colonies would mean the winning of new markets for German industry, the expansion of trade, and a new field for German activity, civilization and capital,"² he said, and also, "Consider what it would mean if part of the cotton and the coffee which we must

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 24.

² *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, March 16, 1885, p. 1864. *Vide*, also, *ibid.*, January 10, 1885, p. 524, and June 26, 1884, p. 1073.

import could be grown on German territory overseas. Would that not bring an increase of national wealth?"¹

To sum up, Bismarck never set forth a complete and exact colonial program but administered it in homeopathic doses. As he himself remarked, "We have not evolved a fully developed colonial system, which like Minerva sprang from the head of Jove and appeared full grown at once, but we have allowed it to develop and shape itself." The Chancellor preferred to present a flexible program which, on the one hand, would be vague and elastic enough to escape the explicit criticism of the Opposition, and, on the other, would be susceptible to change and addition as opportunity offered. As Fabri expressed it, "Bismarck limited his program of colonial policy to individual experiments without any initiative on the part of the government. This quieted suspicion and criticism and the responsibility appeared much less."²

Nevertheless, despite the rapidity of achievement in actually establishing a colonial empire and the dexterity with which he introduced a colonial program, Bismarck found himself well nigh hopelessly blocked by the Parliamentary Opposition. One more way of overcoming his enemies remained—that of inciting a national patriotic enthusiasm for colonies, an enthusiasm great enough to submerge their objections; and to this never failing stratagem the Chancellor finally had recourse. He was, as we have already seen, a consummate master in swaying popular sentiment and he now put forth his best efforts. His plan was to stir up German ire against England for her attempts to block Germany in the colonial field. Thus he would win to his side and to the side of German colonization all his patriotic

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, March 13, 1885, pp. 1800 et seq.

² Fabri, *Fünf Jahre Deutscher Kolonialpolitik* (Gotha, 1889), p. 15.

countrymen, while he would be able to brand the Opposition as unpatriotic and pro-British. Moreover, so great was the pressing need of winning popular support against the *Reichstag* that he no longer felt the necessity of following that path of impeccable scrupulousness which he had hitherto pursued in his dealings with England. He would stoop to sharp practices to gain his ends. He attempted both to exclude Great Britain from various colonial areas, and, at the same time, to delude his own nation with the idea that Great Britain was monopolistically crowding Germany out of those very districts.

The Chancellor began his campaign by reciting in the Budget Commission, on June 23, 1884, the whole story of England's shabby treatment of Germany in the Angra Pequena affair; he pointed out that England had never replied to his note of December, 1883, and had only just recognized on the previous day (June 22) Germany's claims in Southwest Africa.¹ The recital was an attempt to arouse sympathy for his policy from the Opposition, but it failed completely. The Chancellor, enraged by the stubborn partisan animosity of his opponents, openly declared war. "I am diplomat enough to understand this policy of obstruction and I do not say 'Good-bye' to the Subsidy Bill, but only '*Auf Wiedersehn*'."² . . . The administration will employ the interval before the next session in securing the approval of the new *Reichstag* for the bill."³

In executing his threat Bismarck strained every nerve to influence public opinion, and left no stone unturned in order to outstrip England in the colonial game, as well as to stir up feeling against her in Germany. In fact, he anticipated this

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 168, note 2.

² *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 26, 1884, p. 1062.

³ Poschinger, *Bismarck als Volkswirt*, vol. ii, p. 188, letter to Chamber of Commerce at Freiburg.

policy in April when he sent forth Dr. Nachtigal with instructions to place under imperial protection the territory in West Africa. At the same time he notified England that, "Nachtigal goes to Africa merely to verify information about the state of German commerce in that region,"¹ although the *Kölnische Zeitung* made no secret of announcing his purpose of annexation, confirmed later by the German protectorate which was formally established in West Africa in July. Again, as if to secure allies for Germany at Cape Colony, the Chancellor arranged a Convention between Germany and the Transvaal. He also received delegates from the Transvaal at Berlin on July 8, 1884, gave them a special audience with the Emperor and fêted and petted them so as to imbue them with a preference for German *Kultur* and a fear of Great Britain's monopolistic designs.² Likewise in the South Seas, Bismarck, on the one hand, openly sought and gained the cooperation of England in securing a joint commission to settle the extension of either nation's claims in New Guinea,³ while, on the other hand, he secretly promised imperial protection to lands acquired by the New Guinea Company and even, on August 19, suggested the raising of the German flag over areas in New Britain and New Guinea.⁴ In reply, England, urged on by the incessant demands of her Australian colonies, who were always in terror of German expansion, annexed New Guinea on September 19, with the exception of a part of the North Coast. Bismarck's protest that England's act was contrary to the agreement, forced Lord Granville, on October 2, to limit the English annexation to the South Coast, "if all other claims are left

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 24.

² *Annual Register*, 1884, p. 299.

³ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 80, 81.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

to negotiation." Bismarck interpreting this stipulation to read, "Germany could make acquisitions but England was debarred therefrom," proceeded to appropriate officially the North Coast of New Guinea and the islands in the New Britain archipelago.

Furthermore, the Chancellor directed his foreign policy with the purpose of arousing national animosity against England: he isolated her in her Egyptian schemes by drawing closer and closer to France. He had already forged a link with France by their *rapprochement* on the Congo question. The despatch which he prepared on May 5, 1884, for transmission to England, proves that his policy was deliberate: he stated therein that England could be very useful in helping Germany in her new colonial policy, in return for which service, Germany would support England in Egypt; but, on the other hand, if England's help should prove unsatisfactory or insufficient, he would approach France.¹ The despatch, though never sent, was remarkable as showing the importance which the Chancellor attached to his colonial policy. Bismarck evidently deemed it more profitable, in view of England's unfavorable attitude in Africa, to associate himself with France and to use England as a red rag to incite German public opinion in favor of colonies. In pursuance of this policy, therefore, he pushed the plans for the calling of an International Congress; and many notes on the subject passed between Germany and France indicating an harmonious understanding between them. Finally, on October 2, 1884, France notified Germany of her complete agreement with the latter's arrangements and the German Government issued the invitations for the Congo Congress, on October 6, 1884.

When the new *Reichstag* opened in November, 1884, Bismarck apparently felt very confident of the success of

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 88.

his summer's efforts in shaping public opinion; he amended the Steamship Subsidy Bill by adding another line to Africa, which would raise the annual state subsidy from 4,000,000 M. to 5,400,000 M., and he publicly indicted the Clerical-Radical majority for hindering national progress.

The Opposition, all along, had placed themselves in that extremely disadvantageous position where they could be assailed as unpatriotic. Bismarck had branded them as cowards in June, when they had argued that a colonial policy would precipitate a war with the Great Powers. Referring to Bamberger's speech, at that time, Bismarck had said, "His entire argument bore the stamp of submission if not of cowardice towards Europe, and the words of the Chancellor in 1866 'that fear found no echo in German hearts' would no longer find any response in these political factions."¹

Bismarck did not spare the factions in any way but strove to arouse the indignation of the whole nation against them on the ground that they were trying to overthrow the Government and to control foreign policy contrary to the interests of national honor. He said in November, 1884: "You say you will not be coerced by the *Bundesrat*. I say that I will not be coerced by a *Reichstag* majority. Indeed I have never allowed myself to be coerced even by Europe. You are not the first who have tried it. . . . Your parties are fighting for control in state and empire. We are in control of the Government for our Kaiser and you are attempting to overthrow us. . . . You do not oppose these bills because you disapprove of them, but because the Government is not in your hands. It will then be a battle for supremacy, one fighting for the Kaiser, another for ecclesiastical control, and another for himself."²

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, June 26, 1884.

² *Verhandlungen des Deut. Reichstages*, Nov. 26, pp. 32 et seq.

Naturally, the effect of this attack upon the Opposition was to aggravate their antagonism towards Bismarck. They decided to pay him back in his own coin. Hence they not only blocked the Subsidy Bill, but cut down the proposed appropriation for the exploration of Africa from 150,000 M. to 50,000 M. Their hostility was thorough-going and petty. They opposed the smallest measure favored by the Government; they rejected even an appropriation of 2700 M. for extra clerks in the Chancellor's office, and one of 20,000 M. for a second Director in the Foreign Office; and they defeated any increase of the consulate in Africa.¹ They made a fatal mistake, however, in carrying obstruction so far. In their contemptuous treatment of Bismarck, they gained for him the sympathy and support of an undoubted majority of the German people. Expressions of confidence began to pour in upon the Chancellor from all parts of the empire, accompanied by offers of personal subscriptions to the amount required to finance a second Director in the Foreign Office.

The Chancellor now realized as never before the force of public opinion which could transcend the *Reichstag*, and he resolved to rally every factor of it which he could muster to defeat his intolerable political opponents and force through his colonial policy. He perceived that he could count on the righteous indignation of those who, whatever opinions they might entertain on the value of a colonial policy, were unanimous in condemning the petty, irritating attacks against the "Founder of the Empire." Happily for Bismarck, coincident with the parliamentary deadlock, came the news, on December 23, that the German flag waved over parts of New Ireland, New Britain, and New Guinea. Moreover, the Congo Congress had commenced its sessions in Berlin on November 15, at Bismarck's invitation and under his guid-

¹ *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, 1884, pp. 135, 136.

ance, to discuss questions of international colonial policy, which, by implication at any rate, aligned Germany with the great national, colonizing Powers. Could the "Honor of the Fatherland" afford to permit its own and its Chancellor's prestige to be tarnished or the external influence of Germany to be jeopardized by the disgraceful repudiation of the national colonial policy in the *Reichstag*? No, the empire was entertaining prominent guests; it must discipline its refractory children into a semblance of family unity.

Fully appreciating the significance of all the elements in the situation which he had himself created Bismarck proceeded openly and directly to apply the torch of patriotic fire—anti-English sentiment. The Chancellor initiated an entirely new and unwonted policy for Germany; he published a series of *White Books*, all of which attempted to show the unjust treatment sustained by Germany at the hands of England. The first three books appeared during the height of the parliamentary crisis, on December 4, 12 and 13, and dealt respectively with the Congo District and Biafra Bay, Angra-Pequena and Samoa. To the German people, they not only showed the stupendous difficulties which Bismarck had encountered in his dealings with England, but also proved that England had been obliged to retreat before his superior diplomacy.¹

To supplement the effect of the *White Books*, events played into the Chancellor's hands at the beginning of the year 1885. The news then reached Germany that the first German blood had been shed for the cause of colonial rights, that disturbances had broken out between the natives and the Germans in Kamerun, and that King Old Bell Town and Hickory Town had been burnt on December 20.² The

¹ *Weissbuch*, 1885, pts. i, ii, iii.

² *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, 1884, p. 438.

Chancellor immediately seized the opportunity to accuse the English of inciting the natives against Germany, as a means of dislodging her from Kameroun. He produced not a particle of real proof to support his accusations. However, he presented as evidence a report which he claimed to have received on November 24, 1884, from the Hamburg Syndicate, complaining of the actions of representatives of the English firm of J. Holt and Company, and of Buchanan, the British Vice Consul, in stirring up the war.¹ Bismarck further supported the illusion of England's aggression by sending a note to England demanding Buchanan's dismissal² and by reviving the quarrel with England over the New Guinea question, since after Germany's annexations, announced on December 23, 1884, England had resumed her liberty of action and annexed what was left of New Guinea.³ Furthermore, the Chancellor personally attacked Malet, the English Ambassador in Berlin, for England's colonial greediness. Perhaps the report of their conversation will illuminate the situation and prove Bismarck's pre-determined plan to quarrel with England and thus to arouse national ill-will against her. In the report, Malet told how the Chancellor had accused England of unparalleled egotism in claiming all the territory in Africa which other powers had not appropriated, and how he had administered a severe rebuke, saying that he had the feeling that England was not treating Germany as an equal. He was so vehement in his charges that Malet begged him to state definitely what he wanted. Malet said: "Was it parts of New Guinea which we had annexed? Was it Zululand? I thought that a knowledge of his wishes, whatever they might be, would be better than

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, Jan. 10, 1885, pp. 525 et seq.

² Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 29.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

our acting in the dark and consequently colliding with each other. Bismarck replied, however, that his understanding with France placed it beyond his power to come to any such understanding with England, so long as England had *rejected his offer of cooperation of May 5, 1884.*"¹

The despatch of May 5, 1884, containing the offer of cooperation, had, as we have already learned, never been sent to England; it had been countermanded by Bismarck himself. As Gladstone said in the House of Commons, March 12, 1885: "I regret that the Chancellor Bismarck's despatch of May 5, 1884, was never sent. . . . If the despatch had been communicated to this country, it would have attracted all the attention and have received all the friendly consideration which it would well have deserved."²

Indeed, Bismarck lost all restraint in his quarrel with England. He published two more *White Books*, one on the South Seas, February 6, 1885, and one on Fiji, January 19, 1885;³ he attacked England in both the *Bundesrat* and the *Reichstag*, and he employed every means to discredit her colonial designs and to justify those of Germany. He was later forced to modify his position somewhat, because his attacks reacted against him. The Opposition cited his quarrel with England as an illustration of their major objection that a colonial policy would lead inevitably to friction with neighbor nations and surround Germany with enemies. He then attempted cleverly to shift the responsibility for Germany's ill treatment from the English Government to her agents and merchants; and he asserted, all the while that he was condemning her, that Great Britain and Germany were on the best of terms. "The colonial net of England

¹ Hahn-Wippermann, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 89. Cf., also, *supra*, p. 185.

² *Hansard*, vol. ccxcv, March 12, 1885, p. 978.

³ *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, January 19, February 6, 1885.

is so all-embracing that it is well nigh impossible for her to supervise the actions of all her agents.”¹ . . . “We are not surrounded by enemies. We are on good terms with Great Britain. But it is not to be wondered at that when her cousins, the land rats, take to the water, she is surprised, as she believes that ‘Britannia Rules the Waves.’”²

The Chancellor repeated to the National Assembly Gladstone’s remark, “If Germany becomes a colonial power, I wish her God-speed,” and then he commented, “Has Gladstone more love and understanding of the German nation than Windthorst?”³

Bismarck’s campaign of inciting German resentment against England could not fail to bear results. England, finally aroused to Germany’s real purposes and colonial plans, began to checkmate her in every direction and to frustrate all of her designs. Her actions succeeded in imparting a reality to the illusion of rivalry and competition so carefully created by the Chancellor. Indeed, after January 10, 1885, the tide of opposition in Germany began to turn. The elements of hostility to the Chancellor were forced to bend before the pressure of a popular indignation, raised to white heat by the patriotic fervor which swept the country. On January 10, the parliamentary Opposition began to weaken; it consented to an appropriation of 150,000 M. for ships to be placed at the disposal of the Governor of Kamerun; on January 23, it voted for the proposed sum for African exploration and on March 2, appropriated 150,000 M. for the extension of the consular service in the overseas territory.⁴ All parties except the Poles and the Democrats supported

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, Jan. 19, 1885, p. 525.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 532 et seq.

³ *Ibid.*, March 14, 1885, p. 1825.

⁴ *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, January 10, 23, March 2, 1885.

the Chancellor. Even the speakers of the Centre assured Bismarck that the majority of the *Reichstag* would never be found wanting when it was a question of defending the honor and prestige of the empire, and that the Catholic party would find it possible to agree thoroughly with the Chancellor's colonial plans if they provided for a well balanced and not a merely commercial colonial policy. These victories were interpreted as signs that a large majority of the people were in favor of colonization and all opposition was gradually withdrawn. On March 13, 1885, Bismarck made his famous patriotic speech wherein he stated that a new spirit was now actuating the German people, that he had at last found the "popular support" which he had demanded nine years before as indispensable to the execution of any colonial policy.¹

Finally, on March 23, 1885, the Steamship Subsidy Bill passed the *Reichstag* with a large majority. A part of the *Deutsch-Freisinnige* and the Centre, the Social Democrats and the Poles alone voted against it. Bismarck could well indulge on April 1, 1885, in a glorious celebration of his seventieth birthday and of the twentieth anniversary of his chancellorship. He received, as an added token of confidence, a gift of more than 2,000,000 M. from his devoted countrymen.

National inauguration of colonialism had been a difficult struggle. At last, the colonial party and the Government had triumphed. Concentration upon the passage of the Steamship Subsidy Bill had overthrown the Opposition; while the vigorous construction of a small colonial empire, the close cooperation of administration and merchants and the skillful promulgation of a colonial program had all united to achieve national ratification of state-directed colonialism.

¹ *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*, March 13, 1885, p. 1801.

Above everything else, in its ultimate effect, had been the fire of chauvinistic patriotism, so carefully prepared, lighted and kept alive by Bismarck; it had reduced the Opposition to silence or consent and had completely destroyed the last obstacles to the adoption of a national colonial policy.

CONCLUSION

OUR research has revealed the two dominating influences responsible for modern German colonialism—the economic class in Germany, and Bismarck.

Throughout the entire period, merchants and traders both pushed and led the movement; business interests and opportunities rendered circumstances conducive to its progress. The Hanse merchants first began commercial colonialism; they converted colonial theory into colonial practice. They alone brought sufficient pressure upon the Government to secure protection for overseas enterprises and they formed the colonial party, whose vanguard first proposed a national colonial policy during the debates over the Samoan treaty. Economic appeals and arguments were most potent in the mass of colonial propaganda which appeared in 1879. Business men acquired such power over the Government as to involve it financially in colonial enterprises that precipitated the crisis of 1880 and the subsequent publicity and discussion of the entire subject. Business men were the leading spirits in the formation of the *Kolonialverein* and promoted, above every other element, the struggle from 1881 to 1885. Moreover, economic forces created the crisis in the business world which demanded expansion for markets and capital; economic forces occasioned the huge emigration; they produced a social unrest that impelled the Chancellor to distract popular attention by overseas projects; and finally they influenced Bismarck to turn from free-trade to protection and decided his consequent espousal of the colonial cause.

As for Bismarck, himself, the study has attempted to contradict the prevailing opinion that the Chancellor opposed colonialism until 1883 and that he was then reluctantly forced into it by the efforts of the merchant class. He was, on the contrary, in hearty if cautious sympathy with the movement from the year 1876; and he grew more and more its advocate through the reversal of his economic policy from free-trade to protection. His attitude was wholly consonant with his final repudiation of liberalism and his return to conservatism in 1879. All the evidence, as we read it, clearly proves that when the Chancellor appeared to oppose colonialism he was merely applying the brakes as a diplomatic stratagem, that he was, at the same time, feeding fuel to the engine, and that he gave his whole-hearted, if secret, support to the movement from 1879 onwards. Bismarck's one over-ruling purpose and aim, it is true, was to establish the hegemony of Germany in Europe; but instead of colonialism clashing with that object, as it has been the custom to assert, it became essentially subordinated to it. After founding the empire, the Chancellor came to perceive that in order to secure and maintain a position of supremacy, Germany too must enter the new game of imperialistic colonialism. Without overseas expansion, Germany could not hope to compete with the other nations or attain her great ideal.

The study has further shown that the circumstances of its origins stamped modern German colonialism with its salient characteristics. Briefly, they were: the limitation at first of all colonial activity to individual initiative, the slow growth of administrative effort and control, not completely established until the year 1906, the enduring connection of the colonial question with political and partisan opposition, and, finally, the over-emphasis upon the economic motives for colonization which contributed to the excessive influence of

“big business” in national affairs and the resulting disastrous economic imperialism.

The first chapter of modern German colonialism closes with the year 1885. It leaves colonial policy in control of the dominating forces of its origin, the economic class supported by the Government. It thus forms a logical introduction to the second chapter, the period of the Commercial Companies, to whom Bismarck intrusted the foundation of the German colonial empire.

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
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